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Abstract
This thesis examines the role of agency costs in the context of takeover markets,
which leads to a better understanding of the functioning of the market for corporate
control and takeover likelihood. There has been considerable previous research on
the main topics considered here but using new methodologies and techniques, a
number of contributions to the literature are identified. The thesis contributes to
the literature by (1) reassessing bidding firm abnormal returns, (2) using takeover
likelihood to identify a detailed view of the market for corporate control with regards
to disciplinary targets on the basis of agency costs and agency costs of free cash flow.
In a sample of successful takeover announcements from UK bidders between 1995
and 2014, half of modelled events display ARCH effects. We apply the appropriate
GARCH models to correct market model parameters estimated during the market
model estimation period. We find that the standard market model overstates betas
when ARCH effects exist, in turn leading to an overstatement of negative Cumulative
Average Abnormal Return. Significant differences between the market model and
GARCH adjusted model are identified. Our results show agency costs to bidding
firms, consistent with previous studies. But returns must be somewhat upwards
corrected. These differences do not translate to significantly different coefficients in
CAR prediction models. Conclusions of such prediction models are thus unaffected
by GARCH adjustment.
The second empirical chapter tests whether agency costs predict takeover like-
lihood and if the takeover mechanism disciplines inefficient management. The ap-
proach is to identify candidates for disciplinary takeover on the basis of excess return
i
and Tobin’s Q from a sample of companies with primary listing in London between
1986 and 2016. When using the lowest decile for excess return to identify discip-
linary targets, takeover risk increased but little evidence was found to indicate that
fundamental agency cost indicators were related to takeover risk. The market was
more selective regarding companies in the lowest decile of Tobin’s Q. These com-
panies appear undervalued and, therefore, improved managerial efficiency is likely
to enhance company value.
In the third chapter, the disciplinary candidate identifier is adjusted to detect
agency costs of free cash flow. A set of company-year observations with high free cash
flows but where growth opportunities for investment of that cash were lacking, was
generated. Specifically, we required both Tobin’s Q to exceed, and free cash flow on
assets to fall below, industry-year cut-offs at the quartile and the median. However,
we only find limited evidence for such companies being disciplined in takeover mar-
kets. We did not observe strong evidence for companies’ ability to adjust takeover
likelihood by distributing cash to investors. These findings imply that agency costs
of free cash flow are regulated through means other than the market for corporate
control.
The findings presented in this thesis provide a set of implications for researchers,
practitioners, as well as regulators and policymakers. For researchers, the evidence in
this thesis suggests that ARCH effects should not be ignored when performing event
study methodology. When researching the market for corporate control, the cut-off
point for excess return and Tobin’s Q must be set relatively low for the classification
of the disciplinary set - in our study at around 10% to 20% of the sample. Regarding
agency costs of free cash flow, it is not sufficient to use low Tobin’s Q alone and
overlook free cash flows. For practitioners, the results on bidding firm abnormal
returns demonstrate that previous findings of long-term underperformance must be
somewhat upwardly corrected, even though our findings confirm previous studies
which show that UK acquisitions do not create value for acquirer shareholders.
Through the study of takeover likelihood, a well-functioning market for corporate
ii
control is observed in the UK. What is important is the display which companies are
likely to be disciplinary candidates. The evidence suggests that agency costs of free
cash flow are not a significant determinant of takeover likelihood in the UK market
for corporate control. For regulators, the main implication is that an open merger
policy is desirable if a functional market for corporate control is expected to protect
shareholders from agency costs.
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In a letter to the board of directors of ABN Amro N.V., dated February 2007, activist
investor The Children’s Investment Fund Management LLP demanded the search
for an acquirer or the breakup of the company with the main justification that the
market value did not reflect the value of underlying assets (Degorce 2007). In the
following acquisition contest, a Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS) led consortium
won the auction for ABN Amro at a price of €72bn. The acquisition would prove
fatal shortly after, as RBS had to first approach equity investors and subsequently
the UK government for funding a write-down of almost £6bn in non-performing
loans and to finance the ABN Amro acquisition at costs of approximately £20bn.
The UK government purchased new RBS shares at a total value of £25bn, leading
to a stake of 68% in the equity of RBS. Throughout the takeover RBS plc’s share
price fell from 600 Great British pence (GBp) in April 2007 to 15 GBp in January
2009; a return of -97.50% (Telegraph 2010). The UK government still holds 62%
of shares today (RBS plc 2018). The case is illustrative for the takeover likelihood
associated with low market value of assets and the disciplinary effect on management




This thesis aims to provide a better understanding of the functioning of the market
for corporate control. We adopt a strong agency cost perspective throughout as
we view the two concepts, agency costs and the market for corporate control, as
tightly connected. In our approach, the market for corporate control is examined
by investigating bidding firm abnormal returns and takeover likelihood, whereas the
most common method is to examine abnormal returns in target companies (Jensen
& Ruback 1983). We consider this latter approach as insufficient since the premium
paid and a general increase in return, due to greater demand in a stock throughout
the bidding process, not only reflect positive target abnormal returns but also agency
costs to bidder shareholders. Additionally, non-targets are ignored entirely in most
such studies i.e. targets are not compared to non-targets.
Bidder abnormal returns are the market’s evaluation of merger performance for
the acquirer. A negative evaluation is an indication of shareholder money that is
not expended in the best interest of shareholders, in other words, agency costs. The
approach adopted in this study enhances the benchmarking process when calculating
abnormal returns in order to provide a better understanding of the magnitude of
value destruction in takeover bids (Dodd 1980, Franks & Harris 1989, Morck, Shleifer
& Vishny 1990, Schwert 1996, Agrawal & Jaffe 2000, Walker 2000, Andrade, Mitchell
& Stafford 2001, Capron & Pistre 2002, Martynova & Renneboog 2008).
Studying takeover likelihood results in a comparison of targets and non-targets
and bidder abnormal returns provides a clearer indication of agency costs. Previous
studies of takeover likelihood have only superficially investigated agency costs and
the market for corporate control (Dickerson, Gibson & Tsakalotos 2002). We notably
extend the dissection of the candidate pool for disciplinary takeovers.
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1.2 Objectives and Contributions
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the current understanding of the nature
of agency costs in the context of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A). We approach this
issue from two perspectives, (1) bidder abnormal returns and (2) takeover likelihood.
In the framework adopted in this study, negative bidding firm abnormal returns are
a reflection of agency costs and we improve our understanding of this reflection
through a refinement of the underlying methodology (Chapter 2). The market for
corporate control hypothesis dictates that firms with high agency costs are prone
to takeover, which should be translated into an increase in takeover likelihood. In
this thesis, we use a wide range of agency cost indicators as predictors of takeover
likelihood in combination with a reclassification of disciplinary candidates to reassess
the functioning of the market for corporate control (Chapter 3). We also apply a
narrower set of indicators in a study examining the effects of agency costs of free
cash flow on takeover likelihood (Chapter 4).
Chapter 2 provides a methodological refinement to re-evaluate the classic finding
of bidding firm underperformance in financial markets following takeover (Martyn-
ova & Renneboog 2008). The basis for this finding is usually derived from event
study methodology using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) modelling. This approach
has been demonstrated to be problematic in modelling financial returns (Brockett,
Chen & Garven 1999, Engle 2001) when potential Autoregressive Conditional Het-
eroscedasticity (ARCH) effects lead to efficiency problems that must be modelled
(Brooks 2014), which then often lead to mean equation coefficients different from
an OLS estimate (Armitage & Brzeszczynski 2011). In an event study, this differ-
ence affects the expected return estimation, which translates to a different abnormal
return. To address this issue, we conducted an event study incorporating a detec-
tion of ARCH effects which are subsequently corrected using a series of Generalised
ARCH (GARCH) models. While this approach has been applied in other fields (op-
tion expiration effect: De Jong, Kemna & Kloek 1992, divestitures: Corhay & Rad
1996, insurance regulation: Brockett, Chen & Garven 1999), it is a novelty in M&A
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research.
In Chapter 2, we seek to answer the following questions: (1) Are there ARCH
effects when conducting M&A event studies in the UK? (2) Can models from the
GARCH family help ameliorate the estimation problems of OLS when ARCH ef-
fects are present? (3) Are the resulting abnormal returns different from standard
event studies when using ARCH models? and (4) Do these differences translate
to variations in Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) cross-sectional models? We
identify ARCH effects in around half of modelled events. The application of GARCH
type models (GARCH, Exponential GARCH (eGARCH), Threshold GARCH (tG-
ARCH)) led to a significant removal of ARCH effects in the affected events. OLS
betas tended to be greater than their GARCH adjusted counterparts, which con-
secutively lead to an overstatement of abnormal return negativity. When viewing
this negativity as a reflection of agency costs, GARCH adjustment did not lead to a
reversal of the traditional finding of value-destroying M&A. That traditional finding
must, however, be corrected upwards after GARCH adjustment. While there are
positive abnormal returns for bidders in short periods surrounding announcement,
longer term abnormal returns are negative.
Chapter 3 provides an examination of whether agency costs predict takeovers
and if the takeover mechanism disciplines inefficient management. We approach
the problem with two research questions: (1) How effective is the market for cor-
porate control in an economy with an open merger policy? and (2) What agency
cost indicators are associated with market discipline? Answering these questions
helps to establish the link between takeover likelihood with the market for corpor-
ate control and agency costs. The chapter contributes to the literature on takeover
likelihood, the disciplining effect of stock listing and agency costs. The link between
takeover likelihood and the market for corporate control has previously been made
(Dickerson et al. 2002), but we adopt a general agency theory approach. The key
differentiation lies in the classification of candidates for disciplinary takeovers. While
Dickerson et al. (2002) is limited to classifying disciplinary candidates with a focus
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on agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen 1986), our approach is to set excess return
and Tobin’s Q (TQ) in relation to an array of agency cost indicators, which is more
consistent with the mechanism hypothesised by Manne (1965). TQ is the ratio of
the market value of company assets to the replacement costs of that company’s as-
sets. In our sample, we approximate the replacement costs of assets by the book
value of assets as in previous literature (for example Danbolt, Siganos & Tunyi 2016,
Dargenidou, Gregory & Hua 2016. Our findings help explain the workings of one of
the central mechanisms for rectifying systemic and company specific agency costs.
Firms that experience a significant fall in share price demonstrate a significantly
higher takeover likelihood, but we find no association with agency costs for these
takeovers. Stock price falls alone do not indicate a disciplinary effect as stock price
effects may indicate a correction to the market value rather than agency costs. When
we extended the analysis to takeovers with low TQ (our definition for disciplinary
candidates), results reveal that agency cost indicators are associated with takeover
likelihood. Given the UK context of our study, in which anti-takeover provisions are
disallowed, and compared to the findings of US studies, our results imply support
for the effectiveness of an open merger policy if regulators desire a functioning mar-
ket for corporate control. Our results also demonstrate that the definition applied
in Dickerson et al. (2002) is not effective in identifying disciplinary takeovers and
confirm the relationship between disciplinary takeovers and agency cost indicators.
A particular subcategory of agency costs is Jensen’s agency costs of free cash flow
(1986). Chapter 4 combines that theory with the approach to testing the market for
corporate control through the study of takeover likelihood and, in doing so, answers
the research questions (1) Can we identify companies with free cash flow agency
problems? and (2) If yes, are such companies disciplined in takeover markets? The
expectation is to observe an increased threat of takeover for firms with elevated
agency costs of free cash flow. Our study builds on Dickerson et al. (2002) to further
refine the methodology applied to identify companies with free cash flow agency
problems. Dickerson et al.’s (2002) method can identify general agency problems but
not free cash flow agency problems. In this chapter, a set of disciplinary candidates
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was identified by requiring both low TQ and high free cash flows for the classification
of a case that matches Jensen’s (1986) definition. The findings do not indicate a
disciplining effect from threat of takeover towards these candidates. Evidence for
disciplinary candidates’ abilities to adjust takeover likelihood by relinquishing cash
to investors is weak. Agency costs of free cash flow seem to be handled through
corporate governance mechanisms other than the market for corporate control.
1.3 Background
Agency costs are a crucial concept in fields such as corporate governance, M&A,
management theory and business law. Quantifying those costs, however, is difficult.
The term agency costs was first introduced by Jensen & Meckling (1976) as a com-
bination of principal agent theory (Mitnick 1973, Ross 1973) with the separation
of ownership and control visible in the modern stock-listed corporation with highly
dispersed ownership (Berle & Means 1932). Jensen & Meckling (1976) described
agency costs as all costs that accrue to shareholders (the principal) due to inefficient
behaviour by corporate management (the agent). A subcategory of this cost are the
agency costs of free cash flow, where company management holds cash or invests be-
low the firm’s required rate of return instead of distributing to shareholders, thereby
increasing management’s sphere of control at the cost of shareholders (Jensen 1986).
Separation of ownership implies that (1) decision makers do not substantially
participate in wealth effects of those decisions and (2) dispersed ownership leads to
free rider problems (the payoff of intervention by a single atomic owner is too small
to return a positive Net Present Value (NPV) for that owner) (Fama & Jensen
1983). With free rider problems, shareholders are incentivised towards buy and sell
decisions over monitoring efforts (Jensen & Ruback 1983). Management of company
assets determines market valuation and if that valuation could be increased with
more efficient management, the company should become a takeover target with
the purpose of improving management and increasing stock price to its true value
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(Manne 1965). Manne coined this takeover mechanism ’the market for corporate
control’ and in light of this theory, depressed stock prices result from inefficient
management, which we classify as agency costs. From this perspective, agency costs
can be viewed as a driver of shareholder’s sell decisions and in turn, the driver of
the market for corporate control.
When using event study methodology, observed return of an asset surrounding
the event of interest (in our case, takeover announcement) is compared to a bench-
mark return that indicates the asset’s hypothetical behaviour had the event not
occurred. The difference between observed return and benchmark return is abnor-
mal return. The magnitude of those abnormal returns and their statistical difference
from zero is typically the factor of interest. Event study methodology is presently
the primary method for studying the impact of different events on asset returns
(Binder 1998). The concept of abnormal returns during events or as new informa-
tion arrives is closely associated with the efficient market hypothesis, the idea that
market prices efficiently reflect all publicly available information (see Fama 1965,
Malkiel & Fama 1970, Fama 1971), in the sense that abnormal returns reflect the
NPV of new information, such as major investment decisions, from the investors
perspective (Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll 1969). As a result, negative bidding firm
abnormal returns imply a negative NPV for the decision, in our case the takeover
decision, which in turn implies agency costs. A similar logical chain does not apply
in the case of target firms.
Takeover likelihood predicts which companies become takeover targets before
public announcement by comparing lagged public data of targets and non-targets.
Takeover likelihood studies initially investigated whether this prediction is possible
with a satisfactory degree of reliability (Palepu 1986). More recent studies have
rather focussed on the distinguishing attributes between targets and non-targets
(Dickerson et al. 2002, Loderer & Waelchli 2015). In our framework, the driver of
takeover likelihood in the market for corporate control is agency cost by extension
of the separation of ownership and control and the pricing mechanism in equity
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markets (Dickerson et al. 2002).
While takeover likelihood might be high for well-run targets with strategic be-
nefits or similar cases outside the market for corporate control, the panel nature of
prediction models from the survival family enables identification and examination
of a set of disciplinary candidates without the omittance of other and non-targets
outside this set. A contender to takeover likelihood could be bankruptcy likeli-
hood modelling (Altman 1968, Shumway 2001). While we expect both measures to
initially increase simultaneously, when fundamentals deteriorate beyond the point
where recovery is possible or environmental factors lead to loss of competitive ad-
vantage, bankruptcy likelihood increases, while takeover likelihood should decrease.
In contrast, we prefer takeover likelihood for this study of agency costs as it clearly
identifies a disciplinary set, likelihood of takeover can be expected to increase when
fundamentals or company potential are positive, but management is inefficient re-
garding the use of company assets.
Sample periods are differing between (a) Chapter 2 and (b) chapters 3 and -4.
The main reason for this divergence is a stark difference in methodologies between
(a) and (b), requiring the collection of an entirely new data set for the latter. In
the takeover likelihood based chapters 5 years of data are required for a firm to be
included in the sample so that the 1986 to 1990 are merely for independent variable
observation. As such, in effect, both samples cover similar periods in that they start
in 1990s and go up unto the last full available year at time of data collection.
1.4 Agency Costs, the UK Market for Mergers &
Acquisitions and its Regulation
Takeover markets are an excellent testing ground for studying agency costs. Tra-
ditionally, takeover markets have been a key corporate governance mechanism in
reducing agency costs (Larcker & Tayan 2015). As previously stated, we hypo-
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Deal value acquired by target country and in billion USD for 2017. Adapted from Statista (2018)
Figure 1.1: Value of M&A deals 2017
thesise that this disciplining effect of stock listing will be reflected in (increased)
takeover likelihood for a set of disciplinary candidates. The traditional view is that
agency costs are also reflected in positive abnormal returns for target firm sharehold-
ers (Jensen & Ruback 1983), although targets’ shareholders might gain for reasons
other than agency costs and is difficult to compare to non-targets, (see Section 1.1).
A further clear indication of agency costs in takeover markets is bidder abnormal re-
turns when negative, in a demonstration of the price-finding mechanism that drives
the market for corporate control.
The UK’s premier stock market, the London Stock Exchange, is considered one
of the most developed in the world and was ranked first on the Global Financial
Centres Index (Yeandle 2018) in 2018. The UK takeover market is the largest
in Europe and the third largest in the world (see Figure 1.1). For its regulatory
properties, we prefer this market over its two larger alternatives, the United States
(US) and China.
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UK takeover regulation is structured with the agency problem in mind and as
such orients itself towards shareholder protection. The root of this are cases of
anti-takeover provisions used at the expense of target firm shareholders in the 1950s
(Okanigbuan 2013). A most influential case was the attempt by private investor
Harold Samuel to take over Savoy Hotel Ltd with the intention to convert hotel
real estate into office space. The management of Savoy Hotel Ltd reacted with a
sell and lease-back agreement containing the obligation by the buyer to maintain
the property as hotel space, thereby effectively applying a poison pill to deter the
takeover attempt and sparking the anger of shareholders in the process. Whilst
the Board of Trade investigated the case, its subsequent report was non-binding
(Armour & Skeel Jr 2006, Okanigbuan 2013).
The main bodies of text governing takeovers in the UK today are The City
Code on Takeovers and Mergers, published since 1968, in combination with the EU
Takeover Directive 2004 (Okanigbuan 2013). The City Code on Takeovers and Mer-
gers has the purpose to regulate takeovers in the UK with the intention to protect
shareholders (Burges Salmon LLP 2019). The objective of the EU Takeover Direct-
ive is the regulation of M&A within the European Union (Okanigbuan 2013).1 Both
texts are mainly concerned with the interaction of management and shareholders of
target firms in situations of bids. A common theme is to reduce powers of manage-
ment and allow shareholders to decide on bids (Okanigbuan 2013, Burges Salmon
LLP 2019). Shareholder primacy is expressed in the non-frustration rule meaning
that management cannot accept or reject a bid without approval from shareholders,
relegating management to the role of an advisor. Further influence on management
behaviour surrounding takeover bids stems from the Companies Act 2006, which
again emphasises shareholders’ primacy (Okanigbuan 2013) and LSE listing rules
which are highly influential on issues of corporate governance (Sudarsanam 2003).
Stronger legal protection for shareholders in takeover situations increases takeover
1At the time of writing, it is unclear in what form the EU Takeover Directive will apply or will
be replaced with after the UK leaves the European Union. Though large parts of the EU Takeover
Directive have been imported into both the Companies Act 2006 and The City Code on Takeovers
and Mergers (Okanigbuan 2013), so that even an unregulated exit should not have an immediate
(material) impact on UK takeover law.
10
market efficiency without hurting bidders and the UK has been consistently ranked
in first place regarding takeover law strictness during the period from 1986 to 2010
(Wang & Lahr 2017). Anti-takeover provisions, similar to what is common in the
US, should be prohibited to improve the function of the market for corporate con-
trol (Humphery-Jenner & Powell 2011). In fact, anti-takeover measures are almost
non-existent in the UK. Dual share classes are not permitted by the London Stock
Exchange, poison pills and staggered boards are rare, employee stock option pro-
grams as poison pills are forbidden entirely and golden parachutes and share buyback
programs are possible only with shareholder approval, so that the most viable de-
fence against takeover for UK firms is the creation of shareholder value (Sudarsanam
2003).2 Additionally, free float (the shares outstanding in a company that are pub-
licly tradable) is usually high in the UK, which correlates with cross holdings between
UK companies being negligibly low (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny
1998, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes & Shleifer 1999), which facilitates takeover.
The root for conflicts of interest between target firm management and its share-
holders is that management will often lose considerable control over company assets
when a bid is successful (Okanigbuan 2013). This loss of control is generally due to
management being made redundant by the new owner or more subtly the result of a
more concentrated ownership structure implying a lower degree of management en-
trenchment. Currently, loopholes available to management are (1) pre-bid defences
and (2) a lack of accountability in advisory functions.
The non-frustration rule only applies when a bid is received (Okanigbuan 2013).
Consequently, mechanisms can be set in place by management before a bid is received
with the intention to deter takeover attempts in the first place (Magnuson 2009,
Okanigbuan 2013). E.g., golden parachutes at change of control generally make
acquisitions more costly for the bidder (Okanigbuan 2013).3 While staggered boards
2Dual share classes exist when a company issues shares with differing voting rights. Poison pills
are tactics aimed at making the target shares undesirable for the acquirer, for example through
shareholder rights plans or employee stock options. A board is staggered when its directors are
elected at different term lengths. A golden parachute is the practice of granting key personnel the
rights to considerable severance pay and the option to depart at change of control. Share buyback
programs are schemes under which a company purchases its own shares at the market.
3As indicated above, golden parachutes can be adopted with shareholder approval in the UK.
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are not regulated in takeover law, they are made ineffective in the Companies Act
2006, which states that shareholders can remove directors at any time (Okanigbuan
2013). Dual share classes are forbidden by LSE listing requirements (Sudarsanam
2003) and, outwith listing rules, would seldom find application due to a combination
of necessity of shareholder approval and large institutional ownership, that would
likely oppose dual share classes (Okanigbuan 2013).
The advisory role of management during the takeover process is not reviewed
by an external body, which reduces accountability for the outcomes stemming from
the advice given to shareholders. Simultaneously, the advice given might be highly
influential on shareholder votes, thereby allowing for influence on the outcome of a
bid without accountability (Clarke 2009, Okanigbuan 2013). An extension to this
is the possibility of inviting white knights, which can serve to increase competition
for the target, thereby increasing the purchase price or, if the price is driven up too
far, might end the takeover bid altogether (Okanigbuan 2013). The Takeover Code
aims to counter this by requiring the target company to hire an external advisor who
gives independent advise to target firm shareholders (Burges Salmon LLP 2019).
1.5 Thesis Outline
The following three chapters present empirical studies of agency costs in UK takeover
markets. Chapter 2 investigates the role of ARCH effects of bidding firm abnormal
returns. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are takeover likelihood studies where the former
focusses on general agency costs and the latter addresses agency costs of free cash
flow. The concluding remarks are presented in Chapter 5.
Shareholders might opt to do so because they want to encourage takeover sucess once a bidder
initiates an attempt. However, golden parachutes also incentivise management to conclude an
acquisition regardless of price which might depress target shareholder returns.
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Chapter 2
The Market Valuation of Mergers
and Acquisitions in the UK —
1995 to 2014: Evidence from a
GARCH Adjustment to Market
Model Parameters
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to improve the understanding of abnormal returns ac-
cruing to bidding firm shareholders by refining the prevailing approach for evaluating
stock price effects of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A), i.e., event study methodo-
logy, on the basis of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (Brockett et al. 1999). Reflecting
agency costs to bidding company shareholders, acquirer firm shares significantly un-
derperform their benchmarks in the years following takeover announcements when
expected returns are estimated using Market Model parameters (Dodd 1980, Franks
& Harris 1989, Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1990, Schwert 1996, Agrawal & Jaffe 2000,
Walker 2000, Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford 2001, Capron & Pistre 2002, Martyn-
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ova & Renneboog 2008). The use of OLS regression in financial research is com-
monplace despite recognised problems when modelling financial return data (Engle
2001). One such problem is that of Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity or
ARCH effects, which may lead to inefficient estimation of model parameters. In such
cases, ARCH effects should be modelled (Brooks 2014), which can, in turn, lead to
mean equation coefficients that differ from OLS estimates (Armitage & Brzeszczyn-
ski 2011).
This chapter examines whether correcting model parameters for ARCH effects
in the estimation period results improves Market Model parameters and results in
a different interpretation of the effectiveness of Merger & Acquisition activity in
the UK. Research using event study methodology with ARCH models is scarce.
We identified three event studies using some form of Generalised ARCH (GARCH)
based Market Models (De Jong, Kemna & Kloek 1992, Corhay & Rad 1996, Brockett,
Chen & Garven 1999). However, none of these papers examine M&A. Therefore,
we attempt to answer the following questions: (1) Are there ARCH effects when
conducting M&A event studies in the UK? (2) Can models from the GARCH family
help ameliorate the estimation problems of OLS when ARCH effects are present? (3)
Are the resulting abnormal returns different from standard event studies when using
ARCH models? and (4) Do these differences translate to variations in Cumulative
Abnormal Return (CAR) cross-sectional models?
The term Market Model (MM) is used to describe a purely OLS-based event
study and we introduce the term GARCH-Adjusted Model (GAM) for an event study
where events with ARCH problems are modelled using GARCH. Notably, 50.76%
of modelled events suffer ARCH effects. The range of GARCH models applied can
correct all but 3.96% of total events. The MM seems to overestimate betas when
ARCH effects exist, in turn leading to an overstatement of CAR negativity, which
then leads to significant differences between the MM and GAM. The finding of
agency costs in bidding firms remains intact but is corrected upwards (-20.09% in
the MM vs. -15.95% when using the GAM over two years for the full sample).
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This difference in CAARs translates to a disparity in shareholder value creation of
£373.53mn for the average bidder. These differences, however, do not translate to
significantly different coefficients in CAR prediction models.
Section 2.2 provides a literature review of abnormal returns to M&A and applica-
tions of GARCH models. The review concludes with a set of hypotheses. Section 2.3
provides an account of the methodology used for testing these hypotheses and is fol-
lowed by an analysis of the resulting empirics in Section 2.4. A final section extends
our concluding remarks.
2.2 Literature
2.2.1 M&A Abnormal Returns
Since Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll (1969) introduced and applied event study meth-
odology, the approach has come to be the primary method for studying the effects
of different events on asset returns (Brockett et al. 1999). Event studies observe the
impact of an event on a variable. Usually, one aims to isolate the change in the
variable due to the event from changes in the variable due to other factors. That
isolated effect of an event can be termed the abnormal change of the variable. When
applying this concept to finance, the variable of interest becomes the return on a
company’s share price and the event of interest is new (supposedly price-relevant)
information that reaches the public. The isolated effect deriving from an event is
then called abnormal (or excess) return. The Abnormal Return (AR) per period
is the difference between the company’s observed return and its would-have-been
return in case the event does not happen.
The return that would have occurred without a takeover announcement can
be calculated using a number of asset pricing models. The most commonly used
approach is known as the Market Model, that is, the preceding relationship between
a firm’s stock and the market as a whole is used to derive an expected return series
15
for the time around the event date. This return series is then estimated for a single
period or cumulated over several periods. The magnitude of these abnormal returns
and their statistical difference from zero is at the core of event study methodology.
With Fama often seen as the father of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama 1965,
Malkiel & Fama 1970, Fama 1971), event study methodology is tightly integrated
into the concept of efficient capital markets. This perspective has two implications:
(1) Event study methodology assumes that financial markets efficiently change the
price of an asset when new information reaches the market and (2) Asset returns
are, on average, determined by their level of systemic risk as measured by beta.
Note that whether the market reaction is rational is debated by behavioural finance
scholars (see for example Barberis & Thaler 2003).
Examples of events in financial applications include changes in regulation (Binder
1985), central bank announcements, changes in accounting laws or, at a firm level,
changes in accounting practices, and earnings announcements or surprises (Binder
1998), or in the case of Fama et al. (1969), stock splits.1 By taking the announcement
of corporate takeovers as the event of interest, the stock market reaction around the
announcement date can be viewed as the market’s short-term evaluation of the
merger. M&A event studies focus on the share price reactions of bidding firms,
target firms or both. While the focus of this chapter is on bidding firm shareholders,
we also provide a brief overview of studies from two perspectives. In the case of
a successful implementation of a merger with a favourable motive, we expect to
observe positive abnormal returns in the bidding company i.e. value creation. In
the case of value destroying takeover motives, we expect negative abnormal returns
surrounding a takeover announcement.
On average, the shareholders of a target firm experience significant positive ab-
normal returns surrounding a merger announcement (Dennis & McConnell 1986,
Servaes 1991, Schwert 1996, Mulherin & Boone 2000, Goergen & Renneboog 2004,
1A stock split is the practice to is to multiply the number of outstanding shares in a company
by a specific factor with subsequent reissue to the company’s shareholders proportional to their
holdings.
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Martynova & Renneboog 2008). These results can be explained by the market for
corporate control hypothesis (Manne 1965, Jensen & Ruback 1983) in specific cases
of disciplinary takeovers where mismanaged firms become takeover targets. A more
general explanation can be derived from the bidding practice of paying a premium
above current market price to target firm shareholders (DePamphilis 2010).
Abnormal returns accruing to bidding firms’ shareholders around the announce-
ment date are, on average, negative or not significantly different from zero (Dodd
1980, Morck et al. 1990, Schwert 1996, Agrawal & Jaffe 2000, Walker 2000, An-
drade et al. 2001, Capron & Pistre 2002). Also, slight positive abnormal returns are
observable in rare cases (Goergen & Renneboog 2004).
There are no significant differences between returns for domestic and interna-
tional acquirers (Capron & Pistre 2002, Goergen & Renneboog 2004), which is often
seen as evidence for the integration of international financial markets. Abnormal
returns are significantly lower in hostile bids compared to friendly bids (Goergen
& Renneboog 2004). Furthermore, bidding firms gain significantly higher abnormal
returns in successful bids (Goergen & Renneboog 2004). Conversely, abnormal re-
turns are especially negative when a bidder fails to complete a transaction (Bradley,
Desai & Kim 1988).
Surprisingly, Travlos (1987) did not find a significant relationship between the
premium paid in an acquisition and bidder abnormal returns. On the contrary,
Hackbarth & Morellec (2008) have reported negative abnormal bidder returns when
higher premiums are paid and the bidder carries a low level of debt. Bidding firms
gain significantly more when paying with their stock compared to all-cash offers
(Chang 1998, Agrawal & Jaffe 2000, Black, Carnes & Jandik 2001, Shleifer & Vishny
2003, Goergen & Renneboog 2004, Megginson, Morgan & Nail 2004). There is a
range of evidence for higher abnormal returns when the acquisition target is an
unlisted firm (Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz 2005, Faccio, McConnell & Stolin
2006, Capron & Shen 2007, Poulsen & Stegemoller 2008).
When acquiring targets from unrelated industries, bidders typically accrue lower
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returns compared to horizontal or vertical acquisitions (Campa & Kedia 2002, Vil-
lalonga 2004). This observation is closely related to the diversification discount
present in companies active in multiple industries (Berger & Ofek 1995, Lins &
Servaes 1999). Goergen & Renneboog (2004) observe a negative effect of bidding
firm diversification on abnormal returns, regardless of the diversification effect of the
current acquisition. DeLong (2001) and Graham, Lemmon & Wolf (2002) present
evidence for higher returns in horizontal acquisitions. These findings provide em-
pirical support for the existence and recognition of economies of scale and scope,
as well as the possibility of increased pricing power in more concentrated markets.2
Somewhat related to this is the importance of availability of suitable merger partners
for acquisition success (Haspeslagh & Jemison 1991, Angwin 2000).3
There is evidence for lower takeover intensity for industries with a low Herfindahl
Index, a measure for industry concentration (Andrade & Stafford 2004). Bao &
Edmans (2011) report a non-significant effect for the Herfindahl Index on short-term
CARs. Aktas, De Bodt & Roll (2010) control for industry concentration without
showing results.
Takeover activity is cyclical so that waves of higher takeover intensity are ob-
servable (Martynova & Renneboog 2008, DePamphilis 2010). Aktas et al. (2010)
have demonstrated that increased takeover intensity leads to higher premiums paid
in acquisitions. Related to this, Lambrecht (2004) hypothesise that takeover activity
should be higher in times of economic expansion.
Due to hubris (Moeller et al. 2004, 2005) and empire building (Gorton, Kahl &
Rosen 2009), larger corporations can accrue smaller abnormal returns than smaller
market participants, though at least one study reported non-significant findings
(Franks & Harris 1989). When examining the relative size difference between bidder
and target, the evidence is mixed. Hackbarth & Morellec (2008) find a negative
2Economies of scale refer to the ability to accrue higher profits with higher volume where fixed
costs are high. Economies of scope allow for higher profitability through knowledge effects.
3We import proxies of merger partner availability from the takeover likelihood literature (see
Chapters 3 and 4). Next to benefits from choosing a fitting target we hypothesize that availability
of more potential targets leads to a negotiation advantage which should protect from overpayment.
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effect of relative size on one- and two-year CARs. Travlos (1987), Chang (1998),
Capron & Pistre (2002) and Goergen & Renneboog (2004) reported no significant
effect for relative size, while Danbolt, Siganos & Vagenas-Nanos (2015) reported a
significant positive effect on short-term CARs.
In line with international results, empirical evidence for UK acquirers suggests
negative or non-significant abnormal returns for UK acquirers. Franks & Harris
(1989), Limmack (1991) and Higson & Elliott (1998) reported zero Average Abnor-
mal Returns (AAR) and Sudarsanam, Holl & Salami (1996), Sudarsanam & Ma-
hate (2003) and Antoniou et al. (2008) concluded negative bidder abnormal returns.
Additionally, some UK studies have demonstrated positive short-term Cumulative
Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) (Conn, Cosh, Guest & Hughes 2005, Danbolt
et al. 2015, Giannopoulos, Khansalar & Neel 2017).
Combined firm studies are rare. However, Servaes (1991) and Martynova & Ren-
neboog (2008) demonstrated that the combined firm, i.e., the total equity market
values of bidder and target gain positive abnormal returns following a merger an-
nouncement. Goergen & Renneboog (2004) come to the same conclusion under the
condition of the potential for synergies. Combined firm gains are significantly higher
for takeovers occurring at the start of a takeover wave (Harford 2005, Bhagat, Dong,
Hirshleifer & Noah 2005, Moeller et al. 2005).
Finally in this section, the percentage of equity acquired in a takeover has been
shown to have a weak positive effect on long-term CARs (Hackbarth & Morellec
2008).
Table 2.1 summarises variables, provided they are readily available for us, from
Sections 2.2.1 and 3.2.2 and their corresponding literature. Some of the studies,
especially from the literature on agency costs are not on bidding firm abnormal
returns and we imply their hypothesised sign under the premise that higher agency
costs lead to lower abnormal returns (see Chapter 3, especially Section 3.2.2).
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Table 2.1: Previous literature
Panel A: Deal characteristics
Study (Year) Effect on
bidding firm CARs
Relative deal value Danbolt, Siganos & Vagenas-Nanos (2015) Positive
Hackbarth & Morellec (2008) Negative
Travlos (1987), Chang (1998), Capron
& Pistre (2002), Goergen & Renneboog
(2004)
Non-significant
Diversifying acquisition Campa & Kedia (2002), Goergen & Ren-
neboog (2004), Villalonga (2004)
Negative
Availability of merger partners Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991), Angwin
(2000)
Positive
Percentage acquired Hackbarth & Morellec (2008) Positive
Panel B: Agency cost indicators
Valuation Yermack (1996), Doukas, Kim & Pantzalis
(2000), Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003),
Coles, Daniel & Naveen (2008), Hackbarth
& Morellec (2008)
Positive
Sudarsanam & Mahate (2003), Bao & Ed-
mans (2011)
Negative
Profitability Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003), Coles,
Daniel & Naveen (2008), Bao & Edmans
(2011)
Positive
Sales growth Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003), Loderer
& Waelchli (2015)
Positive
Doukas, Kim & Pantzalis (2000), Powell
& Yawson (2007)
Non-significant
Cost- and sales efficiency Yermack (1996), Ang, Cole & Lin (2000),
Singh & Davidson III (2003), McKnight &
Weir (2009)
Positive
Indebtedness and debt capacity Jensen (1986), McKnight & Weir (2009),
Hackbarth & Morellec (2008)
Positive
Bruner (1988), Nuttall (1999) Negative
Dickerson, Gibson & Tsakalotos (2002),
Loderer & Waelchli (2015)
Non-significant
Dividend payments Jensen (1986) Positive
Barnes (2000), Dickerson, Gibson &
Tsakalotos (2002)
Non-significant
CAPEX Dickerson, Gibson & Tsakalotos (2002) Positive
Jensen (1986) Negative
Yermack (1996) Non-significant
Firm size Yermack (1996), Doukas, Kim & Pantzalis
(2000), McKnight & Weir (2009)
Positive
Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz (2004,
2005), Gorton, Kahl & Rosen (2009)
Negative
Franks & Harris (1989) Non-significant
Panel C: Environmental factors
Takeover intensity Martynova & Renneboog (2008), Aktas,
De Bodt & Roll (2010), DePamphilis
(2010)
Negative
Industry concentration Andrade & Stafford (2004) Positive
Bao & Edmans (2011) Non-significant
Economic growth Lambrecht (2004) Negative
Notes: The table details variables used in our models for coefficient difference testing and indicates references to
previous research. Panel B shows variables that are not necessarily present in previous studies of bidding firm
cumulative abnormal returns, but are proxies of agency costs, which are included here to conform to the approach
in this thesis to study agency costs in takeover markets. This part of the table is heavily influenced by the variables
identified in Chapter 3. See Table A.1 in Appendix A for variable names and definitions.
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2.2.2 GARCH Applications
One of the statistical properties of financial return data is that volatility appears in
clusters, meaning the volatility of financial asset returns is autocorrelated. While
asset returns are not related, they are serially dependent (Cont 2001). When fin-
ancial returns are used as the dependent variable in an OLS regression, volatility
clusters are transferred to the variance of the error term. What follows is an un-
equal variance of the error term, which is called heteroscedasticity (Engle 2001).
Using OLS in the presence of heteroscedasticity leads to faulty model standard er-
rors. Consequently, many diagnostic tests cannot be applied with confidence and the
estimators do not serve the minimum variance property, meaning there is another
more efficient estimator (Hill, Griffiths & Lim 2012).
Models in the ARCH family target both problems by adding an equation for the
error term variance and, in the process, correcting the estimator of the explanatory
variable (Tsay 2005, Brooks 2014). In practice, the most commonly used model from
the ARCH family is generalised ARCH (GARCH), developed by Bollerslev (1986,
1987).
The first application of ARCH in empirical research was the study of volatility
spillovers and autocorrelation, dubbed meteor showers and heat waves, in relation
to market efficiency. Engle et al. (1990) applied ARCH to demonstrate that there
is a considerable spillover of volatility from one market to another.
Although more complex and difficult to use, GARCH models are widely applied
in financial research and practice (Engle 2001), in particular, concepts that use an
asset’s volatility as an input benefit from considering conditional heteroscedasticity
(Tsay 2005). However, models that use the conditional variance as an explanatory
variable in the mean equation (e.g., GARCH in mean) and return forecasts on the
basis of the Market Model or Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) can be signi-
ficantly improved (Brooks 2014). We find only a limited number of studies have
applied a GARCH adjustment in event studies to date. Brockett et al. (1999) ex-
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amined the announcement of a referendum on insurance regulation, whilst Corhay
& Rad (1996) studied divestiture announcements.
An early attempt to build a GARCH-based option pricing model was carried out
by Duan et al. (1995) which was later refined by Barone-Adesi, Engle & Mancini
(2008). Several shortcomings of the Black-Scholes Model, such as mispricing, can
be overcome by including GARCH results in the options calculation. This solution
is achieved by having a more reliable and dynamic input for the implied volatility
of an option.4
Several authors have demonstrated that it is possible to produce more reliable
Value at Risk (VAR) results when using GARCH as an input. For example, So &
Philip (2006) have demonstrated how to incorporate GARCH when determining the
VAR for indices and foreign exchange rates. Berkowitz & O’Brien (2002) describe
how a combination of ARCH and Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) could
lead to VAR exceeding the reliability of most VAR models employed in commercial
banks.5
Many authors have also successfully incorporated ARCH corrections into the
calculation of optimal hedge ratios. One example is the application of a GARCH-
based hedge ratio for Australian futures on equities in a sample from 1992 to 2002,
where a conditional hedge ratio was developed that is notably stronger than OLS
when used on an out-of-sample test (Yang & Allen 2005). The need for a conditional
hedge ratio has also been demonstrated on a commodity market sample (Moschini
& Myers 2002).
A paper of crucial importance for this study is Armitage & Brzeszczynski (2011),
which reveals that CAPM betas derived from GARCH deviate from OLS betas by
absolute values of up to 0.25%. In out-of-sample forecast tests, ARCH style betas
did not outperform the OLS betas reported in Schwert & Seguin (1990) and Fraser,
Hamelink, Hoesli & Macgregor (2004). Notably, Braun, Nelson & Sunier (1995),
4The Black-Scholes Model is a probabilistic method for valuing stock-options.
5A firm’s VAR is the amount of value it might lose under a set of assumptions within a certain
amount of time.
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Brooks, Faff, McKenzie & Ho (2000) and Lie, Brooks & Faff (2000) found almost
perfect positive correlations between OLS and ARCH/GARCH betas.
Brockett et al. (1999) have stated that it is possible to include GARCH results
in event study methodology and suggest calculating expected returns incorporating
the effects of ARCH and time-varying beta. The model was tested with a critical law
passage influencing insurance companies. Crucially, the findings contest previously
held assumptions about the effect of the law announcement of interest and demon-
strate that event studies neglecting the influence of conditional heteroscedasticity
can be misleading.
Corhay & Rad (1996), in a study of corporate divestiture announcements, com-
pared abnormal returns resulting from an OLS-based Market Model with abnormal
returns from a GARCH model of the order (1,1). Findings revealed that daily av-
erage abnormal returns are not significantly different between models for any event
day from -20 to +20. We apply a methodology similar to that of Corhay & Rad
(1996) but extend their simplistic results by analysis of differences in parameter
estimation and their subsequent effect on cross-sectional significance.
The preceding literature leads us to identify the following hypotheses for testing:
Market efficiency and the unpredictability of the arrival of price-sensitive inform-
ation lead to volatility clustering in financial return series. Such volatility clusters
are likely to lead to ARCH effects when applying event study methodology based
on OLS (Engle 2001). Accordingly the first hypothesis is
H1: There are ARCH effects in OLS-based event studies.
As an empirical observation (but not a mathematical necessity) betas are diver-
ging from an OLS estimate when correcting ARCH effects using GARCH (Armitage
& Brzeszczynski 2011). In the context of an event study, such differences in beta will
translate to different expected returns, which in turn will lead to different abnormal
returns (De Jong et al. 1992, Corhay & Rad 1996, Brockett et al. 1999). Thus,
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H2: GAM abnormal returns are significantly different from MM abnormal
returns.
Correcting for ARCH effects will not affect the underlying economics of value
creation in M&A (Dodd 1980, Franks & Harris 1989, Morck et al. 1990, Schwert
1996, Agrawal & Jaffe 2000, Walker 2000, Andrade et al. 2001, Capron & Pistre
2002, Martynova & Renneboog 2008). Mainly as a result of implicit or explicit
competition between bidding firms,
H3: Bidding firm GAM abnormal returns are negative or not significantly
different from zero.
Finally, if abnormal returns from the GAM are different from those generated by
the MM, it can be expected that cross-sectional models using these different values
as the dependent variable will find, that
H4: Coefficients of CAR predictors differ between GAM estimation and MM
estimation.
The variables for prediction modelling in H4 are listed in Table 2.1 together with
their (implied) signs from previous literature.
2.3 Data Set and Methodology
2.3.1 Data Set
The UK takeover market was selected for testing because it is considered to have
an active market for corporate control (Sudarsanam 2003). In an active market for
corporate control, the takeover market is used for disciplining corporate management
by facilitating corporate takeovers. That is, such a market has low restrictions on
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M&A activity, and thus experiences high takeover activity (Jensen & Ruback 1983).
The UK market also has only very restricted anti-takeover provisions and is amongst
the most open global markets for M&A. Dual class shares are prohibited (at the
time of writing) and corporate ownership is amongst the most dispersed among all
financial markets (see Section 1.4). This environment makes the UK an ideal sample
market for our analyses.
Takeover data was sourced from Thomson ONE Banker. We required the ac-
quirer nation to be United Kingdom and the acquirer public status to be Public.
We did require an acquirer market capitalisation of at least one billion GBP and
considered acquisitions announced between 01/01/1995 and 31/12/2014. Only suc-
cessful acquisitions were included. Stock price data for each event was loaded from
DataStream. If there were two events for the same company on a given date, we
treated them as one event for univariate analysis. The FTSE All share was used as
a proxy for the market portfolio.
Thomson ONE Banker lists takeovers with deal values in United States Dollars
(USD). Deal values were translated to Pound Sterling (GBP) by the USD/GBP
exchange rate on the announcement date as stated by the Bank of England. Where
the announcement date fell on a non-trading day, we used the next available trading
day. We implemented both adjustments for a maximum of seven calendar days. For
our data set, this rule did not result in any event exclusions.
For the main analysis, the data set was restricted to contain acquisitions where at
least 50% of target firm equity was held by the bidder after the transaction. Also, the
relative value of the transaction to bidding firm market capitalisation was required
to be at least 1%. Both rules were implemented to ensure that the transactions
in the sample were acquisitions of control with material impact on the acquirer’s
business, as opposed to foothold acquisitions (Moeller et al. 2004, Danbolt et al.
2015).
The most recent available accounting data were matched with the event set
using the financial year end date for cross-sectional modelling. Where the date was
25
missing, it was inferred from other available years, or, if that failed, was assumed to
be the 31st of March of that year, in line with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
(HMRC) standard. Market-value-based data were used on the day of the event.
Both accounting and market value data were sourced from DataStream. All cross-
sectional variables were winsorised at 0.5% on both sides to prevent potential outlier
issues. Financial services firms and utilities firms were excluded from cross-sectional
analysis.
2.3.2 Event Study Methodology
Abnormal return was calculated using event study methodology. A one-day abnor-
mal return refers to the difference between the company’s observed return and its
expected or benchmark return in case a merger does not happen, which is calculated
as follows:
ARi,t = ri,t − E(ri,t) (2.1)
where ARi,t denotes the abnormal return for company i on event day t, ri,t is the
realised return for company i on event day t, and E(ri,t) is the expected return for
company i on event day t. The expected return E(ri,t) that would have occurred
without a takeover announcement is calculated using the Market Model:
E(ri,t) = αi + βirm,t (2.2)
where αi is company i’s intercept, βi is company i’s beta with the overall market
and rm,t is the market return on event day t. The coefficients were estimated based
on trading data before the event windows of interest to exclude possible effects of
pre-merger information leakage and diminish other extraordinary events’ effects on
the stock price. In our case, the lowest boundary of all event windows was -30
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trading days. Maintaining a gap of 20 trading days, we used the set of returns from
230 to 50 trading days before the event for our estimations.
Market Model alphas and betas are estimated using OLS. Omitting the firm-
specific subscript i, our first model was defined as follows:
rt = α + βrm,t + ut (2.3)
where it is assumed that the error term ut is normally distributed with zero mean
and constant variance, serially uncorrelated and independent.
The results from OLS modelling provide the foundation for the GARCH-corrected
event study (GAM). We test each event for ARCH effects using Engle’s (1982) test
for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. With the residuals from an event’s
OLS Market Model as the dependent variable, we estimate:





t−q + υt (2.4)
The statistic of interest here is R2 × N , which follows a χ2q distribution. The
null hypothesis is γ0 = γ1 = . . . = γq = 0, so that a significant test indicates ARCH
effects. We tested for all {q | q ∈ N, q ≤ 5}.
If a test for ARCH effects was significant at the 95% level for any lags ≤ 5, we
ran a range of GARCH models on the same data until the ARCH tests were non-
significant. In each case the first GARCH model under consideration was GARCH
of the order (1,1). If that approach failed to sufficiently model ARCH effects, we
dropped the results and modelled an Exponential GARCH (eGARCH) of the same
order. If this also failed, we dropped the exponential GARCH results and estimated
a Threshold GARCH (tGARCH) of the order (1,1). If none of these GARCH models
returned non-significant ARCH tests for all lags, we defined the event as Uncorrect-
able and removed it from the OLS study. The results consisting of ARCH-free OLS
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results and GARCH-corrected Market Models were labelled Corrected in the results
section.
GARCH models the return series as a simultaneous estimation of Equation 2.3
and
ut = σtεt (2.5)





ε is an iid random variable with an assumed Student’s t-distribution of zero
mean and variance of 1, where the degrees of freedom are part of the estimation
process. Also, γ1 can be referred to as the ARCH(1) parameter while γ2 is termed
the GARCH(1) parameter (Bollerslev 1986). We opted for t-distributed innovations
in line with Tsay (2005) and the recommendations set by the author of R’s univariate
GARCH package (Ghalanos 2015).
In tGARCH, the conditional volatility is estimated as:







where It−1 is a binary variable that is 1 when ut−1 < 0. As a result,γ3 captures
sign effects.
In an eGARCH, the variance equation is as follows:















Again, possible asymmetry effects are captured in γ3. In both eGARCH and
tGARCH, we assumed the innovations to be skewed Student’s t-distributed.
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The GARCH models were selected to closely resemble the original Market Model.
ARMA or GARCH in mean models were not considered for event studies because
we calculate the expected return without a merger happening. Using ARMA or
GARCH in mean results in the event predicting itself.
We use a third, rather simplistic method for determining abnormal returns by al-
lowing a day’s abnormal return to be the difference between the individual company
and market return for that day:
ARi,t = ri,t − rm,t (2.9)
This model is commonly referred to as the Index Model (IM) or market-adjusted
returns. An alternative description of this model is the zero-one model due to αi
being fixed at 0 and βi at 1 for all i.
The purpose of an event study is to observe the behaviour of abnormal returns






where CARi,(t1,t2) is the cumulative abnormal return for company i in the event
window t1 to t2. Using the day of the takeover announcement as event day 0, t1
and t2 are expressed in the number of days’ distance to the takeover announcement.
For example, a day before the takeover announcement is -1 and one day after the
announcement is +1.
An event day t’s average abnormal return (AARt) is the arithmetic mean of all








AARs were examined for event days -5 to 5 to detect short-term market move-
ment closely around the event day. Since such daily changes can be expected to be
miniscule we were also interested in aggregating AARs into short-term and long-
term event windows. Taking the sum of average abnormal returns for the event






A wide range of short-term windows was applied to observe the entire reaction
of investors to takeover announcement up to two weeks starting with the event day:
0 to 1, 0 to 2, 0 to 5 and 0 to 10. Similar short windows but including pre-event
days were examined to capture possible information leakage: -2 to 0, -2 to 2, -3 to
3, -5 to 5 and -5 to 10. A range of mid-term windows was used to estimate the value
creation after all deal relevant information, including potential additional disclosures
and post deal announcement were incorporated (-10 to 10, -20 to 20, -30 to 30 and
-50 to 50). A pre-event window was tested to verify that there was no significant
price-movement in the mid-term run-up to the event (-60 to -3).
The long-term effects of M&A were analysed to include information on post-
merger integration success and realisation of strategic and financial objectives of the
transaction. Here we exclude the event day itself in order to remove the announce-
ment effect itself and focus the arithmetic on the post-integration success: 3 to 60,
3 to 130, 3 to 260 (one year) and 3 to 520 (two years). While it can be argued
that buy-and-hold abnormal returns should be used to estimate long-term merger
success (Barber & Lyon 1997), we follow Hackbarth & Morellec (2008) and Franks &
Harris (1989) in their assumption that cumulation is a valid proxy for compounded
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abnormal returns.6
We test abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns resulting from the OLS
(MM), GARCH-corrected (GAM) and Index Model (IM)-based studies for stat-
istical difference using paired samples t-tests. For each pair, the null hypothesis was
equal (cumulative) abnormal returns for both studies. For the main results, ARs
and CARs are left unwinsorised. To ensure that results are not driven by outliers,
tests of CAARs were repeated on basis of winsorised CARs, with a degree of 0.5%
on both sides, in Subsection 2.4.6.7
2.3.3 Cross-Sectional Analysis and Coefficient Difference Test-
ing
We estimated OLS models with industry-year dummies using (a) short-term ab-
normal returns from t0 to t10 and (b) long-term abnormal returns from t3 to t520
as the dependent variables. The windows have been selected by repeating the re-
gression detailed in Equation 2.13 for all calculated event windows (see for example
Table 2.4) and subsequently identifying one short window and one long window
based on maximising the number of significant coefficients. Other windows were
examined to confirm consistency. For both times windows, we modelled the same
regression based on the three different AR estimation methods in succession:
CARi = α + β1xi + β2yi + β3yi + ε (2.13)
where CARi is the cumulative abnormal return for event i, x is a vector of deal-
specific variables, y is a vector of bidder-specific variables and z is a vector of micro-
and macro-environment variables, α and β1 to β3 are vectors of parameters to be
6Note that Franks & Harris (1989) calculate CARs on basis of monthly returns.
7OLS regressions were estimated using the Python package statsmodels, version 0.6.1. Uni-
variate GARCH models were estimated using the R package rugarch, version 1.3-6 on R 3.2.2 (R
Core Team 2015, Ghalanos 2015). t-test functionality from the python package scipy version 16.0
was also used.
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estimated with α being the constant and ε is the error term.








The significance of the test statistic is assessed as a two-tailed test.
2.4 Results and Discussion
2.4.1 Descriptives
Figure 2.1 illustrates the number of acquisitions and total deal value acquired per
year. M&A activity peaks in 1999, just before the burst of the dot-com bubble (the
collapse of equity prices after 2000), both in terms of deal count and acquired value.
Further high marks in number of deals, are in 2007, before the 2008 financial crisis,
and in 2011, the recovery after the financial crisis. These peaks are surrounded by
phases of low activity. Such cyclical patterns are typical for M&A data (DePamphilis
2010).
Event descriptives are listed in Table 2.1. The final sample comprises 1,041
events; the first being announced on the 03/01/1995 and the last on 24/12/2014.
Deal values range from £11mn to £65bn with a mean of £911mn. Conforming
to the inclusion criteria, the smallest bidder has a market capitalisation of £1bn
at announcement, and the largest acquirer is valued at £176bn. The average deal
is 10% of the acquirer’s market cap and ranges from 1% to more than double the
market cap of the acquirer. The average acquirer took over 20 companies throughout
the period of observation. 30% of all acquisitions were within the same industry and
a mean of 96% of target equity was owned after acquisition in our sample.
32
The figure shows deal value acquired per year (blue line, scale on the left y-axis) and number of deals per year (red
line, scale on right y-axis). Deal values are in 2015 million GBP.
Figure 2.1: Number of deals and deal value per year
Table 2.2: Descriptives of deal characteristics
N mean std min median max
ex post takeover count 226 20.2876 30.9741 1 10 295
event date 1041 1995-01-03 2014-12-24
deal value 1041 910.9569 3380.0080 10.9964 165.6710 64 751.6063
market cap 1041 9.0224 17.1443 1.0255 3.4871 175.9216
rel deal value 1041 0.1040 0.2029 0.0101 0.0344 2.1681
pct owned after transaction 1041 0.9615 0.1143 0.5000 1.0000 1.0000
same industry 1041 0.3026 0.4596 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for the deal characteristics in the final sample. Ex post-takeover count
is the total number of acquisitions per acquirer during our period of observation. Event date is the announcement
date of an acquisition. Deal value is the value of the acquisition in million British Pound (2015). Market Cap is
the market value of the acquirer’s equity on the acquisition date in billion British Pound (2015). Rel deal value is
deal value as a ratio of acquirer market cap. Pct acquired is the percentage of the target’s equity acquired. Same
industry is a dummy that is 1 when the acquirer and target have the same 4-digit SIC code.
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2.4.2 ARCH Effects and Corrections
ARCH effects were detected in several events. The data set criteria defined in Sec-
tion 2.3, before enforcing limitations on relative deal value and percentage owned
after acquisition, resulted in an initial set of 4,039 takeovers. An OLS-based Market
Model was modelled for each acquisition and if the OLS model produced evidence
of ARCH effects, a GARCH-corrected version of the same event was modelled (the
GAM model). There was no evidence of ARCH effects in 1,989 cases of OLS-based
Market Models. In 1,324 cases, a standard GARCH(1,1) model was sufficient for
modelling the ARCH effects. From the remaining events, a further 506 events could
be modelled by an eGARCH(1,1). Of the remaining 220 events, 60 were modelled
as tGARCH(1,1). The remaining 160 events revealed significant evidence of ARCH
effects for all attempted models. These events were subsequently classified as uncor-
rectable and were omitted from the sample. The final data set thus contains 3,879
events. With almost half of the events receiving GARCH adjustment, the following
analysis examined the effect of the effect of GARCH modelling on beta values. These
results were robust to the implementation of relative size and percentage-owned lim-
itations. The sample size decreased to 1,041 with 54% modelled through OLS, 32%
using GARCH, 13% using eGARCH and 1% tGARCH.
Individual betas may not differ substantially between estimation methods. Fig-
ure 2.2 presents a comparison of distributions of OLS- and GARCH-based betas for
each event receiving a GARCH correction. Differences between beta distributions
are barely discernible; a phenomenon that is amplified when events not needing cor-
rection are added, as in Figure 2.3. In both cases, however, adjusting for GARCH
seems to move notably high OLS betas towards the mean of the distribution. This
visual observation is reflected in a positive mean difference between Market Model
and GARCH-Adjusted Model betas that is highly significant in a t-test (see sub-
captions of Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3). It is questionable whether this positive mean
difference translates into significantly different abnormal returns. Both figures em-
phasise that it is not sufficient to examine beta differences alone since materiality
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The figure shows a histogram of betas from the Market Model at the top and a histogram of betas from the GARCH-
Adjusted Model at the bottom. The sample is the subset of corrected events only. N = 478 with mean difference
for MM Beta - GAM Beta = 0.0570***, std = 0.1245 and p < 0.0000 for t-test = 10.0050
Figure 2.2: Beta histograms Market Model vs. GARCH-Adjusted Model, corrected
events only
of the adjustment depends on subsequent estimation of expected and abnormal per-
formance.
CAARs differ substantially when corrected and uncorrected events are compared.
Figure 2.4 displays CAARs for all events not needing a GARCH correction (red line),
CAARs for events with ARCH problems on the basis of the uncorrected Market
Model (blue line), the GARCH-corrected equivalent (purple line) and the average of
all events using the Market Model (on the grey line). Events with ARCH problems
display more volatile CAARs, regardless of their correction.8 The autoregressive
nature of their volatility appears to persist past the estimation period. The GARCH
correction shifts the CAAR line closer to the average for events where correction is
not necessary. Over the course of 600 trading days, ARCH-affected events display
higher returns than when no ARCH effects were detected, when GARCH-adjustment
is used.
8The GARCH models’ volatility equation does not feed into the calculation of expected returns.
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The figure shows a histogram of betas from the Market Model at the top and a histogram of betas from the GARCH-
Adjusted Model at the bottom. The sample is the full sample. N = 1041 with mean difference for MM Beta - GAM
Beta = 0.0262***, std = 0.0890 and p < 0.0000 for t-test = 9.4868
Figure 2.3: Beta histograms Market Model vs. GARCH-Adjusted Model, full sample
The graph plots CAARs for the subsamples of events with and without ARCH problems. For the subset with ARCH
problems, both the Market Model and the GARCH-Adjusted Model are depicted. The aggregation of all events
when using the Market Model is provided in grey.
Figure 2.4: Subparts of the Market Model and GARCH-Adjusted Model CAARs
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Finding ARCH effects was not surprising as the presence of ARCH in financial
return series with daily frequency is well established (Engle 2001). However, it
was unexpected that the amount was not higher. It was instructive to observe
that GARCH(1,1) was sufficient in most cases. We did not opt to increase the
number of p,q parameters or move to more sophisticated methods (e.g., multivariate
GARCH) because the improvement in models would be negligible, that is, only 3.96%
percentage of events are excluded.9
2.4.3 Event Study
We now consider the issue for short- and long-term shareholder wealth effects and
introduce a comparison of Abnormal Returns (ARs) estimated with different ex-
pected return generating mechanisms. This comparison was conducted by plotting
short- and long-term CAARs for the full sample and statistical analysis of AARs
and CAARs from different models on the basis of the full and corrected subsamples.
Plotting short-term CAARs from different estimation methods for the full sample
reveal a positive reaction to takeover announcements on the event day and emphas-
ise negative post-announcement returns. Figure 2.5 depicts CAARs per estimation
method and cumulative average market returns (rm) for the period t−5 to t11. All
returns are based at 0 on t−1. A clear jump in CAAR is visible at t0 for all estima-
tion methods. The average market movement is consistently positive with very little
short-term cyclical behaviour. In this short-term examination, all three estimation
methods depict a steady increase, roughly in line with the average market move-
ment after the initial jump at t0. After 11 trading days, Index Model CAARs are
highest, Market Model CAARs are lowest, with GARCH-Adjusted Model CAARs
in between.
Daily average abnormal returns per estimation method for the full sample are
listed in Panel A of Table 2.3. There was significant positive movement on event
93.96% is before the implementation of relative deal value and percentage of equity owned after
the transaction.
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CAARs were calculated on the basis of the full sample. MM is Market Model, IM is Index model and GAM is
GARCH-Adjusted Model. Average market returns are added for comparison. Event days are on the x-axis and
CAARs are on the y-axis.
Figure 2.5: CAARs for event window -5 to +11
days t−4, t0, t2 and t5 for all three modelling techniques. A positive abnormal return
of 0.6% was observed on t0, which is markedly larger in magnitude than all other
abnormal returns in Table 2.3. There are no significant negative AARs across the
days t−5 to t5.
Results are not as clear for the subsample of events where GARCH correction
was necessary (Panel B). AARs on the event day are only positive for the Index
Model but not significant for MM and GAM. The only congruence with Panel A
is the significant positive effect on t−4 for all models which may be indicative of
information leakage.
A graphical analysis of long-term CAARs exposed negative returns for all meth-
ods with wide disparities between methods. Figure 2.6 presents a long-term version
of Figure 2.5 and depicts long-term CAARs per estimation method and a cumulative
average of ri and rm for the period t−200 to t600 with t−1 as base zero. rm follows an






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CAARs were calculated on the basis of the full sample. MM is Market Model, IM is Index Model and GAM is
GARCH-Adjusted Model. Average company returns and average market returns are added for comparison. Event
days are on the x-axis and CAARs are on the y-axis.
Figure 2.6: CAARs for event window -200 to +600
the event date as it accumulates faster than the market pre-event and drastically
slower post-event. Accordingly, the Index Model CAAR rose by almost 5% dur-
ing the 200 days before the announcement. Market Model and GARCH-Adjusted
Model CAARs were close to 0 during the same period, with GAM returning slightly
greater returns than MM. This disparity was maintained and continued into post-
event CAARs. The Index Model (IM) CAAR is always greater than the Market
Model and GARCH-Adjusted Model CAARs and GAM CAARs are consistently
greater than Market Model CAARs. The MM and GAM are negative roughly 60
days after announcement while the IM takes approximately 75 days to become per-
manently negative. The steepest drop for all models occurred in the period between
these two intersection points (60 and 75 days). At day 600, the CAAR for the MM
was at almost -21%, approximately -16% for the GAM and only -6.5% for the IM.
A numerical investigation confirmed the tentative findings from Figure 2.6. Table 2.4
presents three panels, one for each estimation method, where each panel consists of
40
shorter event windows at the top and longer event windows at the bottom. Next to
CAARs and their significances, descriptive statistics are also provided. Note that
standard deviations and absolute values of minima and maxima tended to increase
as event windows were lengthened for all models.
The Index Model depicted in Table 2.4, Panel A contains significant positive
CAARs for short-term windows (t0 to t1 to t−10 to t10) and windows that included
longer pre-event times (t−20 to t20 to t−60 to t−3). Post-event returns were initially
non-significant (t3 to t60) and then turned significant negative (t3 to t130 to t3 to
t520). Some minima and maxima had large values beyond an absolute value of 1.
The largest of these was the minimum of -430% and a maximum of 183% for the
longest event window (t3 to t520). The CAAR for this window was -7.74%. Such
CAARs values are possible because AARs are cumulated rather than compounded.
Just as in the IM, the Market Model lead to significant positive returns for shorter
event windows (refer to the first ten rows of the respective panel in Table 2.4).
Returns remain significant positive until the 20 day mark, then turn non-significant
and become negative around t60; an observation that is consistent with the findings
presented in Figure 2.5. Longer event windows exhibit significant negative returns.
Again, some large minima and maxima were evident with -639% 230% at t3 to t520.
The CAAR for the period t3 to t520 is -20.09%.
The GAM significance tests and respective signs for short-term windows were
largely similar to the MM, with the distinction that CAARs remained significant
positive into longer event windows. Longer symmetric windows (t−30 to t30, up to
t−50 to t50) were still positive while they were insignificant when using the MM. This
finding was not due to a possible positive return in the pre event phase, as might be
suggested from Figure 2.6, since the CAAR for t−60 to t−3 was not significant. GAM
results align with MM results in that long-term post-announcement CAARs (t3 to
t60 until t3 to t520) were negative, although the GAM was less negative than the
MM, as indicated in Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.6. While the maxima between GAM
and MM are the same (as no correction was necessary on that event), the minimum
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Table 2.4: Cumulative average abnormal returns, full sample
Panel A: Index Model
t N CAAR std min median max
0 to 1 1041 0.0073*** 0.0462 −0.3057 0.0053 0.3504
0 to 2 1041 0.0086*** 0.0499 −0.3596 0.0052 0.3770
0 to 5 1040 0.0100*** 0.0593 −0.4505 0.0062 0.3397
0 to 10 1040 0.0108*** 0.0703 −0.5427 0.0110 0.2692
-2 to 0 1041 0.0074*** 0.0476 −0.2759 0.0049 0.2188
-2 to 2 1041 0.0097*** 0.0562 −0.3690 0.0064 0.2625
-3 to 3 1041 0.0092*** 0.0605 −0.4748 0.0069 0.2525
-5 to 5 1040 0.0119*** 0.0673 −0.5116 0.0059 0.2894
-5 to 10 1040 0.0126*** 0.0775 −0.6037 0.0093 0.2915
-10 to 10 1040 0.0115*** 0.0829 −0.7195 0.0108 0.3485
-20 to 20 1039 0.0166*** 0.1069 −0.4371 0.0177 0.3591
-30 to 30 1039 0.0183*** 0.1259 −0.5926 0.0250 0.4869
-50 to 50 1039 0.0272*** 0.1619 −0.6802 0.0316 0.7465
-60 to -3 1041 0.0161*** 0.1219 −0.4705 0.0121 0.6709
3 to 60 1038 0.0013 0.1207 −0.8645 0.0088 0.5389
3 to 130 1036 −0.0200*** 0.2091 −1.3596 −0.0033 0.6140
3 to 260 1024 −0.0310*** 0.3273 −3.2388 0.0022 1.3762
3 to 520 934 −0.0774*** 0.5590 −4.3003 0.0261 1.8311
Panel B: Market Model
t N CAAR std min median max
0 to 1 1041 0.0066*** 0.0457 −0.2946 0.0042 0.3412
0 to 2 1041 0.0078*** 0.0497 −0.3441 0.0041 0.3628
0 to 5 1040 0.0086*** 0.0593 −0.4298 0.0037 0.3100
0 to 10 1040 0.0079*** 0.0716 −0.5099 0.0067 0.2521
-2 to 0 1041 0.0063*** 0.0468 −0.2923 0.0038 0.2122
-2 to 2 1041 0.0082*** 0.0557 −0.3538 0.0053 0.2512
-3 to 3 1041 0.0072*** 0.0605 −0.4429 0.0041 0.2601
-5 to 5 1040 0.0095*** 0.0684 −0.4723 0.0030 0.2687
-5 to 10 1040 0.0089*** 0.0803 −0.5524 0.0059 0.2924
-10 to 10 1040 0.0063** 0.0863 −0.6547 0.0058 0.2906
-20 to 20 1039 0.0061* 0.1166 −0.5252 0.0107 0.4157
-30 to 30 1039 0.0040 0.1404 −0.7605 0.0055 0.5905
-50 to 50 1039 0.0029 0.1890 −0.9160 −0.0053 0.8868
-60 to -3 1041 0.0018 0.1333 −0.7148 −0.0019 0.8155
3 to 60 1038 −0.0123*** 0.1374 −0.7659 −0.0127 0.5656
3 to 130 1036 −0.0506*** 0.2484 −1.3671 −0.0256 0.7237
3 to 260 1024 −0.0925*** 0.4402 −4.5482 −0.0588 1.1361
3 to 520 934 −0.2009*** 0.8250 −6.3938 −0.1323 2.3209
Panel C: GARCH Adjusted Model
t N CAAR std min median max
0 to 1 1041 0.0067*** 0.0457 −0.2946 0.0036 0.3430
0 to 2 1041 0.0080*** 0.0497 −0.3441 0.0044 0.3658
0 to 5 1040 0.0090*** 0.0593 −0.4298 0.0040 0.3168
0 to 10 1040 0.0089*** 0.0717 −0.5099 0.0064 0.2521
-2 to 0 1041 0.0065*** 0.0468 −0.2923 0.0036 0.2122
-2 to 2 1041 0.0085*** 0.0558 −0.3538 0.0053 0.2512
-3 to 3 1041 0.0077*** 0.0605 −0.4429 0.0046 0.2601
-5 to 5 1040 0.0104*** 0.0681 −0.4723 0.0030 0.2724
-5 to 10 1040 0.0102*** 0.0801 −0.5524 0.0058 0.3156
-10 to 10 1040 0.0080*** 0.0866 −0.6547 0.0071 0.2932
-20 to 20 1039 0.0094*** 0.1164 −0.5252 0.0139 0.4277
-30 to 30 1039 0.0092** 0.1404 −0.7605 0.0081 0.5905
-50 to 50 1039 0.0111* 0.1903 −0.6434 −0.0027 0.8868
-60 to -3 1041 0.0062 0.1344 −0.6331 −0.0013 0.8155
3 to 60 1038 −0.0077* 0.1354 −0.7659 −0.0085 0.5656
3 to 130 1036 −0.0410*** 0.2429 −1.1718 −0.0250 0.7753
3 to 260 1024 −0.0731*** 0.4311 −4.2379 −0.0450 1.2839
3 to 520 934 −0.1595*** 0.7936 −4.7244 −0.1004 2.3209
Notes: Descriptive statistics are listed for cumulative abnormal returns of the full sample. The mean column
indicates the CAAR and its significance per event window and estimation method of the expected return. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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for GAM was of smaller magnitude compared to MM (-472% vs. -639% on t3 to
t520). Finally, the CAAR for the window t3 to t520 was -19.24%.
The differences in CAARs should also be examined on the set of events with
ARCH problems in MM modelling only. As such, Table 2.5 lists CAARs per model
and CAAR differences for the model pairs of ARCH-affected events. With positive
short-term CAARs and negative long-term CAARs, the general tendency for CAARs
on the corrected subsample was the same as for the full sample. Short term CAARs
were occasionally insignificant for the MM, which might be due to the fact that it
is arbitrary which events experience ARCH effects and therefore the construction of
the subsample was arbitrary by extension.10. It was illustrative to see that ARs from
the IM were greater than those from the GAM which in turn exceeded MM abnormal
returns, which confirmed the general trend from the full sample. As suspected from
Figure 2.4, the pre-event window t−60 to t−3 was significant positive for the GAM.
The comparison of AARs and CAARs using different expecting return generating
mechanisms leads us to three findings: (1) Bidding firm shareholders gain significant
abnormal returns on the event date; (2) the short-term gain quickly dissipates and
turns into a loss, which deepens in the long run; and (3) ARs on the basis of the
Index Model are greater than ARs from the GARCH-Adjusted Model, which in turn,
are greater than ARs from the Market Model. The question of statistical significance
of these differences is discussed below.
2.4.4 Model Differences
It is possible that the observed differences between AARs and CAARs are within
acceptable confidence intervals. This subsection provides analysis of the statistical
differences between AARs and CAARs from different models on the basis of the full
and the corrected samples.
Differences in AARs for the full and corrected sample are presented in the right-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































most three columns in Table 2.3. A positive significant difference in betas (see
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.2) translated into significantly negative AAR differences
between the MM and GAM for both the full sample and the corrected subsample.
Consistent across both samples, the only days with non significant differences were
t−1, t0 and t4. This lack of significance can be explained by a small magnitude of
market movement on that event day.11 These differences are consistently visible at
the fourth decimal point only. These small but significant differences, however, add
up and translate into greater differences for CAARs. Differences of each MM and
GAM to the Index Model are erratic, which is due to the fact that differences to IM
are driven by the sign and magnitude of rm.
12
The differences between the MM and GAM were greater when considering the
corrected subsample only (see Panel B in Table 2.3), as the zero differences between
the MM and GAM for uncorrected events are removed. As the differences between
IM and the other two models were usually not zero (unless α = 0 and β = 1), the
differences might be entirely different for the subsample of corrected events. In fact,
differences between the IM and MM as well as the IM and GAM were significant
less often than for the whole sample.
As suspected from the AAR differences and from Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6,
CAAR differences for the full sample, listed in Table 2.6, amplified the small daily
differences such that even for small windows the relationship IM > GAM > MM
was statistically significant for the full sample. After two years (t3 to t520), IM was
12.35% greater than the MM and 8.21% greater than the GAM. The MM was 4.14%
smaller than the GAM.
Again, the difference between the MM returns and GAM returns were amplified
after removing uncorrected events (Table 2.5, rightmost three columns) as the effect
of zero differences from uncorrected events was omitted. The difference between the
11Differences in ARs depend on beta, amplified by the magnitude of market return, as ARmm−
ARgam = (αgam+βgamrm)−(αmm+βmmrm). Therefore, assuming that alphas are zero on average,
a day’s AAR difference will be insignificant when the average rm is close to zero for that day.
12If βMM < 1 then ARIM > ARMM when rm < 0. ARMM > ARIM when rm > 0. Vice
versa if beta >1. The same holds for GAM. Since average beta is constant for columns 4 and 5,
respectively, in Table 2.3 the changing signs are due to changes in rm.
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Table 2.6: CAAR differences, all events
t IM - MM IM - GAM MM - GAM
0 to 1 0.0007*** 0.0006*** −0.0001**
0 to 2 0.0008*** 0.0006** −0.0002***
0 to 5 0.0015*** 0.0010** −0.0005***
0 to 10 0.0028*** 0.0019*** −0.0009***
-2 to 0 0.0011*** 0.0009*** −0.0002**
-2 to 2 0.0016*** 0.0012*** −0.0003***
-3 to 3 0.0019*** 0.0014*** −0.0005***
-5 to 5 0.0024*** 0.0015** −0.0009***
-5 to 10 0.0038*** 0.0024*** −0.0014***
-10 to 10 0.0052*** 0.0035*** −0.0017***
-20 to 20 0.0105*** 0.0072*** −0.0033***
-30 to 30 0.0143*** 0.0091*** −0.0052***
-50 to 50 0.0243*** 0.0161*** −0.0083***
-60 to -3 0.0143*** 0.0098*** −0.0045***
3 to 60 0.0136*** 0.0090*** −0.0046***
3 to 130 0.0306*** 0.0210*** −0.0096***
3 to 260 0.0616*** 0.0422*** −0.0194***
3 to 520 0.1235*** 0.0821*** −0.0414***
Notes: Each column lists the average difference between the indicated models’ cumulative abnormal returns. The
asterisks indicate significances for paired difference tests. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and
99%, respectively. MM is Market Model, GAM is GARCH-Adjusted Model and IM is Index Model. The basis of
calculations is the full sample.
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MM returns and the GAM returns in the two-year window was 8.68%. Since there
were no zero differences for uncorrected events when comparing either the MM or
GAM to IM, the only questions remaining were whether the IM and GAM were
statistically different, and whether the general pattern that the IM is greater than
both the MM and the GAM holds.13 Results reveal that the general pattern holds as
most rows were positive and significant, with the exception of the occasional window
for IM − GAM where no significant difference was found.
2.4.5 Prediction Model Differences
Event studies usually examine the mean ARs and CARs, and then attempt to un-
cover the drivers of CARs using cross-sectional regression. If there are differences
in abnormal returns arising from the ARCH correction, these might be visible in
various cross-sectional coefficients when relating abnormal returns to some common
predictors. This subsection presents analysis of differences in coefficients from such
regressions. The question is: Does a GARCH correction impact on the coefficients
from regression when compared to the Market Model? OLS regressions were mod-
elled with CARs from the IM, MM and GAM, for both the full sample and corrected
sample.
Coefficient difference tests were performed on the basis of their estimates and
standard errors. In addition to the deal characteristics presented in Panel A (re-
peated from Table 2.2), Panel B in Table 2.7 lists cross-sectional variables for sample
acquirers after removing missing observations on the cross-sectional variables. Not-
able values are a maximum Tobin’s Q (q) of 22 and a minimum sales growth of -0.48.
While far from the TQ mean of 2.42, this variable is known to fluctuate wildly (see
for example Danbolt et al. 2017). Given that the dot-com bubble is part of our
observation period, the value of 22 is not surprising.
Correlations between variables used in regressions are listed in Table 2.8. Al-
13That is unless the MM or GAM parameters were exactly α = 0 and β = 1.
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Table 2.7: Descriptives of cross sectional variables
Panel A: Deal characteristics
N mean std min median max
ex post takeover count 174 20.5632 33.3774 1 9 295
event date 763 1995-03-13 2014-12-16
deal value 763 773.4619 2625.6167 12.0619 152.0755 41 448.6623
market cap 763 8.6727 17.5530 1.0255 3.3108 175.9216
rel deal value 763 0.0937 0.1640 0.0102 0.0328 1.0458
pct acquired 763 0.8848 0.2334 0.0919 1.0000 1.0000
same industry 763 0.3159 0.4652 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Panel B: Acquirer characteristics
N mean std min median max
q 763 1.9585 2.4243 0.4384 1.4474 22.3551
asset utilisation 763 1.1018 0.6827 0.1310 0.9358 4.3012
expense ratio 763 0.8532 0.1009 0.4931 0.8682 1.1112
div on assets 763 0.0348 0.0245 0.0000 0.0291 0.1729
investment 763 0.0554 0.0379 0.0020 0.0482 0.2350
tangible 763 0.3216 0.2254 0.0063 0.2737 0.8881
sales growth 763 0.1123 0.2368 −0.4821 0.0726 1.4517
roa 763 0.1296 0.0779 −0.0416 0.1183 0.4771
leverage 763 0.2562 0.1735 0.0000 0.2316 1.0129
mva 763 10.7114 20.2609 1.0592 4.3340 195.9127
mtb similarity 763 0.2524 0.1442 0.0000 0.2810 0.5335
size similarity 763 0.0415 0.1533 0.0000 0.0048 0.8927
Panel C: Industry/macro variables
N mean std min median max
intensity 763 0.2814 0.1310 0.0000 0.2548 0.6567
herfindahl 763 0.0578 0.0837 0.0092 0.0262 0.5576
gdp growth 763 0.0242 0.0172 −0.0593 0.0259 0.0479
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in cross sectional variables. Variable definitions
are in Table A.1 in Appendix A. market cap and mva are presented in billion GBP here.
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though there were some significant values, their magnitude was usually small. The
highest correlation was observed between the investment rate (investment) and tan-
gibility (tangible) with 0.63, which was exceptionally high in our sample. Other
high correlations were seen between expense ratio and asset utilisation ratio (0.51)
and market value of assets and the Herfindahl Index (0.46). The strongest negative
correlation was -0.43 between profitability (roa) and expense ratio.
Cross-sectional results are listed in Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 which correspond to
the difference test presented in Table 2.11, Panel A and Panel B respectively. Each
cross-sectional table presents models for the IM, MM and GAM for the full sample
on the left and the same three models for the corrected sample on the right. The
analysis of significant coefficients mainly focuses on the full sample, as the occurrence
of ARCH effects might be too arbitrary to allow an overall statement about general
CAR creation.
All long-term models (Table 2.9) demonstrate that higher TQ firms, larger firms
(with the exception of IM in the corrected sample), firms acquiring in times of high
takeover intensity and coming from more concentrated industries accrued signific-
antly lower CARs (full and corrected sample). There was some limited evidence
of a negative impact of sales growth, the investment rate and economic growth on
long-term CAR creation. Profitability was significant positive for IM and MM in
both samples. Asset utilisation and tangibility had a positive effect on CARs in all
corrected sample models. The remaining variables were significant only occasionally
or not at all. The constant was significant positive in all models.
In the short-term CAR models (Table 2.10), all models (full and corrected) re-
turned significant positive effects of return on assets (roa) and leverage, and negative
effects from Tobin’s Q, sales growth and firm size (ln mva). There was some evid-
ence for a positive effect of industry concentration (herfindahl) on CARs in the full
sample. The expense ratio was significant positive while there was some evidence for
a negative impact of the percentage of equity acquired (pct acquired) in the MM and















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.9: Cross-sectional results, long-term
Dependent variable: CAR t3 to t520
Panel A: All events Panel B: Corrected events only
IM MM GAM IM MM GAM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rel deal value −0.175 −0.005 −0.059 −0.340∗ −0.271 −0.389
(0.150) (0.227) (0.228) (0.198) (0.287) (0.318)
pct acquired −0.109 −0.215 −0.199 −0.138 −0.694 ∗ ∗ −0.557 ∗ ∗
(0.113) (0.152) (0.146) (0.208) (0.284) (0.259)
same industry 0.020 −0.007 −0.009 0.019 0.166 0.176
(0.043) (0.063) (0.066) (0.075) (0.115) (0.124)
mtb similarity −0.285 −0.594∗ −0.410 −0.940 ∗ ∗ −1.180 ∗ ∗ −0.733
(0.206) (0.303) (0.313) (0.406) (0.593) (0.589)
size similarity 0.158 −0.358 −0.222 −0.696 −1.513 ∗ ∗ −1.002∗
(0.235) (0.319) (0.251) (0.579) (0.725) (0.570)
q −0.043 ∗ ∗ −0.132 ∗ ∗∗ −0.102 ∗ ∗∗ −0.038∗ −0.111 ∗ ∗∗ −0.072 ∗ ∗
(0.018) (0.028) (0.027) (0.023) (0.036) (0.034)
roa 1.423 ∗ ∗∗ 1.805 ∗ ∗∗ 1.064 1.811 ∗ ∗ 2.426 ∗ ∗ 0.854
(0.438) (0.608) (0.731) (0.823) (1.105) (1.259)
sales growth −0.311∗ −0.470 ∗ ∗ −0.478 ∗ ∗∗ −0.260 −0.425∗ −0.437 ∗ ∗
(0.170) (0.189) (0.171) (0.192) (0.229) (0.197)
leverage 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.369 0.367 0.206
(0.189) (0.235) (0.244) (0.290) (0.416) (0.435)
ln mva −0.047 ∗ ∗ −0.089 ∗ ∗∗ −0.087 ∗ ∗∗ −0.057 −0.120 ∗ ∗ −0.133 ∗ ∗∗
(0.023) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038) (0.050) (0.051)
asset utilisation 0.085 0.036 0.048 0.130∗ 0.192 ∗ ∗ 0.207 ∗ ∗
(0.052) (0.062) (0.065) (0.076) (0.093) (0.100)
expense ratio −0.383 −0.100 −0.103 −0.467 −1.018 −1.204
(0.462) (0.533) (0.553) (0.831) (1.018) (1.112)
div on assets 0.855 2.774 3.277∗ 0.944 0.797 2.458
(0.963) (1.710) (1.679) (1.574) (2.478) (2.412)
investment −2.497 ∗ ∗∗ −0.145 0.157 −3.102 ∗ ∗ −3.975 ∗ ∗ −3.923 ∗ ∗
(0.905) (1.161) (1.243) (1.361) (1.824) (1.981)
tangible 0.293∗ 0.405∗ 0.296 0.660 ∗ ∗∗ 1.391 ∗ ∗∗ 1.106 ∗ ∗∗
(0.159) (0.230) (0.235) (0.245) (0.361) (0.361)
intensity −2.088 ∗ ∗∗ −1.935 ∗ ∗∗ −1.844 ∗ ∗∗ −2.689 ∗ ∗∗ −2.762 ∗ ∗∗ −2.809 ∗ ∗∗
(0.388) (0.586) (0.556) (0.580) (0.828) (0.784)
herfindahl −1.230 ∗ ∗ −2.075 ∗ ∗∗ −1.808 ∗ ∗ −3.373 ∗ ∗∗ −4.775 ∗ ∗∗ −4.102 ∗ ∗∗
(0.479) (0.743) (0.730) (1.010) (1.451) (1.463)
gdp growth −6.870 ∗ ∗ −6.262∗ −6.481∗ −7.677∗ −8.916 −9.817∗
(2.747) (3.546) (3.783) (4.056) (5.629) (5.832)
Constant 1.447 ∗ ∗ 1.981 ∗ ∗ 1.840 ∗ ∗ 2.587 ∗ ∗ 4.241 ∗ ∗∗ 4.447 ∗ ∗∗
(0.579) (0.781) (0.765) (1.079) (1.411) (1.474)
N 695 695 695 313 313 313
R2 0.321 0.319 0.258 0.419 0.473 0.390
Adjusted R2 0.274 0.272 0.207 0.321 0.384 0.287
Residual Std. Error 0.513 0.730 0.728 0.571 0.804 0.804
df (SE) 649 649 649 267 267 267
F Statistic 6.811∗∗∗ 6.751∗∗∗ 5.020∗∗∗ 4.281∗∗∗ 5.330∗∗∗ 3.787∗∗∗
df (F) 45; 649 45; 649 45; 649 45; 267 45; 267 45; 267
Notes: This table presents multiple regression models with CARs as the dependent variable. Variable descriptions
are listed in Table A.1 in Appendix A. Panel A is based on all events while Panel B only uses CARs from models
that displayed ARCH problems in an OLS-based event method. All models include year and industry dummies (ex-
cluded from the output). Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01
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Other variables were occasionally significant without a clear pattern. Again, the
constant was always significant positive.
In the full sample, all models also returned negative effects from tangibility
(tangible) and economic growth (gdp growth). In the corrected subsample, all models
revealed negative effects of relative deal size (rel deal value), size similarity between
bidders, and industry concentration (herfindahl). The MM and GAM results for the
full sample showed a positive effect of higher leverage on short-term CARs and a
negative effect from the percentage acquired (pct acquired). The Index Model alone
produced a positive effect of same industry for the full sample.
Table 2.11 lists the coefficient differences from regression models using long-term
CARs (Panel A) and short-term CARs (Panel B) as the dependent variables. As
shown by the lack of significance, there was no significant difference between the
MM and GAM coefficients with either long- or short-term CARs neither for the
full nor the corrected subsample. The Index Model lead to a significantly higher
coefficient for TQ (q) in models with long-term CARs in both the full and corrected
sample with the exception of difference to GAM in the corrected subsample. The
only other, though weakly, significant coefficient difference is for investment between
IM and GAM in the full sample. There were no coefficient differences for short-
term CAR models. CAARs were significantly different (see Tables 2.5 and 2.6), but
apparent differences in the short-term were too small to detect significant differences
in coefficients.
Comparing signs and significance levels of the models supports this finding.14
Importantly, for the comparison columns between the MM and GAM, whenever a
coefficient was significant for either method, that coefficient always had the same
sign in the other method even though the level of significance occasionally differed.
Sometimes, one of the methods returned significant results where the other did not.
In case of the short term models MM and GAM significances and signs were perfectly
congruent for the full sample and congruent with the exception of size similarity for
14Refer to Table A.2 in Appendix A as an aid.
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Table 2.10: Cross-sectional results, short-term
Dependent variable: CAR t0 to t10
All events Corrected events only
IM MM GAM IM MM GAM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rel deal value 0.010 0.014 0.013 −0.016 −0.019 −0.022
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
pct acquired −0.017 −0.022∗ −0.022∗ −0.010 −0.021 −0.020
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
same industry 0.008 0.009 0.009 −0.008 −0.003 −0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
mtb similarity 0.018 0.014 0.020 −0.018 −0.027 −0.013
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.045) (0.048) (0.047)
size similarity 0.017 −0.002 0.001 −0.048 −0.065 ∗ ∗ −0.052
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033)
q −0.005 ∗ ∗ −0.006 ∗ ∗∗ −0.005 ∗ ∗∗ −0.006 ∗ ∗∗ −0.007 ∗ ∗∗ −0.006 ∗ ∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
roa 0.156 ∗ ∗ 0.170 ∗ ∗∗ 0.158 ∗ ∗∗ 0.251 ∗ ∗∗ 0.275 ∗ ∗∗ 0.251 ∗ ∗∗
(0.063) (0.063) (0.061) (0.085) (0.090) (0.088)
sales growth −0.036 ∗ ∗∗ −0.040 ∗ ∗∗ −0.040 ∗ ∗∗ −0.043 ∗ ∗∗ −0.044 ∗ ∗∗ −0.043 ∗ ∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
leverage 0.054 ∗ ∗∗ 0.059 ∗ ∗∗ 0.061 ∗ ∗∗ 0.065 ∗ ∗ 0.068 ∗ ∗ 0.071 ∗ ∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
ln mva −0.016 ∗ ∗∗ −0.017 ∗ ∗∗ −0.017 ∗ ∗∗ −0.018 ∗ ∗∗ −0.020 ∗ ∗∗ −0.021 ∗ ∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
asset utilisation −0.0004 −0.001 −0.001 0.0002 −0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
expense ratio 0.065 0.094 ∗ ∗ 0.095 ∗ ∗ 0.083 0.113 0.110
(0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.080) (0.089) (0.088)
div on assets 0.008 0.072 0.087 −0.297 −0.251 −0.203
(0.139) (0.142) (0.141) (0.187) (0.190) (0.193)
investment −0.200∗ −0.167 −0.165 −0.033 −0.086 −0.107
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.147) (0.157) (0.158)
tangible 0.007 0.016 0.016 0.010 0.033 0.031
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030)
intensity −0.050 −0.047 −0.048 −0.061 −0.057 −0.064
(0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.058) (0.060) (0.060)
herfindahl 0.144 ∗ ∗ 0.140∗ 0.148∗ −0.113 −0.134 −0.120
(0.073) (0.077) (0.076) (0.089) (0.096) (0.097)
gdp growth −0.201 −0.223 −0.214 0.125 0.077 0.106
(0.299) (0.299) (0.298) (0.424) (0.427) (0.440)
Constant 0.190 ∗ ∗∗ 0.184 ∗ ∗ 0.181 ∗ ∗ 0.262 ∗ ∗ 0.266 ∗ ∗ 0.269 ∗ ∗
(0.070) (0.072) (0.071) (0.122) (0.132) (0.131)
N 763 763 763 334 334 334
R2 0.147 0.160 0.154 0.272 0.296 0.286
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.107 0.099 0.156 0.183 0.171
Residual Std. Error 0.069 0.071 0.071 0.064 0.067 0.068
df (SE) 716 716 716 287 287 287
F Statistic 2.682∗∗∗ 2.975∗∗∗ 2.825∗∗∗ 2.336∗∗∗ 2.618∗∗∗ 2.495∗∗∗
df (F) 46; 716 46; 716 46; 716 46; 287 46; 287 46; 287
Notes: This table presents multiple regression models with CARs as the dependent variable. Variable descriptions
are listed in Table A.1 in Appendix A. Panel A is based on all events while Panel B only uses CARs from models
that displayed ARCH problems in an OLS-based event method. All models include year and industry dummies (ex-
cluded from the output). Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.11: Coefficient difference test
Panel A: Long term models (CAR t3 to t520)
All events Corrected events only
IM - MM IM - GAM MM - GAM IM - MM IM - GAM MM - GAM
(Intercept) −0.5493 −0.4103 0.1285 −0.9309 −1.0183 −0.1011
rel deal value −0.6241 −0.4244 0.1675 −0.1980 0.1298 0.2747
pct acquired 0.5592 0.4869 −0.0745 1.5787 1.2596 −0.3563
same industry 0.3541 0.3761 0.0267 −1.0701 −1.0814 −0.0577
mtb similarity 0.8419 0.3337 −0.4203 0.3334 −0.2896 −0.5347
size similarity 1.3003 1.1028 −0.3353 0.8803 0.3764 −0.5541
q 2.6507∗∗∗ 1.7832∗ −0.7774 1.6868∗ 0.8223 −0.7849
roa −0.5091 0.4216 0.7794 −0.4462 0.6365 0.9386
sales growth 0.6237 0.6931 0.0325 0.5532 0.6460 0.0413
leverage 0.0270 0.0287 0.0021 0.003 0.3129 0.2693
ln mva 1.0495 0.9955 −0.0480 1.0065 1.2024 0.1807
asset utilisation 0.5981 0.4423 −0.1268 −0.5227 −0.6144 −0.1062
expense ratio −0.4008 −0.3884 0.0037 0.4190 0.5310 0.1237
div on assets −0.9781 −1.2520 −0.2100 0.0503 −0.5257 −0.4805
investment −1.5974 −1.7260∗ −0.1775 0.3834 0.3415 −0.0191
tangible −0.4023 −0.0111 0.3328 −1.6760∗ −1.0204 0.5590
intensity −0.2171 −0.3588 −0.1123 0.0719 0.1228 0.0413
herfindahl 0.9564 0.6624 −0.2564 0.7933 0.4102 −0.3266
gdp growth −0.1358 −0.0833 0.0424 0.1786 0.3012 0.1112
Panel B: Short term models (CAR t0 to t10)
All events Corrected events only
IM - MM IM - GAM MM - GAM IM - MM IM - GAM MM - GAM
(Intercept) 0.0635 0.0924 0.0284 −0.0185 −0.0362 −0.0170
rel deal value −0.1492 −0.1009 0.0473 0.0653 0.1455 0.0772
pct acquired 0.2976 0.3123 0.0146 0.4739 0.4212 −0.0532
same industry −0.1564 −0.1389 0.0166 −0.3800 −0.3398 0.0366
mtb similarity 0.0786 −0.0463 −0.1256 0.1293 −0.0794 −0.2027
size similarity 0.5897 0.5103 −0.0872 0.3962 0.0954 −0.2877
q 0.4750 0.2403 −0.2400 0.2947 0.0186 −0.2737
roa −0.1620 −0.0303 0.1342 −0.1935 0.0000 0.1912
sales growth 0.2409 0.1890 −0.0494 0.0798 0.0140 −0.0630
leverage −0.1653 −0.2472 −0.0809 −0.0707 −0.1350 −0.0627
ln mva 0.2505 0.3058 0.0544 0.2492 0.3398 0.0890
asset utilisation 0.1393 0.0755 −0.0617 0.0617 −0.0321 −0.0904
expense ratio −0.4913 −0.5120 −0.0186 −0.2544 −0.2231 0.0307
div on assets −0.3242 −0.3979 −0.0715 −0.1704 −0.3483 −0.1779
investment −0.1976 −0.2071 −0.0090 0.2465 0.3442 0.0950
tangible −0.3932 −0.3735 0.0206 −0.5593 −0.5260 0.0375
intensity −0.0406 −0.0259 0.0146 −0.0523 0.0330 0.0837
herfindahl 0.0383 −0.0305 −0.0675 0.1594 0.0539 −0.1009
gdp growth 0.0534 0.0321 −0.0213 0.0801 0.0305 −0.0483
Notes: This table lists the z-scores of differences between coefficients from the indicated models. Variable definitions
are in Table A.1 in Appendix A. When testing for statistical difference, a normal distribution is assumed. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Panel A is based on models using event-wise CARs from t3 to t520. Panel B uses models
with event-wise CARs from t0 to t10.
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the corrected subsample. Similarly, when comparing to the Index Model, signs were
pointing in the same direction when a coefficient was significant. Again, differences
in significance levels were more pronounced for the long-term models than for the
short-term models. GARCH adjustments had no significant effect on coefficients
and, therefore, previous studies of drivers of bidding firm results remain intact in
light of our results.
2.4.6 Robustness to outliers
In this subsection key tests from this chapter are repeated on basis of a winsorised
sample to ensure that results are not driven by outliers. For this purpose, the full
sample of CARs was winsorised at 0.5%, both at the upper and lower end of the
range. The tests repeated here are the test of CAARs (Table 2.12) and the test of
CAAR differences (Table 2.13).
As expected all minima and maxima have decreased in absolute value when
comparing to Table 2.4. Since value ranking is not affected by winsorisation, the
medians are unchanged. Winsorisation removes variation data so that all standard
deviations have decreased. As variation is greater over longer time periods, the two
year windows were affected more strongly by winsorisation than shorter windows.
CAARs over two years were -7.62% with winsorisation compared to -7.74% without
winsorisation for the IM, -19.76% vs. -20.09% for the MM and -15.65% vs. -15.95%
for the GAM. The previous finding of positive CAARs in short-term windows and
negative CAARs in long term windows is robust and has not been driven by outliers.
CAAR differences, in Table 2.13, were slightly smaller when comparing to the
same test without winsorisation (Table 2.6), but nonetheless significant. For all
windows CAARs from the Index Model were greater than those from the Market
Model and the GARCH-Adjusted Model. The GARCH-Adjusted Model, in turn,
found greater CAARs than the Market Model. Accordingly, previous findings are
robust to the effects of outliers. After two years GAM was 4.11% greater than MM
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Table 2.12: Cumulative average abnormal returns, full sample, winsorised
Panel A: Index Model
t N CAAR std min median max
0 to 1 1041 0.0073*** 0.0418 −0.1611 0.0053 0.1491
0 to 2 1041 0.0089*** 0.0452 −0.1556 0.0052 0.1658
0 to 5 1040 0.0103*** 0.0553 −0.1915 0.0062 0.1985
0 to 10 1040 0.0114*** 0.0659 −0.2227 0.0110 0.2087
-2 to 0 1041 0.0074*** 0.0463 −0.1852 0.0049 0.1645
-2 to 2 1041 0.0101*** 0.0526 −0.1861 0.0064 0.1819
-3 to 3 1041 0.0096*** 0.0560 −0.1982 0.0069 0.1988
-5 to 5 1040 0.0125*** 0.0628 −0.1764 0.0059 0.2270
-5 to 10 1040 0.0134*** 0.0720 −0.2520 0.0093 0.2319
-10 to 10 1040 0.0123*** 0.0759 −0.2865 0.0108 0.2330
-20 to 20 1039 0.0166*** 0.1059 −0.4026 0.0177 0.3141
-30 to 30 1039 0.0187*** 0.1231 −0.3749 0.0250 0.3874
-50 to 50 1039 0.0271*** 0.1585 −0.4853 0.0316 0.5827
-60 to -3 1041 0.0158*** 0.1182 −0.3206 0.0121 0.4197
3 to 60 1038 0.0020 0.1157 −0.3804 0.0088 0.3442
3 to 130 1036 −0.0188*** 0.2009 −0.8210 −0.0033 0.5004
3 to 260 1024 −0.0301*** 0.3053 −1.3276 0.0022 0.6426
3 to 520 934 −0.0762*** 0.5371 −2.9115 0.0261 1.0248
Panel B: Market Model
t N CAAR std min median max
0 to 1 1041 0.0067*** 0.0416 −0.1650 0.0042 0.1568
0 to 2 1041 0.0080*** 0.0453 −0.1656 0.0041 0.1606
0 to 5 1040 0.0089*** 0.0560 −0.2021 0.0037 0.1951
0 to 10 1040 0.0085*** 0.0677 −0.2368 0.0067 0.2037
-2 to 0 1041 0.0064*** 0.0453 −0.1808 0.0038 0.1607
-2 to 2 1041 0.0085*** 0.0525 −0.2010 0.0053 0.1812
-3 to 3 1041 0.0077*** 0.0561 −0.2017 0.0041 0.1823
-5 to 5 1040 0.0100*** 0.0646 −0.1914 0.0030 0.2191
-5 to 10 1040 0.0095*** 0.0763 −0.2987 0.0059 0.2380
-10 to 10 1040 0.0072*** 0.0808 −0.2987 0.0058 0.2404
-20 to 20 1039 0.0061* 0.1137 −0.3900 0.0107 0.3345
-30 to 30 1039 0.0043 0.1367 −0.4516 0.0055 0.3937
-50 to 50 1039 0.0028 0.1832 −0.5488 −0.0053 0.5077
-60 to -3 1041 0.0018 0.1290 −0.3721 −0.0019 0.4270
3 to 60 1038 −0.0116*** 0.1333 −0.4441 −0.0127 0.4620
3 to 130 1036 −0.0506*** 0.2449 −1.1331 −0.0256 0.4951
3 to 260 1024 −0.0886*** 0.4119 −1.9636 −0.0588 1.0007
3 to 520 934 −0.1976*** 0.7991 −4.5425 −0.1323 1.9061
Panel C: GARCH Adjusted Model
t N CAAR std min median max
0 to 1 1041 0.0068*** 0.0416 −0.1600 0.0036 0.1568
0 to 2 1041 0.0082*** 0.0453 −0.1619 0.0044 0.1617
0 to 5 1040 0.0094*** 0.0559 −0.2021 0.0040 0.1963
0 to 10 1040 0.0094*** 0.0678 −0.2367 0.0064 0.2037
-2 to 0 1041 0.0066*** 0.0454 −0.1808 0.0036 0.1607
-2 to 2 1041 0.0088*** 0.0527 −0.1991 0.0053 0.1812
-3 to 3 1041 0.0082*** 0.0564 −0.2026 0.0046 0.1915
-5 to 5 1040 0.0109*** 0.0644 −0.1896 0.0030 0.2206
-5 to 10 1040 0.0108*** 0.0761 −0.2862 0.0058 0.2415
-10 to 10 1040 0.0088*** 0.0815 −0.3046 0.0071 0.2550
-20 to 20 1039 0.0096*** 0.1140 −0.3642 0.0139 0.3719
-30 to 30 1039 0.0094** 0.1372 −0.4034 0.0081 0.4035
-50 to 50 1039 0.0112* 0.1876 −0.5055 −0.0027 0.6238
-60 to -3 1041 0.0061 0.1306 −0.3458 −0.0013 0.4378
3 to 60 1038 −0.0071* 0.1318 −0.4063 −0.0085 0.4748
3 to 130 1036 −0.0410*** 0.2391 −1.0414 −0.0250 0.5838
3 to 260 1024 −0.0693*** 0.4065 −1.5839 −0.0450 1.1031
3 to 520 934 −0.1565*** 0.7745 −3.6193 −0.1004 1.9985
Notes: The table repeats the descriptive statistics from Table 2.4 on basis of winsorised cumulative average abnormal
returns at 0.5% on each side on the full sample. The mean column indicates the CAAR and its significance per
event window and estimation method of the expected return. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 2.13: CAAR differences, all events, winsorised
t IM - MM IM - GAM MM - GAM
0 to 1 0.0007*** 0.0005** −0.0001**
0 to 2 0.0009*** 0.0007** −0.0002***
0 to 5 0.0015*** 0.0010** −0.0005***
0 to 10 0.0028*** 0.0020*** −0.0009***
-2 to 0 0.0010*** 0.0009*** −0.0002**
-2 to 2 0.0016*** 0.0013*** −0.0003***
-3 to 3 0.0020*** 0.0015*** −0.0005***
-5 to 5 0.0024*** 0.0016*** −0.0009***
-5 to 10 0.0039*** 0.0025*** −0.0013***
-10 to 10 0.0051*** 0.0035*** −0.0016***
-20 to 20 0.0105*** 0.0070*** −0.0035***
-30 to 30 0.0144*** 0.0093*** −0.0051***
-50 to 50 0.0242*** 0.0159*** −0.0083***
-60 to -3 0.0140*** 0.0097*** −0.0043***
3 to 60 0.0136*** 0.0091*** −0.0045***
3 to 130 0.0318*** 0.0223*** −0.0096***
3 to 260 0.0586*** 0.0393*** −0.0193***
3 to 520 0.1214*** 0.0804*** −0.0411***
Notes: Each column lists the average difference between the indicated models’ cumulative abnormal returns from the
winsorised, full sample with a degree of 0.5% on each side. The asterisks indicate significances for paired difference
tests. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively. MM is Market Model, GAM is
GARCH-Adjusted Model and IM is Index Model. The basis of calculations is the full sample.
(4.14% without winsorisation), and IM is 8.04% greater than GAM (8.21% without
winsorisation).
2.4.7 Discussion
Negative long-term CAARs were expected and are consistent with previous research.
Two-year CAARs in the present study were not as negative as in Dargenidou,
Gregory & Hua (2016), that is, -11.26% to -14.33% over two years, and Franks
& Harris (1989), 12.60% over two years when using a Market Model. A markedly
less negative result was reported in Conn et al. (2005) with a buy and hold abnormal
return of -9.02% over three years using compounded ARs from the Market Model.15
More consistent with our results are Aw & Chatterjee (2004) with -24.4% over two
years using the MM. Much more negative findings using the MM were reported in
15Buy and hold abnormal returns use the cumulative product, i.e., compounding, instead of the
cumulative sum to aggregate abnormal returns over a period.
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Conn & Connell (1990) with -22.6% CAAR 12 months after announcement. While
we observed CAARs becoming negative relatively quickly after announcement —
around 75 trading days, i.e., three months for the IM and approximately 11 days for
the MM and GAM — Franks & Harris (1989) observed positive CAARs for IM and
insignificant CAARs for the MM after half a year. Sudarsanam & Mahate (2003)
reported non-significant CAARs over a similar period (t2 to t40).
The negative long-term returns are a clear indication of wide-spread agency costs
in UK bidding firms. Most acquisitions, to paraphrase Buffett (1981), serve to ex-
pand the empire while leaving the citizens poorer. However, this does not necessarily
mean that shareholders should forbid M&A. In our sample, 37% of events generated
positive abnormal returns over a two-year period.16
In contrast to long-term CARs, short-term CARs are about signalling as they
depict the expectations of long-term merger success. Our results confirm some UK-
based literature which finds significant positive short-term CARs for bidders (Conn
et al. 2005, Danbolt et al. 2015, Giannopoulos et al. 2017). Exceptions are Franks &
Harris (1989), Limmack (1991) and Higson & Elliott (1998) who have observed non-
significant short-term CAARs. Sudarsanam & Mahate (2003) and Raj & Forsyth
(2003) reported significant negative short-term CARs in the UK. Note that US
studies are usually in line with these latter findings of zero or negative short-term
ARs (Dodd 1980, Morck et al. 1990, Schwert 1996, Walker 2000, Andrade et al.
2001, Capron & Pistre 2002).
The combination of positive short-term CAARs and negative long-term CAARs
appears consistent throughout many UK-based studies. It is somewhat counter-
intuitive that the market’s positive assessment upon announcement consistently be-
comes negative in the long-term. Possible explanations for this change of assessment
might be: (1) that markets are not rational, i.e., shareholders are unrealistically op-
timistic about future merger success; (2) that post-merger problems simply cannot
be foreseen or estimated upon announcement and thus are unexpected when such
16The figure is based on CARs from the GARCH-Adjusted Model over the period t3 to t520 for
the full sample.
58
information becomes public knowledge; or (3) investment banks bolster bidding firm
share prices.17
The analysis of AAR and CAAR differences revealed that the Market Model leads
to significantly lower abnormal returns than its GARCH-corrected counterpart and
thus overstates the negative long-term effect of a takeover. GARCH adjustment
seems to move CAARs for events needing ARCH correction closer to the CAARs
for the sample of takeovers which did not exhibit ARCH effects (see Figure 2.4).
This finding, in turn, confirms that GAM betas are consistently lower than their
Market Model counterparts, which is also evident in the positive t-tests for mean
difference between the MM and GARCH-Adjusted Model betas (see Figures 2.2 and
2.3).18
The Index Model, on the other hand, had the opposite problem as it leads to
significantly higher returns than the more sophisticated alternatives. The results
provide strong support for the necessity of GARCH correction in event study meth-
odology. The difference between GARCH betas and OLS betas is consistent with
previous literature (Armitage & Brzeszczynski 2011). In our case, betas might be
lower because a portion of the variation collected in the MM beta was due to autore-
gressive volatility. Note, however, that this finding is not a mathematical implication
of GARCH. Corrected events exhibit a more volatile graph progression in Figure 2.4
but neither the graph nor any table make entirely clear that this is due to ri and
not rm (both are financial return series). This difference, however, is unimportant.
ARCH effects might be due to rm so that the subtrahend in the AR formula (Equa-
tion 2.1) causes the more volatile progression of the CAAR lines for corrected events
(while ARCH effects were only measured during the estimation period, they might
have persisted into the measurement period). Important is that correct for ARCH
and that beta was specified properly so that the benchmark and AR, in turn, were
17This is common practice in an Initial Public Offering (IPO), for example. It is unlikely though
as this practice is too expensive with larger bidders. On the other hand, all events receive equal
weights in the CAAR calculation, so that this point may warrant further investigation.
18CARGAM > CARMM implies that ri−(αGAM +βGAM rm) > ri−(αMM +βMM rm). As α can
be assumed to be zero on average, ri−βGAM rm > ri−βMM rm which is the same as βGAM < βMM
after dropping ri from both sides.
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correct. When ARCH effects were present, a standard MM seemed to overestimate
beta in our sample.19
Studies of statistical difference in benchmarks are uncommon in the literature
on M&A in the UK. As the GAM is our addition to M&A event study literature,
no comparison exists. In addition, the use of both the IM and MM in event studies
is strangely rare in this strand of literature which may reflect the importance of the
risk adjustment. In Franks & Harris (1989), the IM was almost 20% higher than
Market Model over two years following takeover for a UK sample. The CAPM in
their study is notably similar to the Index Model.
Results for both the MM and GAM did not differ much from results of other
studies using a range of related benchmarks (Franks & Harris 1989, Aw & Chatterjee
2004, Conn et al. 2005, Danbolt et al. 2015, Dargenidou et al. 2016, Giannopoulos
et al. 2017). Across the range of relevant literature, the simplistic IM seemed to
underestimate the severity of abnormal losses. The prevailing hypothesis that ac-
quisitions serve bidding firm management and not shareholders and therefore intro-
duce agency costs remains intact when correcting for ARCH effects. We suspect,
however, that the severity of these agency costs has been overestimated in previous
studies.
Overall our results confirm previous findings of long-term underperformance of
bidding firm shares. However, evidence of short-term CARs for UK bidders in the lit-
erature is mixed and our results confirm those that have reported gains (for example
Franks & Harris 1989). The statistically significant difference of 4.14% between MM
and GAM over two years translates to an economically significant disparity in value
creation of £373.53mn for the average bidder in our sample. Comparing MM to IM
this disparity increases to £1.11bn.
The evidence in this chapter contains implications for academics, practitioners
and regulators. For academics the main implications lie in the effects of ARCH when
19Which we did in the vast majority of cases. Only 3.96% of events were excluded due to the
remaining ARCH problems. We did not find it necessary to apply multivariate GARCH models,
which would allow for ARCH effects in rm.
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applying event study methodology. When ARCH effects are present in the estim-
ation period of an event, OLS seems to consistently overestimate systemic risk of
bidders. The event study arithmetic then implies higher expected returns which lead
to significantly lower abnormal returns. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that
previous research has understated abnormal returns for bidding firm shareholders.
Coefficients in previous cross-sectional studies are not affected by these differences
so that they remain valid. For shareholders, the traditional finding of long-term
value destruction of M&A must be upward corrected. Still, on average, shareholder
value is destroyed, implying UK takeovers are serving management more than its
shareholders and are therefore incurring agency costs. Executives and directors are
advised to take note of the detrimental long-term effect of takeover bids that accrues
in spite of short-term gains. Post-merger integration management is costly in both
financial terms as well as time and effort. Nonetheless, positive long term CARs are
possible and management would be doing well in studying our cross-sectional results
for determinants of long-term M&A success.
2.5 Conclusions
ARCH effects in OLS-based event studies can have a material impact on abnormal
return calculations which can be corrected using GARCH modelling. In a first-time
application of GARCH correction in M&A, this chapter addressed four research
questions: (1) Are there ARCH effects when conducting M&A event studies in
the UK? (2) Can models from the GARCH family help ameliorate the estimation
problems of OLS when ARCH effects are present? (3) Are the resulting abnormal
returns different from standard event studies when using ARCH models? and (4)
Do these differences translate to variations in CAR cross-sectional models?
An ARCH-Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test with up to five lagging days for the
detection of ARCH effects led to the detection of ARCH problems in 50.76% of
modelled events. In events with ARCH effects, we tested a range of GARCH fam-
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ily models, i.e., GARCH, eGARCH and tGARCH of the order (1, 1) to model the
ARCH effects. This approach sufficed for an inclusion of 96.04% of events. In our
sample, OLS seemed to overestimate betas when ARCH effects were present, leading
to a significant difference in both short- and long-term abnormal returns where the
GARCH-adjusted event study returned greater but still negative, results compared
to OLS (-20.09% in OLS vs. -15.95% when correcting for ARCH over two years for
the full sample). These differences did not lead to a significant difference in predict-
ors of either short- or long-term abnormal returns. Consistent with some UK-based
literature, we found positive short-term abnormal returns around the announcement
date (0.86% with pure OLS and 0.90% with GARCH correction within five days of
announcement) and long-term negative abnormal returns.
Contributions to the literature are made by providing a more detailed assess-
ment of bidding firm abnormal returns. Importantly, our results provide verification
of previous examinations of abnormal return drivers, while upwardly-correcting the
extent to which bidding stocks and acquirer shareholders are losing value. We col-
lected valuable evidence for the number of ARCH effects present in daily UK stock
data.
One or two suggestions can be made to improve on these results in future studies.
One improvement might lie in the averaging process of abnormal returns. For in-
stance, if small bidders overreact, value-weighted averages might produce a different
interpretation. The timing of announcement could also be further examined, as we
found some evidence of announcements on short-term market upswings. Future re-
search might also seek to replicate our methodology to gather evidence on abnormal
return creation in other markets. Finally, events with ARCH effects display more
negative abnormal returns than events without ARCH effects. This trend indicates
possible future research, for example, examining whether ARCH effects serve as an
indicator of negative returns, during and following M&A announcements.
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Chapter 3
Agency Costs in the Market for
Corporate Control: Evidence from
UK Takeovers
3.1 Introduction
The market for corporate control operates as a disciplinary mechanism which both
pressures managers to make decisions in the best interests of shareholders and acts
as the ‘court of last resort’ when other corporate governance systems fail (Kini,
Kracaw & Mian 2004, p 1512, citing Jensen 1987). Through price pressure and
imminent threats of takeover, stock markets are a key instrument for disciplining
management and reducing agency costs (Manne 1965). The purpose of this chapter
is to test whether agency costs predict takeover likelihood and if the takeover mech-
anism disciplines inefficient management. We address two main questions: (1) How
effective is the market for corporate control in an economy with an open merger
policy? and (2) What agency cost indicators are associated with market discipline?
By answering these questions, we determine the extent to which takeover likelihood
is related to the market for corporate control and agency costs. Rather than fore-
casting takeover probabilities on a case by case or aggregate basis, we determine the
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factors, in particular, which variables relate to agency costs, that lead to market
participants identifying a company as a takeover target.
Dispersed ownership, index investing strategies and free rider problems lead
shareholders to rely on buy and sell decisions instead of monitoring management.
Exit (the decision to sell) famously dominates the voice mechanism in market-based
systems of governance (Jensen & Ruback 1983). A stock’s value reflects the value
of the management of company assets (Manne 1965) and if values are lower than
could be achieved by a more efficient management team, the company becomes a
takeover target. After the takeover, inefficient management will be removed and the
stock price restored to the true value. According to Manne (1965), downward pres-
sure on stock prices resulting from shareholders’ decisions to sell their stock follow
from inefficient management of assets and are reflected in the market value. Any
deviation from the true value due to inefficient management are agency costs, that
is, costs arising from the separation of ownership and control Jensen & Meckling
(1976). Therefore, if agency costs for a given company surpass a certain threshold,
the company is expected to become a takeover target. In this chapter, a disciplinary
takeover is defined as a takeover that occurs due to increased agency costs in the
target firm. We expect takeover likelihood to increase with agency costs.
While majority of empirical research on the market for corporate control focuses
on abnormal returns accruing to target shareholders (Jensen & Ruback 1983), rel-
atively few studies have examined the more specific question of whether the market
disciplines firms that perform poorly due to agency costs. Studies on abnormal re-
turns to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) do not usually compare disciplinary and
non-disciplinary takeovers or targets and non-targets. However, takeovers may oc-
cur for non-disciplinary reasons such that the excess return is simply a reflection of
increased demand for target company stock. Similarly, no definitive statement can
be derived regarding the disciplinary effect of takeovers without comparison between
companies that are taken over and those that are not. Such a statement can be made
by modelling takeover likelihood.
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This chapter contributes to the literature on takeover likelihood, disciplinary
takeovers and agency costs. While the connection between takeover likelihood and
the market for corporate control has been made in previous studies (for example
Dickerson, Gibson & Tsakalotos 2002, Kini et al. 2004), our study adopts a more
explicit agency theory framework than previous studies of takeover likelihood, or
indeed of excess returns to M&A. A key component of our contribution follows
from differentiating candidates for disciplinary takeovers from other forms of M&A.
The methodology adopted by Dickerson et al. (2002) focusses on classifying cases
with respect to Jensen’s definition of agency costs of free cash flow 1986. Our
approach is to identify candidates for disciplinary takeover on the basis of excess
return and Tobin’s Q (TQ), which is more consistent with the approach advocated
by Manne (1965). We then examine how indicators of agency costs affect takeover
likelihood within the disciplinary set. Our results reveal that the definition applied
in Dickerson et al. (2002) is not effective in identifying disciplinary takeovers and
confirm the relationship between disciplinary takeovers and agency cost indicators.
Our findings help explain the workings of one of the central mechanisms for rec-
tifying systemic and company specific agency costs. We find strong support for the
impact of pre-bid stock return and valuation on takeover likelihood. Firms that
experience a significant fall in share price have a significantly higher takeover likeli-
hood. However, we find no association with agency costs for these takeovers. Stock
price falls alone do not indicate a disciplinary effect as stock price effects may indic-
ate a correction to the market value rather than agency costs. Such an effect may
arise simply due to investor sentiment. When we extend the analysis to takeovers
with a low market value relative to the replacement costs of assets (our definition of
disciplinary candidates), results indicate that agency cost indicators are associated
with takeover likelihood. Asset utilisation and sales growth exhibit positive asso-
ciations with takeover likelihood while profitability was negatively associated with
the risk of takeover for the disciplinary set.
For the non-disciplinary takeovers in our sample, company fundamentals had only
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a limited association with takeover likelihood. Given the UK context of our study,
in which anti-takeover provisions are disallowed, and when compared to findings of
US studies, our results imply support for the effectiveness of an open merger policy
if regulators desire a functional market for corporate control.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: We continue to review the
relevant literature on takeover likelihood and agency costs in Section 3.2. We then
present the hypotheses for this study in Section 3.3. Issues relating to data collection
and takeover likelihood modelling are discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 includes
the empirical results and a discussion of the findings. The final section provides
concluding comments.
3.2 Literature
3.2.1 Takeover Likelihood and the Market for Corporate
Control
Takeover likelihood studies have provided insight into the type of companies that
are more likely to be taken over. (Manne 1965) discussed the mechanism by which
poorly performing managers may be removed via the takeover mechanism. He de-
scribed this phenomenon as ‘the market for corporate control’. The pressure from
the market may be sufficient to motivate managers to act in the best interest of
shareholders. Inefficiently managed companies should, in this framework, become
takeover targets. Poorly performing management should be removed and new, more
efficient management installed. Shareholders are then protected from agency costs
because if companies perform sufficiently poorly with the assets of the company,
the price increases either as a result of bidding or by increases in the stock price
associated with the new and more efficient management.
If the market for corporate control is effective, we expect takeover likelihood
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to increase if management is observably underperforming. Several variables may
indicate the presence of agency costs. While agency costs are not directly measur-
able, they are approximated through indicators, often in correlation with measures
of the strength of a firm’s corporate governance. Prime indicators identified in the
literature are firm valuation, profitability, sales growth, firm size, cost- and sales effi-
ciency, indebtedness and debt capacity, dividend payments and levels of investment.
For instance, higher profitability or market valuation indicate lower levels of agency
costs. While it is possible that agency costs and high operating performance may
be simultaneously present, such costs are a problem only when shareholders do not
receive their required rate of return. Similarly, higher stock returns indicate lower
levels of agency costs (Jensen & Meckling 1976, Jensen 2001). Empirical results are
mixed. Powell & Yawson (2007) and Loderer & Waelchli (2015) found that excess
returns are positively associated with takeover probability. Alternatively, Agrawal
& Jaffe (2003) observed no relationship between stock returns and takeover risk,
whereas Dickerson et al. (2002) reported evidence for higher takeover likelihood in
low profitability firms.
With agency costs coming at the expense of shareholder wealth, a higher firm
valuation is an indication of lower agency costs (Jensen & Meckling 1976). One
measure of valuation, TQ, has been shown to increase with smaller boards (Yermack
1996) and optimisation of board size for the complexity of firms, such that simple
firms require small boards and more complex firms need larger board with more
outside directors (Coles, Daniel & Naveen 2008). Similarly, there is evidence of
higher valuations, as measured by Tobin’s Q and the book to market ratio, for firms
with stronger shareholder rights (Gompers, Ishii & Metrick 2003). Tobin’s Q has
been shown to increase with managerial ownership, until ownership reaches a critical
point where entrenchment is possible, and to increase with institutional ownership
(Doukas, Kim & Pantzalis 2000).
Tobin’s Q has also been applied as an indicator of growth problems in studying
agency costs of free cash flow. Jensen (1986) demonstrated that agency costs are
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associated with free cash flows. High free cash flows in the absence of growth projects
may indicate high agency costs (Jensen 1986, McKnight & Weir 2009). Jovanovic
& Rousseau (2002) view high Tobin’s Q as a driver of acquisition activity. Tobin’s
Q has been regressed against combined firm CARs in Aktas et al. (2010) without
reporting results. There is some evidence for a negative effect of TQ on short-
term bidder cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) (Bao & Edmans 2011), and of
smaller long-term bidding company CARs for firms with a high price earnings ratio
(Sudarsanam & Mahate 2003). In contrast, Hackbarth & Morellec (2008) find a
significant positive effect of the book to market ratio on long-term bidder CARs.
Several studies have also examined whether growth opportunities are associated
with takeover risk. However, these studies fail to reach consensus. Greater sales
growth reflects lower agency costs. Sales growth is higher for firms with stronger
shareholder rights (Gompers et al. 2003). Sales growth decreases with inside owner-
ship and increases with institutional ownership (Doukas et al. 2000). Sales growth
can also lower takeover likelihood (Loderer & Waelchli 2015), even though some
studies, for example Powell & Yawson (2007), directly examine the effect of vari-
ables which might be expected to be associated with company growth such as sales
growth and free cash flow on takeover likelihood but find no significant effect. Sales
growth, valuation multiples, liquidity and leverage can indicate imbalances between
growth opportunities and company resources (Palepu 1986, Powell & Yawson 2007).
The value of a company with high growth prospects but limited access to necessary
resources could be fully realised if that organisation were to be acquired by a bidder
with suitable resources. Consistent with this view, Palepu (1986) reported higher
takeover risk for firms identified as having a growth-resource imbalance.
Other studies more directly examined the relationship between growth oppor-
tunities, company valuation and takeover hazard. Bates, Becher & Lemmon (2008)
and Cremers, Nair & John (2008) observed a small but significant negative effect of
Tobin’s Q on takeover likelihood, indicating that as growth opportunities increased,
the risk of takeover was marginally reduced. On the other hand, Rhodes-Kropf,
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Robinson & Viswanathan (2005) observe a positive association between the market-
to-book ratio and takeover likelihood, which is inconsistent with an agency cost
explanation. Both Palepu (1986) and Ambrose & Megginson (1992) found no meas-
urable effect for Tobin’s Q.
In a study with similarities to the present study, Dickerson et al. (2002) tested
Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis by examining the level of investment, dividend
payment and leverage of high and low Tobin’s Q firms compared to other firms. On
average, higher investments lead to a lower takeover risk regardless of the level of
Tobin’s Q, while there was no relationship between Q and either dividend payments
or leverage. In addition, investment levels of low Q firms were negative, offering no
support for the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen 1986). Also, Edmans, Goldstein &
Jiang (2012) estimated the discount implied by the difference between the potential,
optimal firm valuation and market value. While the authors find strong support for
an active role of capital markets in a takeover, it is not clear whether the discount
was due to agency costs or mispricing.
Similar to firm value, profitability can be expected to be higher for low agency
cost firms. Higher profitability, in terms of return on equity, for firms with stronger
shareholder rights (Gompers et al. 2003). There is evidence for a positive effect of
profitability on TQ (Yermack 1996, Coles et al. 2008) and on the insider fraction on
board (Coles et al. 2008), a negative effect of profitability on board size (Coles et al.
2008). One study has found a positive effect of profitability on short-term bidder
CARs (Bao & Edmans 2011). Profitability is higher for firms with smaller boards,
and larger firm size (Yermack 1996). Likelihood of becoming a takeover target is
lower for more profitable firms in Dickerson et al. (2002), but higher in Loderer &
Waelchli (2015).
The asset utilisation ratio and expense ratio have been applied as agency cost
proxies, such that lower asset utilisation and higher expense ratio reflect higher
agency costs. Asset utilisation has been demonstrated to increase with equity own-
ership by management (Angwin 2000, Singh & Davidson III 2003 and limited evid-
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ence in McKnight & Weir 2009) and to decrease with Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
tenure (McKnight & Weir 2009).1 Similarly, the expense ratio has been shown to
decrease with higher managerial ownership (Ang et al. 2000, non-significant effect
in Singh & Davidson III 2003). Asset utilisation is decreasing with board size and
increasing with director ownership and firm size (Yermack 1996). Both ratios have
not yet been applied in econometric studies of takeover likelihood.
The level of debt is another variable expected to put pressure on management
to use resources more efficiently (Jensen 1986, Harvey, Lins & Roper 2004, Ber-
ger & Bonaccorsi di Patti 2006, King & Santor 2008, Margaritis & Psillaki 2010).
Therefore, higher levels of debt should be associated with lower takeover probability.
However, there appears to be limited support for this view in the empirical studies.
Bruner (1988) reported that target firms have significantly higher leverage compared
to their peers and Nuttall (1999) find that takeover likelihood increases only slightly
as debt increases. Leverage was reported to have an insignificant effect on takeover
likelihood in several other studies (Dickerson et al. 2002, Powell & Yawson 2007,
Loderer & Waelchli 2015).
3.2.2 Agency Cost Indicators
3.2.3 Influences on Takeover Likelihood
The likelihood of becoming a takeover target has been found to be influenced by
several variables. For instance, firm size is considered to have an important in-
fluence on takeover likelihood (Palepu 1986, Comment & Schwert 1995, Cooley &
Quadrini 2001, Dickerson et al. 2002, Loderer & Waelchli 2015). From an agency
cost perspective, larger firms are harder to monitor (McKnight & Weir 2009), their
management is prone to hubris (Moeller et al. 2004, 2005) and empire building ef-
forts (Gorton et al. 2009). Larger firms tend to be more active buyers in takeover
1Longer CEO tenure is indicative of entrenchment, which facilitates agency costs (Hermalin &
Weisbach 1998).
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markets, which supports the empire building perspective (McKnight & Weir 2009).
Also, larger firms are viewed as less attractive because they have fewer potential buy-
ers and are harder to integrate with the buyer (Cooley & Quadrini 2001). Takeover
likelihood should, therefore, be greater for small firms. In contrast to this, there is
evidence for a positive effect of firm size on asset utilisation (Yermack 1996, McK-
night & Weir 2009), profitability (Yermack 1996) and profit margin (Yermack 1996)
as well as sales growth (Doukas et al. 2000). Palepu (1986) and Comment & Schwert
(1995) find that the expected negative relationship while others reported a positive
effect (Dickerson et al. 2002, Loderer & Waelchli 2015).
Takeover risk also decreases as firms mature. Mature firms often have lower
profitability and fewer growth opportunities, making them less attractive to bidders
(Loderer & Waelchli 2015, Loderer, Stulz & Waelchli 2016). Such firms have lower
levels of investment in research and development and higher post-merger integration
costs. These firms may also have lower corporate governance standards and higher
agency costs as a result (Loderer & Waelchli 2015). For younger, smaller firms,
exit risk is a particular concern (Bhattacharya, Borisov & Yu 2015). The 10-year
survival rate for newly listed firms is just above 50%, with the main exit reason
being takeover (Fama & French 2004). Notably, Shumway (2001) find no empirical
evidence of a relationship between company age and risk of bankruptcy.
A commonly expressed hypothesis is that high cash reserves invite takeover bids,
especially when no growth opportunities are present (Palepu 1986). Contrary to
this expectation, the literature regularly fails to report a significant relationship
between liquidity and takeover likelihood (Palepu 1986, Barnes 2000, Dickerson et al.
2002). In fact, Loderer & Waelchli (2015) find that takeover likelihood is lower for
companies with high cash reserves.
Two further issues are worthy of consideration. First, M&A activity tends to oc-
cur in waves (DePamphilis 2010). During merger waves, or periods of high takeover
activity, takeover risk increases. These effects are closely related to economic growth
and industry concentration. Both of these factors can precipitate takeover waves and
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economic growth is often accompanied by high investor sentiment and greater avail-
ability of funds. Loderer & Waelchli (2015) observed a significant impact of industry
wide acquisition activity on takeover likelihood. Increasing industry concentration
can trigger strategic competition and herding behaviour, which increases takeover
likelihood. As industry concentration increases, competitors gain market share and
benefit from economies of scale. Such environments can lead to ‘eat or be eaten’
situations where competitors race to gain market share by acquisition (Schoenberg
& Reeves 1999). Powell & Yawson (2007) find that industry concentration, as meas-
ured by the Herfindahl Index, has a positive impact on takeover likelihood.2
Second, another strand of the literature focuses on the availability of merger part-
ners and the influence on takeover hazard. For instance, Hoberg & Phillips (2010)
examined the presence of firms with similar product ranges as a proxy for merger
partner availability. The authors report significantly higher takeover likelihood when
rivals to potential targets had similar product ranges, particularly if there were only
a few competitors. Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson (2008) found that companies with
similar market-to-book ratios were often M&A partners and Loderer & Waelchli
(2015) observed a positive effect on takeover likelihood when merger partners were
of similar size. Table 3.1 summarises the previous literature on takeover likelihood
and highlights key variables and their effect on takeover likelihood with respective
references.
3.3 Hypotheses
Consistent with Manne (1965), our prime indicator of disciplinary takeover risk is
a change in market value. We test this in two ways. First, we examine the effect
on disciplinary takeover risk arising from unexpected changes in the stock price and
second, a change in Tobin’s Q, that is, the market value relative to the replace-
ment cost of assets. These variables are the basis of our overarching hypotheses.
2The Herfindahl Index is calculated as the sum of squared market shares of all competitors in
a market. A higher value indicates greater industry concentration.
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Table 3.1: Previous literature
Panel A: Market value
Study (Year) Effect on
takeover likelihood
Excess return Powell & Yawson (2007), Loderer &
Waelchli (2015)
Positive
Agrawal & Jaffe (2003) Non-significant
Dickerson, Gibson & Tsakalotos (2002) Negative
Tobin’s Q Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson & Viswanathan
(2005)
Positive
Palepu (1986), Ambrose & Megginson
(1992)
Non-significant
Bates, Becher & Lemmon (2008), Cre-
mers, Nair & John (2008)
Negative
Stock price volatility Loderer & Waelchli (2015) Positive
Panel B: Firm level fundamentals
Asset utilisation Ang, Cole & Lin (2000), Singh & David-
son III (2003)
Negative
Expense ratio Ang et al. (2000), Singh & Davidson III
(2003)
Positive
Dividend payments Palepu (1986), Barnes (2000), Dickerson
et al. (2002)
Non-significant
Investments Dickerson et al. (2002) Negative
Leverage Bruner (1988), Nuttall (1999) Positive
Dickerson et al. (2002), Powell & Yawson
(2007), Loderer & Waelchli (2015)
Non-significant
Profitability Dickerson et al. (2002) Negative
Loderer & Waelchli (2015) Positive
Sales growth Powell & Yawson (2007) Non-significant
Loderer & Waelchli (2015) Negative
Tangible assets Dickerson et al. (2002) Negative
Powell & Yawson (2007), Loderer &
Waelchli (2015)
Non-significant
Notes: The table summarises variables used in previous literature together with their references, grouped by their
findings for each variable’s effect on takeover likelihood. Ang et al. (2000) and Singh & Davidson III (2003) are
not studies of takeover likelihood, but examine the effects of ownership structure on asset utilisation and expense
ratio (agency cost proxies). We demonstrate the hypothesised effect on takeover likelihood as an extension of our
overarching hypothesis that agency costs drive disciplinary takeover likelihood.
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Specifically, we hypothesise that a significant discount indicates high takeover risk
and argue that increases in takeover likelihood following significant reductions in
stock prices provide support for the effectiveness of the market for corporate con-
trol. However, given that stock price falls may be corrections to the true value of
the firm, we expect agency cost indicators to be relatively weakly associated with
disciplinary takeover risk. Hence, rather than using excess return for our primary
hypothesis, we argue that disciplinary takeover risk is associated with Tobin’s Q and
Tobin’s Q, in turn, is associated with agency cost indicators. Alternatively, our null
hypothesis is that takeover likelihood is unaffected by changes in Tobin’s Q and are
thus not associated with agency costs. Such a finding indicates an ineffective market
for corporate control. Thus, our primary hypotheses (H1 and H2) are:
H1: Disciplinary takeover likelihood is not related to excess return.
H2: Disciplinary takeover likelihood is negatively related to Tobin’s Q.
The third hypothesis (H3) tests whether takeover likelihood is driven by specific
measures of agency costs. In this view, and again consistent with Manne (1965),
agency costs drive market value discounts which in turn, activate the market for
corporate control and increase takeover likelihood. We argue that it is these firm
fundamentals that drive disciplinary takeovers. Hence, our third hypothesis is:
H3: The likelihood of disciplinary takeover is positively related to agency costs.
As pointed out in the literature review in Section3.2.2, agency costs have been
reported to be associated with firm-specific fundamental variables such as relative
profitability (Jensen & Meckling 1976, Gompers et al. 2003, Coles et al. 2008), as-
set utilisation (Jensen & Meckling 1976, Ang et al. 2000, Singh & Davidson III
2003), cost management (Jensen & Meckling 1976, Ang et al. 2000, Singh & Dav-
idson III 2003), dividend policy (Jensen 1986), leverage (Jensen 1986, McKnight
& Weir 2009), unused debt capacity (Jensen 1986, Powell & Yawson 2007), invest-
ment behaviour (Jensen 1986, Yermack 1996) and growth (Jensen 1986, Singh &
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Davidson III 2003, McKnight & Weir 2009). Combining H3 with the interpretation
of the aforementioned variables from the perspective of agency theory leads to the
following sub-hypotheses for H3:
H3:
(i) Higher profitability is indicative of lower agency costs and is therefore
negatively related to the likelihood of disciplinary takeover.
(ii) Greater asset utilisation reflects lower agency costs and, by extension, has
a negative relation with the likelihood of disciplinary takeover.
(iii) A higher expense ratio signals higher agency costs and is consequently
related to greater likelihood of disciplinary takeover.
(iv) Higher dividend payments are indicative of lower agency costs and there-
fore have a negative relation to the likelihood of disciplinary takeover.
(v) Greater usage of leverage is indicative of lower agency costs and is there-
fore negatively related to the likelihood of disciplinary takeover.
(vi) Tangibility acts as a proxy for an entity’s debt capacity and thus has a
similar impact on the likelihood of disciplinary takeover as leverage.
(vii) Capital expenditures can indicate greater agency costs and are therefore
positively related to the likelihood of disciplinary takeover.
(viii) Greater sales growth is indicative of lower agency costs and therefore has
a negative correlation with the likelihood of disciplinary takeover.
3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 Sample Characteristics
Data for this study were collected for all UK companies - excluding financial com-
panies and utilities - which have a primary listing in London and were listed at
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Table 3.2: Sample construction
Panel A: Sample development
N firms N takeovers
Initial 4403 1630
Exclude negative sales or total assets 3659 1630
Exclude firm-year observations after a 100% takeover 3653 1557
Exclude firm-year observation with negative duration 3570 1530
Exclude companies younger than five years 2077 751
Exclude missing data 1929 704
Panel B: Final Sample
Count % of firm-year obs. % of distinct firms
N Firm-years 23 893
N Distinct firms 1929
N Takeovers of 100% 704 2.95 36.50
Notes: The table details the development of number of firm-year observations and number of takeovers in relation
to inclusion criteria in Panel A. Panel B shows number of firm-year observations, number of firms, number of 100%
and their ratios for the final sample. Note that some models will use a smaller sample due to further missing
observations. The final sample for Panel B corresponds to model 2 from Table 3.6.
any point during 1986 to 2015. Company fundamental data were collected from
Thomson Reuters DataStream and information regarding takeover bids was collec-
ted from Thomson ONE Banker. The announcement date was taken as the date of
the takeover bid and the completion date was defined as the effective date of the
merger or acquisition. Only successful takeovers where 100% of equity was owned
by the bidder after completion were included.3 The initial sample included 6,016
takeovers of UK public targets with 874 failed attempts. Details of the sample con-
struction are provided in Table 3.2. Panel A lists exclusions from the sample due to
missing or inadequate data regarding the number of firms and takeovers. The num-
ber of firm-year observations, firms and takeovers in the final sample are provided
in Table 3.2 Panel B. Note that around one-third of sample companies were taken
over.
Our specification requires identification not just of takeovers but, more specific-
ally, of disciplinary takeovers. The methodology for TQ interaction terms used here
resembles the technique applied by Dickerson et al. (2002). However, Dickerson
et al. (2002) tested Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, while we focus on To-
bin’s Q to test the market for corporate control. Specifically, we classify disciplinary
3Acquisitions of smaller percentages of control, e.g., 75%, are negligible in our sample. See
Figure B.1 in Appendix B.
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takeover by identifying companies that have underperformed. We did this in two
ways. First, we create dummy variables indicating any company in the lowest group
for a given quantile of an industry-year group for excess return and Tobin’s Q. For
the initial analysis, we use the median, terciles, quartiles and deciles. Results were
strongest for the deciles of industry-year groups and, therefore, we used deciles (d q
decile) for the main analysis.
Other firm-specific variables were standardised by industry-year group and we use
ICB industry classifications to identify industry groupings. All models include lagged
values for estimation of current takeover hazard. We also control for several variables
that are expected to affect takeover likelihood with the explanatory variables. We
include market-wide variables such as industry concentration, takeover intensity
and macroeconomic growth in the estimation along with firm-specific factors such
as the availability of similarly sized and valued competitors as previous studies have
demonstrated that these factors are relevant to takeover risk (Loderer & Waelchli
2015). Variable definitions are listed in Table 3.3.4
3.4.2 Cox Proportional Hazards (Cox PH) Model
While traditional takeover likelihood literature relies on probit or logistic models
(Palepu 1986, Ambrose & Megginson 1992), more recent studies have used survival
analysis (Dickerson et al. 2002, Loderer & Waelchli 2015). Interestingly, a sim-
ilar methodological shift has been observed in the bankruptcy prediction literature
(Shumway 2001).
Survival models respect the panel nature of the data. As such, models from
the survival family do not face the matching problem inherent in traditional limited
4An important issue with the model we use is the basis for calculating duration. We calculate
duration as the difference in years between financial year end and the first available year of data or
the date of the most recent relevant event. The earliest available year of data for UK companies in
DataStream is 1964. Accordingly, our data were effectively winsorised such that all companies are
considered to have been established in that year. Only about 9% of all companies were established
in 1964 and of these, 53% were successfully taken over. In contrast, of the companies established
after 1964, only 34% were acquired. See Figures B.2 and B.3 in Appendix B.
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Table 3.3: Variable definitions
Panel A: Market value
Variable Definition
excess r Difference between stock return and market return for the 12 months end-
ing at financial year end. Returns are calculated on basis of DataStream’s
return index.
q (Market value of equity plus total debt) divided by total assets
volatility Standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the last 12 months ending
at latest full month before or on financial year end
d excess r decile 1 if firm-year observation is in bottom decile of its industry-year group for
excess r
d q decile 1 if firm-year observation is in bottom decile of its industry-year group for
q
Panel B: Firm specific fundamentals
Variable Definition
duration Difference between financial year end and BDATE in full years
asset utilisation Net sales divided by average of beginning- and end-of-year book values of
Total Assets.
expense ratio Operating expense divided by Net sales. Winsorisation is increased to
2.75% on the right side for the removal of extreme values.
div on assets Cash dividends paid divided by average of beginning- and end-of-year book
values of Total Assets
investment Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) divided by average of beginning- and end-
of-year book values of Total Assets
leverage End-of-year book value Total Debt divided by end-of-year book value of
Total Assets. Winsorisation is increased to 0.50% on the right side to
remove outliers.
roa Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) divided by average of
beginning- and end-of-year book values of assets
sales growth Net sales divided by previous year’s net sales minus one. Winsorisation is
increased to 0.30% on the right side to remove extreme values.
tangible End of year Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) divided by end-of-year
book value of assets.
Panel C: Control variables
Variable Definition
ln mva Natural logarithm of (Market value of equity plus book value Total Debt)
mtb similarity Number of companies with similar market to book ratio from the same
industry-year group divided by total number of companies in the group.
Similarity is assumed for all peers with market to book ratios within 0.25
standard deviations of the company in question.
size similarity Number of similar sized companies from the same industry-year group,
divided by total number of companies in the industry-year group. Similar
size is assumed for companies with a market value of equity within 0.15
standard deviations of the company in question.
intensity Number of other companies from the same industry-year group that get
taken over, divided by total number of other companies in the industry-
year group
herfindahl Sum of squared Net sales figures for all companies of the industry-year
group. The top 2.5% percentile is excluded from the group to prevent
misclassification (Giroud & Mueller 2010, Loderer & Waelchli 2015).
gdp growth Year on year real GDP growth
start A binary variable that is 1 for all companies that are present in the first
year of the panel and 0 otherwise (See Figures B.2 and B.3 in Appendix B).
Notes: The table details the calculation of all variables. Firm-level variables were standardised by industry-year
group. All unbound continuous variables were winsorised at 0.25% on each side to remove outliers unless a different
degree is indicated.
78
dependent variable models such as logit models or probit models. In such models
takeover cases need to be matched with non-takeover cases which implies that choice-
based sampling is necessary. This sampling process, in turn, introduces a bias into
the model (Palepu 1986). Additionally, by maintaining the panel structure of the
data, survival models incorporate the time-dependence of firm-year observations
within firm groups (Dickerson et al. 2002).5 Survival analysis accomplishes this, by
modelling takeover likelihood conditional on survival up unto that point in time.
Finally, survival analysis allows for censoring of data, which means that firms can
leave the sample for reasons other than takeover. This enriches the data set by
adding information that otherwise would be lost (Klein & Moeschberger 2005).
We used the Cox Proportional Hazards (Cox PH) model to estimate the effect
of our explanatory variables (see Table 3.3) on takeover hazard. The initial Cox PH
model was defined as follows:
h(t|x, y, z) = h0(t) exp(β′x+ γ′y + ε′z) (3.1)
where h(t|x, y, z) is the hazard at time t conditional on vectors of covariates x, y
and z, h0(t) is the baseline hazard which, in the case of Cox PH, is non-parametric
and β, γ and ε are the vectors of coefficients to be estimated.x is a vector of firm-
level, market-value-based variables, y is a vector of firm-level fundamental variables
and z is a vector of firm-, industry and macro-level control variables. Covariates are
lagged by one period. All models incorporate firm-specific (clustered) fixed effects.
We included the start variable in all specifications to capture possible survivorship
bias for companies established before 1964.
The assumption of proportional hazard states that the effect of a covariate on
hazard is proportional over time, i.e., the covariate introduces a constant relative
hazard. We tested this assumption by requiring a non-zero slope in a generalised lin-
ear regression of scaled Schoenfeld residuals over a function of duration (Schoenfeld
5A firm’s current year values are influenced by last year’s values.
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1982). Where the assumption was violated, we attempted to restore proportionality
by including an interaction term between the problematic covariate and duration.
To address the second research question, we interacted low excess return and low
Tobin’s Q dummies with the firm-specific fundamental variables:
h(t|dx, y, dxy, z) = h0(t) exp(β′dx + γ′y + δ′dxy + ε′z) (3.2)
where in addition to the variables in Equation 3.1, dx is a dummy variable in-
dicating cases of either excess return or Tobin’s Q in the bottom decile of the firm’s
industry-year group. δ is the vector of coefficients for the interaction terms between
dx and y.
3.4.3 Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) Model
As a robustness test, we compared the Cox PH results to those of an Accelerated
Failure Time model with an assumed Weibull distribution. In log-linear form, such
a model can be written as:
lnT = µ− (β′dx + γ′y + δ′dxy + ε′z) + σW (3.3)
where lnT is the log of failure time, µ is the mean failure time and β′dx + γ′y+
δ′dxy + ε′z is the acceleration factor. σW is the error term and W describes the
error term distribution. We assumed a Weibull distribution. The coefficients are
logs of survival time ratios and the interpretation of coefficient signs is the opposite
of that of a Cox PH model, i.e., a positive sign indicates a longer survival time.
3.4.4 Logistic Regression (Logit) Model




1 + exp−(βdx + γy + δdxy + εz + ui)
(3.4)
where, in addition to previously defined variables P (i) is the probability of firm-
year i receiving a successful takeover bid in the next period and ui is the error term
to the logistic regression.
3.4.5 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 3.1 depicts the number of successful 100% acquisitions in the final sample.
The graph reveals the somewhat wavelike appearance of merger activity. The first
wave starts to build in the mid-1980s and reaches a peak in 1989. The second wave
builds rapidly to a peak at the height of the dot-com boom in 1999 before rapidly
declining. The third wave begins around 2004, the peak is reached in 2007 and then
declines as the UK economy struggled with the aftermath of the Global Financial
Crisis.
Table 3.4 lists the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in this
chapter. We used the average of the beginning-of-year and end-of-year financial data
for the denominator for all flowing variables (for example Return on Assets (ROA)).
To control for outlying observations, we winsorise unbound continuous variables at
0.25%, unless stated otherwise (see Table 3.3). Note that volatility was not included
in the interaction models due to its association with market-value-based variables.
The sample size was set at the maximum number of observations from all later
models.6
Correlation coefficients between the key predictors and control variables are listed
in Table 3.5. Most coefficients are small but significant. The strongest correlation is
6A particularly notable value is the mean of 17% for d excess r decile, which was due to the
dummies being created as early as possible in the data set development (i.e., at step Initial in
Table 3.2) to include the maximum amount of information. A robustness test with the excess r
dummy was calculated in the latest step, and therefore, a mean of 10% was added in Table B.1
(see Appendix B).
81
The blue lines indicate the top and bottom 20% quantiles for the number of takeovers.
Figure 3.1: Number of takeovers per year in final sample
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics
N mean std min median max
div on assets 20 255 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.34
investment 23 149 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.65
leverage 23 893 0.19 0.20 0.00 0.15 1.52
excess r 22 404 −0.11 0.54 −2.79 −0.05 1.75
volatility 23 893 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.61
asset utilisation 23 291 1.28 0.93 0.00 1.15 6.81
expense ratio 22 789 1.11 0.89 0.35 0.94 7.02
roa 23 155 0.02 0.28 −2.95 0.08 0.69
sales growth 22 766 0.31 2.03 −1.00 0.08 33.83
tangible 23 742 0.30 0.24 0.00 0.26 0.96
mva 23 893 931.83 4651.24 0.58 58.19 60 233.82
mtb similarity 23 893 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.21 0.50
size similarity 23 893 0.44 0.29 0.00 0.48 0.94
intensity 23 893 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06
herfindahl 23 893 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.72
gdp growth 23 893 0.02 0.02 −0.06 0.03 0.07
d excess r decile 23 893 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00
d q decile 23 893 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00
Notes: Variable definitions are in Table 3.3. Market value of assets (mva) is in £mn.
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-0.78, which is between firm size (ln mva) and similarly sized merger partners (size
similarity). Another strong coefficient is -0.69 between excess r and d excess r decile,
which are not simultaneously included in any given model. Few other coefficients
exceed 0.3.
3.5 Results and Discussion
In this section, we present the results of the Cox PH analysis. First, we describe
baseline models and then introduce the controls. We begin by assessing the impact
of stock performance and Tobin’s Q on takeover likelihood, as listed in Table 3.6.
We then interact the lowest decile variables, indicating disciplinary takeover risk,
with our independent variables which indicate the potential presence of agency costs
(Table 3.7). Tables 3.8 and 3.10 include details of further analyses and robustness
checks using the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model, comparing different in-
teraction dummy definitions and an analysis of cases with low valuation and low
profitability.
3.5.1 Excess Return, Tobin’s Q and Takeover Likelihood
Table 3.6, models 1 and 2 and list the results of the Cox PH models using firm-
specific external (market-value) indicators as predictors. The first column presents
the model, including excess return and controls. In the second column, we replace
excess return with Tobin’s Q. Results for market value-related variables are largely
consistent with the hypothesised effects on takeover likelihood; excess returns and
valuation multiples are negatively related to takeover likelihood, i.e., takeover likeli-
hood increases with lower performance and company valuation. These findings hold
when explanatory variables were combined with firm-level fundamental variables
and controls in model 5.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.6: Cox PH models
Market Value Firm level fundamentals Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




volatility 0.705*** 0.817*** 0.874***
(0.082) (0.079) (0.095)
asset utilisation 0.001 0.030 0.029
(0.053) (0.054) (0.055)
expense ratio 0.053 −0.144 −0.239
(0.221) (0.206) (0.195)
div on assets −0.049 0.010 −0.041
(0.062) (0.061) (0.068)
investment 0.131 0.132 0.163
(0.120) (0.110) (0.121)
leverage 0.114 0.230 0.095
(0.144) (0.139) (0.143)
roa −0.223*** −0.117 0.075
(0.081) (0.088) (0.097)
sales growth −0.190 −0.052 −0.081
(0.216) (0.195) (0.191)
tangible 0.020 0.019 0.025
(0.051) (0.051) (0.108)
start −1.862*** −1.862*** −2.671*** −1.936*** −1.759***
(0.143) (0.139) (0.128) (0.147) (0.155)
ln mva 0.228*** 0.257*** 0.127* 0.164**
(0.063) (0.062) (0.073) (0.075)
mtb similarity 0.133** 0.030 0.477*** 0.311
(0.054) (0.056) (0.127) (0.132)
size similarity 0.310*** 0.297*** 0.234*** 0.250***
(0.053) (0.051) (0.055) (0.058)
intensity 95.437*** 94.012*** 113.050*** 90.105***
(6.153) (5.997) (6.345) (7.070)
herfindahl 6.151*** 6.524*** 7.222*** 6.058***
(0.923) (0.907) (1.067) (1.109)
gdp growth 38.930*** 41.455*** 14.352*** 59.386***
(5.046) (4.991) (2.657) (6.587)
N 22 407 23 893 20 076 19 938 18 514
Number of events 658 704 586 586 548
R2 0.056 0.056 0.027 0.049 0.060
Max. Possible R2 0.408 0.412 0.404 0.406 0.406
Log Likelihood -5229.550 -5660.306 -4920.394 -4699.875 -4245.276
Wald Test 1390.070*** 1446.520*** 413.740*** 1149.490*** 1191.920***
LR Test 1301.470*** 1366.708*** 552.772*** 992.351*** 1153.128***
Score (Logrank) Test 1415.186*** 1446.747*** 646.523*** 1240.250*** 1315.819***
Notes: The table shows Cox PH models for market value based variables and controls in columns 1 and 2, Cox
PH models for firm level fundamental variables in columns 3 and 4 and a Cox PH model combining all variables
in column 5. Variable definitions are in Table 3.3. Models 1 and 2 contain interaction terms of volatility, gdp
growth, intensity and herfindahl with duration. Models 3 and 4 contain interaction terms of investment, leverage,
sales growth, tangible, intensity and gdp growth with duration. Panel C contains interaction terms of duration
with volatility, investment, sales growth, tangible, intensity and gdp growth. This is for the protection of Cox PH
assumptions. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Loderer & Waelchli (2015) find a significant positive effect on takeover likelihood
and Agrawal & Jaffe (2003) report no relationship between takeover likelihood and
stock performance. The negative impact of Tobin’s Q in our study is consistent with
findings of Bates et al. (2008) and Cremers et al. (2008). To an extent, our results
contradict Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) who find a positive effect of the market-to-
book ratio on takeover likelihood.
Volatility, which can be interpreted as higher price uncertainty, had a positive
effect on takeover likelihood in our models. It might reasonably be expected that
risk-averse bidders would prefer lower volatility. One explanation for this finding is
that volatility presents potential acquirers with an opportunity to launch their bid.
Such opportunities may be related to agency costs, especially considering we control
for industry-year fixed effects.
It is interesting to note that firm size similarity had a positive effect on takeover
likelihood in our sample. Also notable are the large coefficients for takeover intensity
and real GDP growth. The need to control for survivorship bias was confirmed by
significant positive coefficients for the start dummy in all models. Overall, the results
in models 1 and 2 listed in Table 3.6 are consistent with the market for corporate
control explanation and indicate that takeover likelihood is related to falling stock
prices and company valuations.
3.5.2 Takeover Likelihood and Firm Fundamentals
Firm-specific fundamental variables had little effect on takeover likelihood. Table 3.6
provides details of models 3 and 4 depicts Cox PH models based on internal firm-
specific variables. The first column (model 3) presents the baseline model, including
firm-specific fundamental variables. Firm-specific, industry and economy level con-
trols were added to the model (2), as shown in the second column (model 4). Model
5 combines the fourth model (4) with the explanatory variables from models 1 and
2. The only internal variable with a significant, and in this case, negative coefficient
86
was return on assets (roa). However, the significance disappears when industry and
macro-wide controls are included. All other internal variables are non-significant
across all models.
The results are consistent with several other studies of takeover likelihood. The
insignificant effect of leverage on takeover risk is consistent with Dickerson et al.
(2002), Powell & Yawson (2007) and Loderer & Waelchli (2015) but contrary to
positive impacts found in Bruner (1988) and Nuttall (1999). Dickerson et al. (2002)
also reported a negative relationship between takeover likelihood and capital ex-
penditure, which we cannot confirm. However, our results are consistent for return
on assets (positive) and dividends (insignificant). Powell & Yawson (2007) finding
that sales growth is not related to takeover likelihood is also confirmed.
The lack of significance of firm fundamentals on takeover likelihood is slightly
surprising and, therefore, lead to the next step of the analysis. Theoretical argu-
ments for the superior predictive power of market-based variables are present in the
bankruptcy forecasting literature (Agarwal & Taffler 2008). Under the assumption
of market efficiency, asset prices should contain all information that can be extracted
from financial statements, including any identifiable risk of takeover or bankruptcy.
Perhaps the lack of significance in our sample is due to firm fundamentals contain-
ing little of such information, whereas market values are more informative. It could
be that information received after the last accounting date is more pertinent to
such risks. However, we propose another view. We argue that most takeovers are
not disciplinary, and the effect of firm fundamentals is expected to be different for
disciplinary and non-disciplinary takeovers. These effects may be offset in general
models. Our next step is, therefore, to distinguish between disciplinary and non-
disciplinary takeovers. Given that we find decreases in stock price and company
valuation increase takeover likelihood, we next consider whether firm fundamentals,
and in particular agency costs, drive takeover likelihood for companies that have
underperformed in the previous 12 months.
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3.5.3 Disciplinary Takeovers and Agency Costs
Manne (1965) states that if a company’s market value falls relative to the value
that could be achieved under a more efficient management team, the company is
likely to become a takeover target. This mechanism does not require any change
in fundamentals, only a change in value. The logical next step is to ask what
drives acquisition likelihood within those companies that experience the steepest
price discounts and are thus the strongest candidates for disciplinary takeovers. To
investigate this issue, we interact company fundamentals with a binary variable that
indicated firm-year observations in the bottom decile of excess return and Tobin’s Q
for firm’s industry-year group. Table 3.7 shows the results of the models of takeover
likelihood, including the disciplinary dummy that indicated the lowest decile for
excess return - or Tobin’s Q - and internal firm fundamentals.
Our second hypothesis posits that takeover likelihood increases as agency costs
increase. Agency costs are not directly observable but have been found to be related
to several firm-specific variables (see Table 3.1). We hypothesise that these variables
are related to takeover likelihood for disciplinary takeovers. By interacting the firm-
specific indicators of agency costs with the disciplinary dummy, we confirm that
takeover likelihood can be predicted by such fundamental variables.
In Table 3.7, our initial interest is in the interaction between firm fundament-
als and the disciplinary dummy variable (d excess r decile). The lowest decile
dummy was significant in all models for the excess return specification of discip-
linary takeover but not when disciplinary takeovers were identified using the lowest
decile for Tobin’s Q. Firm fundamentals appear to have only a weak relation to
takeover likelihood in models 1 to 3, with the exception of the expense ratio, which
had the correct sign for agency costs. In models 5 and 6, the Tobin’s Q interaction
was insignificant while agency cost indicators were significant. Several specific inter-
actions were identified as significant from our agency costs indicators and consistent
with the market for corporate control hypotheses.
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Table 3.7: Firm level fundamental/market value interaction
Excess Return Tobin’s Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
asset utilisation 0.005 0.017 −0.004 0.008 −0.039 −0.010
(0.053) (0.059) (0.059) (0.053) (0.060) (0.061)
expense ratio 0.043 −0.128 −0.239 0.053 0.054 −0.125
(0.220) (0.241) (0.227) (0.220) (0.237) (0.218)
div on assets −0.044 −0.078 −0.013 −0.055 −0.098 −0.036
(0.062) (0.071) (0.069) (0.063) (0.068) (0.067)
investment 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.048 0.063 0.116
(0.133) (0.137) (0.126) (0.133) (0.133) (0.122)
leverage 0.064 0.038 0.090 0.066 0.077 0.140*
(0.071) (0.084) (0.084) (0.071) (0.074) (0.074)
roa −0.196** −0.240** −0.137 −0.228*** −0.130 −0.012
(0.084) (0.104) (0.107) (0.081) (0.092) (0.097)
sales growth −0.173 −0.174 −0.065 −0.180 −0.281 −0.183
(0.214) (0.220) (0.198) (0.216) (0.219) (0.205)
tangible 0.168 0.213 0.116 0.170 0.155 0.056
(0.109) (0.113) (0.106) (0.108) (0.109) (0.104)
d market 0.221** 0.311** 0.384*** −0.077 −0.211 −0.251
(0.108) (0.120) (0.121) (0.145) (0.221) (0.221)
start −2.632*** −2.639*** −2.059*** −2.650*** −2.676*** −1.941***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.146) (0.129) (0.129) (0.148)
ln mva 0.126* 0.109
(0.072) (0.073)
mtb similarity 0.487** 0.433**
(0.131) (0.126)






gdp growth 14.514*** 14.299***
(2.681) (2.658)
asset utilisation:d market −0.037 −0.026 0.331** 0.268*
(0.136) (0.137) (0.142) (0.142)
expense ratio:d market 0.698 0.802* −0.210 −0.148
(0.490) (0.484) (0.619) (0.603)
div on assets:d market 0.173 0.104 0.263* 0.248
(0.138) (0.146) (0.162) (0.169)
investment:d market −0.016 −0.043 −0.089 0.034
(0.168) (0.168) (0.310) (0.304)
leverage:d market 0.102 0.112 −0.241 −0.308
(0.154) (0.155) (0.339) (0.326)
roa:d market 0.152 0.147 −0.766*** −0.746***
(0.181) (0.194) (0.208) (0.215)
sales growth:d market 0.004 0.027 0.597** 0.523*
(0.237) (0.226) (0.187) (0.201)
tangible:d market −0.190 −0.215 −0.023 −0.065
(0.134) (0.135) (0.193) (0.194)
d market d excess r decile d q decile
N 20 076 20 076 19 938 20 076 20 076 19 938
Number of events 586 586 586 586 586 586
Number of events in 118 118 118 57 57 57
d market
R2 0.027 0.028 0.047 0.027 0.028 0.049
Max. Possible R2 0.404 0.404 0.406 0.404 0.404 0.406
Log Likelihood -4917.220 -4913.826 -4716.457 -4919.100 -4907.722 -4690.152
Wald Test 429.300*** 442.440*** 1178.190*** 417.810*** 440.340*** 1167.130***
LR Test 559.121*** 565.909*** 959.187*** 555.360*** 578.117*** 1011.796***
Score (Logrank) Test 655.418*** 661.390*** 1245.531*** 649.260*** 672.286*** 1253.358***
Notes: The table shows Cox PH models including a dummy that indicates the bottom decile for excess r in Panel
A and a dummy that indicates the bottom decile for TQ in Panel B. Variable definitions in Table 3.3. Panel A
contains interaction terms of investment, tangible, sales growth, mtb similarity and intensity with duration. Panel
B contains interaction terms of investment, tangible, sales growth, intensity and herfindahl with duration. *p<0.1;
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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When the expense ratio was interacted with the excess return specification of
the disciplinary dummy, a slightly significant positive coefficient was observed in
model 3. Among the firms that experienced the lowest levels of excess return and
essentially, falling stock prices, those with poor cost discipline were more likely to
be taken over. While it could be argued that such companies should be unattractive
for bidders, our perspective is that these companies experience agency costs and
do not have a sufficiently strong position to resist takeover. Companies in the
lowest decile for excess return and with higher expense ratios are associated with a
higher risk of being taken over, implying, in our framework, that bidder management
likely expects to be able to improve cost discipline and returns. Other interactions
between the lowest decile dummy for excess return and firm fundamentals returned
no significance.
We use Tobin’s Q rather than excess return to identify disciplinary takeovers
for our formal test of hypothesis 2, while all other model specifications remained
unchanged. Hence, the disciplinary dummy represents companies in the lowest decile
of Tobin’s Q. Contrary to results in models 1 to 3, the disciplinary dummy itself
was insignificant in all three models. However, the interaction terms between the
disciplinary dummy and firm fundamentals exhibit significance for several variables.
Specifically, a notably strong effect, which was consistent across all models, was
identified on return on assets (roa), as detailed in Table 3.7, Panel B. Takeover
hazard decreases as the company’s return on assets increases for companies in the
lowest decile of TQ. The finding for return on assets was consistent with the view
that these companies may have minimal leeway for performance improvement if the
market accurately values the current efforts of management, i.e. the agency costs.
Also, weaker performance regarding return on assets attracts disciplinary takeovers.
When compared to Panel A of Table 3.7, we find a significant effect of sales
growth on takeover likelihood. When disciplinary takeovers were classified using
the lowest decile of Q rather than excess return, the sales growth (d q decile:sales
growth) became positive, specifically, as sales growth increases takeover risk also in-
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creases. Similar effects on takeover likelihood were associated with asset utilisation
and when ignoring controls dividend payments. Asset utilisation (d q decile:asset
utilisation) increased takeover likelihood in both models with slightly greater signi-
ficance in model 5. Similarly, dividends (d q decile:div on assets) were associated
with increased takeover risk in model 5 only. Consistent with our hypothesis, higher
asset utilisation was associated with higher takeover risk for companies in the lowest
decile for Tobin’s Q.
Within the market for corporate control framework, the results in Table 3.7 can
be summarised as follows: sales growth, asset utilisation and, to a limited degree,
dividends raise the likelihood of becoming a target for a disciplinary takeover. Also,
return on assets has a negative effect on disciplinary takeover likelihood. Each of
these variables were consistent with our hypotheses regarding the firm-specific vari-
ables. These results are more intuitive when considering that previous studies have
examined takeover likelihood rather than disciplinary takeover likelihood. Concern-
ing low TQ firms, i.e. underperforming firms, potential bidders appear to be selective
with regards to asset utilisation, sales growth and profitability. In this case, low TQ
indicates the presence of agency costs. On the other hand, a one-year price fall may
be a correction to the stock price rather than an indicator of agency costs.
The negative coefficient for return on assets for the low TQ firms provides further
support for our hypothesis. This finding is consistent with expectations in the
literature for takeover likelihood summarised in Table 3.1. For the low TQ set,
higher profit might be expected to attract bidders because these candidates may be
undervalued. Low Q firms with high return on assets indicate an opportunity for
more efficient management to improve performance, as proposed by (Manne 1965).
In this case, both low Q and low profitability indicate agency costs and increase
disciplinary takeover likelihood. Similarly, when profit is low but other indicators
such as sales growth or asset utilisation are high, agency costs may be constraining
performance and such companies would be expected to become candidates for a
disciplinary takeover in a market for corporate control framework.
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If our definition of disciplinary takeovers used is accepted, our results provide
strong support to Manne’s (1965) market for corporate control argument. Notably, a
declining stock price does not imply that a company is cheap. The discounted stock
price may move the company valuation towards the true value and if the efficient
market hypothesis holds, there is no reason for these companies to become takeover
targets. However, if the company is subject to agency costs and, as Manne (1965)
explains, a more efficient management team could enhance stock price, it is expected
that beyond a given threshold, the company is likely to become a takeover target.
One of the strongest indications of agency costs is that company value has deviated
from potential value. In our study, Tobin’s Q appears to be a strong indicator of
the presence of agency costs and takeover likelihood.
3.5.4 Robustness Tests
We perform two robustness checks to confirm our findings. First, we repeat the Cox
PH model using an Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model. This test confirms the
preceding results. As a second robustness test, we check the appropriateness of our
choice to use the lowest decile of Tobin’s Q. Extending our specification inevitably
reduced the significance of the agency cost indicators but by broadening the analysis
to larger quantiles for the low Tobin’s Q set, we were able to observe the reduction in
sensitivity of takeover likelihood to the interaction terms between firm fundamentals
and the disciplinary dummy. In our main tests, we use the lowest decile of Tobin’s Q
in industry-year clusters. In our robustness tests, we examine Cox PH models where
we extend the definition of candidates for disciplinary takeover from the lowest 10%
of Tobin’s Q to the lowest 15%, 20%, 30% and 40%. The following two subsections
provide further detail of these robustness tests.
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Accelerated Failure Time Model with Weibull Distribution
Table 3.8 repeats selected models from Tables 3.6 and 3.7. The interpretation of
AFT coefficients is the opposite to that in a Cox PH model, that is, a positive
coefficient indicates longer survival. Importantly, the results were consistent with
previous findings. Increases in both excess return and Q lead to longer survival time
in models 1 and 2. TQ was not significant in model 4 where all controls are included.
Firm-level fundamentals are not significant, with the exception of leverage when
excluding market-value-based variables in model 3 and the TQ interaction model
(6). In model 5, consistent with Table 3.7, the dummy for the lowest excess return
decile was significant but the interaction terms were insignificant, with the exception
of expense ratio. When using the indicator of the lowest decile for Q, the disciplinary
dummy was significant positive at 10%, which is in contrast to the results listed in
Table 3.7. Consistent with previous findings, interaction terms between sales growth
and asset utilisation and the disciplinary dummy lead to shorter survival (higher
takeover likelihood), while return on assets is associated with longer survival.
Logistic Regression Models
Table 3.9 presents the results from Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 modelled in logistic re-
gression (logit). The interpretation of the coefficients from a logit model is similar
to that in a Cox-PH model, in that a positive sign indicates increased probability
of takeover. In line with previous results, the logit models found a negative effect
from the continuous versions of excess return and TQ on takeover likelihood (models
1, 2 and 4). Also, firm level fundamental variables had little relation to takeover
likelihood, with sales growth being an exception (models 3 and 4). In the interac-
tion models (5 and 6), the lowest decile for excess return was significant positive,
with no relation to firm level fundamentals. The same dummy based on TQ was
insignificant with interaction terms confirming previous results (ROA negative, asset
utilisation and sales growth positive). Additionally there was a positive interaction
term between low TQ and dividends, which previously had dissipated when includ-
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Table 3.8: Accelerated failure time models with Weibull distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




volatility 0.023 −0.006 0.019
(0.019) (0.020) (0.022)
asset utilisation −0.002 −0.005 −0.008 0.014
(0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025)
expense ratio 0.002 0.027 0.083 0.004
(0.088) (0.089) (0.088) (0.093)
div on assets −0.006 0.003 −0.0002 0.008
(0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
investment −0.010 −0.020 −0.011 −0.009
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023)
leverage −0.046* −0.025 −0.038 −0.049*
(0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028)
roa 0.039 −0.005 0.036 0.001
(0.031) (0.034) (0.038) (0.034)
sales growth 0.034 0.047 0.029 0.066
(0.051) (0.045) (0.062) (0.051)
tangible −0.006 0.002 −0.019 −0.006
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
d market −0.098** 0.127*
(0.042) (0.077)
start 0.998*** 1.022*** 0.987*** 0.975*** 0.986*** 0.982***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
ln mva −0.048** −0.053** −0.022 −0.026 −0.023 −0.016
(0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
mtb similarity −0.026 −0.003 −0.035 −0.016 −0.035 −0.029
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.025)
size similarity −0.097*** −0.097*** −0.079*** −0.077*** −0.077*** −0.080***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
intensity −13.097 *** −14.018 *** −13.007 *** −12.121 *** −13.197 *** −12.826 ***
(0.997) (0.978) (1.037) (1.072) (1.045) (1.035)
herfindahl −0.228 −0.167 −0.182 −0.134 −0.164 −0.186
(0.281) (0.292) (0.322) (0.330) (0.322) (0.319)
gdp growth −4.201*** −4.074*** −5.417*** −5.612*** −5.468*** −5.399***
(0.827) (0.841) (0.931) (0.931) (0.936) (0.930)
asset utilisation:d market 0.019 −0.112**
(0.045) (0.046)
expense ratio:d market −0.355** 0.066
(0.169) (0.199)
div on assets:d market −0.026 −0.061
(0.042) (0.048)
investment:d market 0.009 0.030
(0.054) (0.107)
leverage:d market −0.020 0.110
(0.056) (0.126)
roa:d market −0.036 0.301***
(0.061) (0.070)
sales growth:d market 0.002 −0.185*
(0.091) (0.095)
tangible:d market 0.071 0.010
(0.052) (0.073)
Constant 3.901*** 3.956*** 3.961*** 3.948*** 3.990*** 3.955***
(0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.058) (0.056) (0.053)
d market d excess r decile d q decile
N 22 407 23 893 19 938 18 514 19 938 19 938
Number of events 658 704 586 548 586 586
Number of events in 118 57
d market
Scale 0.347 0.355 0.344 0.338 0.344 0.342
Log(Scale) -1.059*** -1.034*** -1.068*** -1.083*** -1.068*** -1.072***
Log Likelihood -4190.077 -4507.121 -3800.436 -3535.863 -3794.876 -3789.165
χ2 1010.133*** 1033.487*** 844.991*** 828.414*** 856.111*** 867.532***
Notes: The table shows AFT models repeating the final specifications from Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 Panels A and
B. Variable definitions are in Table 3.3. d market is a place holder for the variables d excess r decile and d q decile
in the last two models. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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ing controls in Cox PH modelling. Uninteracted firm level fundamental variables,
again, did not relate to takeover likelihood, with the exception of sales growth and
tangibility. In sum, the logistic model results are confirming previous findings of a
relation between low TQ, agency costs, and takeover likelihood.
Sensitivity to Redefining Quantiles for Disciplinary Takeovers
The results listed in Table 3.10 provide support for the use of low Tobin’s Q as
an indicator of disciplinary takeover likelihood, the choice of threshold used in our
primary tests (Table 3.7) and the association between takeover likelihood and agency
cost indicators. Our findings are largely consistent with the 20% threshold and
begin to moderate beyond it. Our results also indicate that using the median as the
threshold, as in Dickerson et al. (2002), does not capture the desired effects. The
general trend observed in Table 3.10 compared to Table 3.7 is that the significance of
explanatory interaction terms dissipates as we relax the thresholds for disciplinary
takeover candidates. The significance of profitability, asset utilisation and sales
growth declines as the disciplinary takeover set is extended. The only irregularity
was the slight significance on interaction terms for dividend payments and investment
at the 20% dummy. Consistent with a free cash flow agency cost perspective (Jensen
1986), the interaction term on investment is positive, indicating the possibility for
a bidder to decrease or redirect the capital expenditure of a target that seems to be
investing at below its cost of capital. The positive interaction term for dividends is
difficult to explain from an agency cost perspective and might simply represent the
purchase of strong dividend payers at low valuations.
Sensitivity to Redefining Controlling Acquisitions
It might be possible that there is an influential number of acquisitions that lead to
controlling acquisitions that result in at least 50%, but less than 100% ownership
in target firm equity.7 Accordingly, Table 3.11 presents a robustness test for relax-
7For visual evidence see the graph in Figure B.1 in the Appendix.
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Table 3.9: Logistic regression models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




volatility 0.055 0.111** 0.122**
(0.048) (0.045) (0.057)
asset utilisation 0.062 0.058 0.078 0.019
(0.051) (0.052) (0.057) (0.057)
expense ratio −0.085 −0.175 −0.094 −0.012
(0.146) (0.151) (0.162) (0.156)
div on assets −0.013 −0.004 −0.013 −0.050
(0.061) (0.066) (0.068) (0.065)
investment −0.093 −0.032 −0.095 −0.091
(0.061) (0.063) (0.066) (0.062)
leverage 0.096 0.023 0.086 0.109
(0.067) (0.073) (0.079) (0.069)
roa −0.054 0.113 −0.070 0.034
(0.082) (0.096) (0.104) (0.089)
sales growth −0.240** −0.284*** −0.205** −0.319***
(0.094) (0.104) (0.104) (0.106)
tangible 0.086* 0.061 0.127** 0.087*
(0.049) (0.052) (0.055) (0.051)
d market 0.383*** −0.134
(0.121) (0.210)
start −0.020 −0.135* −0.105 −0.087 −0.088 −0.104
(0.084) (0.081) (0.087) (0.092) (0.088) (0.088)
ln mva 0.317*** 0.344*** 0.187** 0.242*** 0.202*** 0.184**
(0.065) (0.063) (0.074) (0.076) (0.074) (0.075)
mtb similarity 0.222*** 0.080 0.215*** 0.092 0.210*** 0.201***
(0.053) (0.055) (0.060) (0.065) (0.060) (0.060)
size similarity 0.204*** 0.189*** 0.137** 0.149** 0.134** 0.140**
(0.054) (0.052) (0.057) (0.059) (0.057) (0.057)
intensity 31.854*** 31.628*** 29.974*** 29.326*** 29.964*** 29.554***
(3.311) (3.273) (3.592) (3.638) (3.603) (3.604)
herfindahl −0.914 −1.046* −0.702 −0.919 −0.664 −0.757
(0.615) (0.612) (0.705) (0.735) (0.705) (0.709)
gdp growth 5.078** 5.462*** 8.154*** 8.750*** 8.240*** 8.219***
(2.091) (2.048) (2.412) (2.517) (2.419) (2.414)
asset utilisation:d market −0.074 0.279**
(0.127) (0.138)
expense ratio:d market −0.003 −0.639
(0.386) (0.447)
div on assets:d market 0.003 0.331*
(0.147) (0.176)
investment:d market −0.013 −0.008
(0.167) (0.272)
leverage:d market −0.034 −0.303
(0.149) (0.313)
roa:d market 0.193 −0.676***
(0.186) (0.232)
sales growth:d market −0.093 0.423**
(0.222) (0.183)
tangible:d market −0.197 −0.008
(0.128) (0.182)
Constant −4.134*** −4.165*** −4.145*** −4.310*** −4.223*** −4.142***
(0.106) (0.103) (0.109) (0.124) (0.113) (0.110)
d market d excess r decile d q decile
N 22 407 23 893 19 938 18 514 19 938 19 938
Number of events 658 704 586 548 586 586
Number of events in 118 57
d market
Log Likelihood -2880.395 -3078.256 -2577.403 -2381.296 -2570.142 -2569.318
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5780.791 6176.512 5186.806 4800.591 5190.283 5188.637
Notes: The table shows logit models repeating the final specifications from Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 Panels A and
B. Variable definitions are in Table 3.3. d market is a place holder for the variables d excess r decile and d q decile
in the last two models. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.10: Low TQ dummy definition test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
asset utilisation −0.007 −0.047 −0.075 −0.041
(0.063) (0.068) (0.078) (0.085)
expense ratio −0.131 −0.107 −0.145 −0.164
(0.212) (0.219) (0.236) (0.263)
div on assets −0.048 −0.053 −0.025 −0.047
(0.067) (0.068) (0.070) (0.076)
investment 0.099 0.093 0.108 0.131
(0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.129)
leverage 0.279* 0.266* 0.285* 0.297*
(0.138) (0.140) (0.143) (0.149)
roa 0.023 0.031 0.040 0.037
(0.099) (0.103) (0.115) (0.125)
sales growth −0.165 −0.115 −0.100 −0.131
(0.192) (0.186) (0.193) (0.211)
tangible −0.002 0.011 −0.006 −0.030
(0.104) (0.105) (0.107) (0.113)
d market −0.129 −0.007 0.152 0.214*
(0.167) (0.138) (0.114) (0.106)
start −1.849*** −1.848*** −1.857*** −1.849***
(0.147) (0.147) (0.148) (0.148)
ln mva 0.112 0.109 0.124 0.133*
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
mtb similarity 0.428** 0.417** 0.416** 0.417**
(0.126) (0.126) (0.128) (0.129)
size similarity 0.225*** 0.224*** 0.218*** 0.212***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
intensity 92.498*** 92.858*** 92.962*** 92.798***
(6.905) (6.920) (6.912) (6.898)
herfindahl 6.099*** 6.119*** 6.139*** 6.151***
(1.104) (1.103) (1.099) (1.100)
gdp growth 65.781*** 65.742*** 66.052*** 65.951***
(6.429) (6.421) (6.434) (6.439)
asset utilisation:d market 0.220* 0.261** 0.215* 0.117
(0.128) (0.115) (0.108) (0.109)
expense ratio:d market 0.112 0.011 0.110 0.071
(0.504) (0.463) (0.407) (0.391)
div on assets:d market 0.241 0.270* 0.153 0.210
(0.172) (0.157) (0.148) (0.129)
investment:d market 0.252 0.252* 0.121 0.030
(0.160) (0.147) (0.134) (0.127)
leverage:d market −0.287 −0.047 −0.046 −0.056
(0.250) (0.204) (0.159) (0.142)
roa:d market −0.572*** −0.500*** −0.314* −0.253
(0.185) (0.184) (0.175) (0.175)
sales growth:d market 0.389 0.281 0.167 0.156
(0.195) (0.197) (0.195) (0.191)
tangible:d market 0.054 −0.017 0.037 0.068
(0.153) (0.131) (0.107) (0.103)
d market d q 15 d q 20 d q 30 d q 40
N 19 938 19 938 19 938 19 938
Number of events 586 586 586 586
Number of events in 89 128 218 295
d market
R2 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054
Max. Possible R2 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406
Log Likelihood -4641.845 -4642.271 -4645.832 -4646.579
Wald Test 1178.340*** 1152.610*** 1146.790*** 1150.550***
LR Test 1108.410*** 1107.558*** 1100.436*** 1098.943***
Score (Logrank) Test 1307.919*** 1307.387*** 1301.414*** 1300.028***
Notes: The table shows Cox PH models repeating model 6 from Table 3.7 while relaxing the TQ dummy definition
to the lowest 15%, 20%, 30% and 40%. Variable definitions are in Table 3.3. The figure behind the d market
descriptor indicates the top percentile at which the indicator function operates. All models contain interactions of
investment, leverage, tangible, sales growth, mtb similarity, intensity, herfindahl and gdp growth with duration in
order to protect the proportional hazards assumption. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.11: Low TQ dummy definition test on basis of all controlling acquisitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
asset utilisation −0.023 −0.020 −0.058 −0.099 −0.056
(0.059) (0.061) (0.065) (0.075) (0.081)
expense ratio −0.037 −0.030 −0.001 −0.033 −0.004
(0.210) (0.218) (0.226) (0.243) (0.277)
div on assets −0.038 −0.044 −0.051 −0.016 −0.034
(0.065) (0.066) (0.068) (0.070) (0.075)
investment 0.064 0.038 0.034 0.051 0.076
(0.115) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.121)
leverage 0.264* 0.268* 0.259* 0.286* 0.293*
(0.128) (0.128) (0.131) (0.132) (0.137)
roa −0.052 −0.046 −0.031 −0.016 −0.009
(0.088) (0.090) (0.093) (0.104) (0.112)
sales growth −0.207 −0.191 −0.173 −0.163 −0.186
(0.108) (0.109) (0.111) (0.118) (0.139)
tangible 0.077 0.074 0.087 0.071 0.057
(0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.103) (0.109)
d market −0.238 −0.145 −0.019 0.123 0.182
(0.213) (0.158) (0.131) (0.111) (0.103)
start −1.852*** −1.848*** −1.848*** −1.862*** −1.855***
(0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.143) (0.143)
ln mva 0.085 0.087 0.084 0.101 0.112
(0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.071) (0.071)
mtb similarity 0.114 0.114 0.106 0.107 0.105
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.061)
size similarity 0.221*** 0.226*** 0.225*** 0.223*** 0.216***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
intensity 112.460*** 112.234*** 112.543*** 112.592*** 112.507***
(6.181) (6.175) (6.193) (6.191) (6.171)
herfindahl 7.409*** 7.412*** 7.402*** 7.514*** 7.579***
(0.995) (0.994) (0.993) (0.989) (0.989)
gdp growth 11.732*** 11.780*** 11.781*** 11.784*** 11.641***
(2.465) (2.461) (2.459) (2.462) (2.460)
asset utilisation:d market 0.202 0.174 0.223* 0.216* 0.103
(0.139) (0.127) (0.113) (0.105) (0.105)
expense ratio:d market 0.028 0.115 −0.033 0.078 −0.061
(0.578) (0.495) (0.454) (0.404) (0.395)
div on assets:d market 0.265* 0.266* 0.297** 0.155 0.191
(0.161) (0.159) (0.144) (0.140) (0.125)
investment:d market −0.113 0.223 0.221 0.087 −0.020
(0.314) (0.166) (0.149) (0.133) (0.123)
leverage:d market −0.160 −0.206 0.031 −0.057 −0.031
(0.317) (0.250) (0.199) (0.155) (0.137)
roa:d market −0.652*** −0.520*** −0.475*** −0.310* −0.280*
(0.211) (0.178) (0.172) (0.161) (0.160)
sales growth:d market 0.469 0.323 0.203 0.138 0.141
(0.199) (0.207) (0.201) (0.194) (0.184)
tangible:d market −0.081 −0.002 −0.083 0.001 0.031
(0.188) (0.151) (0.129) (0.105) (0.100)
d market d q 10 d q 15 d q 20 d q 30 d q 40
N 19 472 19 472 19 472 19 472 19 472
Number of events 620 620 620 620 620
Number of events in 59 90 132 227 309
d market
R2 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.050
Max. Possible R2 0.431 0.431 0.431 0.431 0.431
Log Likelihood -4 981.448 -4 982.247 -4 981.939 -4 985.130 -4 986.271
Wald Test 1 189.860∗∗∗ 1 192.850∗∗∗ 1 174.950∗∗∗ 1 162.370∗∗∗ 1 169.970∗∗∗
LR Test 1 015.681∗∗∗ 1 014.084∗∗∗ 1 014.700∗∗∗ 1 008.317∗∗∗ 1 006.035∗∗∗
Score (Logrank) Test 1 254.939∗∗∗ 1 252.518∗∗∗ 1 253.096∗∗∗ 1 249.312∗∗∗ 1 247.053∗∗∗
Notes: The table shows a robustness test using Cox PH models based on Table 3.10 with acquisitions that lead to
50% of target equity acting as the event identifier, where the analysis in the main text used 100%. From left to
right, the TQ dummy definition is relaxed from the lowest 10% to 15%, 20%, 30% and 40%. Variable definitions
are in Table 3.3. The figure behind the d market descriptor indicates the top percentile at which the indicator
function operates. All models contain interactions of investment, leverage, tangible, intensity and herfindahl with
duration in order to protect the proportional hazards assumption. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Standard errors
in parentheses.
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ing the definition of a takeover event to 50% of target firm equity owned after a
transaction.
The number of events was slightly larger compared to the models in the main
analysis (620 vs. 586 events). Similarly, for each cutoff, the number of events within
the d market identifier was marginally greater than before. The models in Table 3.11
support the findings from the main analysis. The result for the interaction term with
ROA was now significant for all cutoffs, when the finding was previously insignificant
at the 40% cutoff. Still, the significance level for ROA is decreasing with relaxation
of the d market definition. The interacted asset utilisation now followed a more
erratic progression in that it was only beginning to be significant at the 20% cutoff
while it was significant from 10% to 30% in the main analysis. While sales growth
was previously significant positive in the lowest decile definition, it was insignificant
in all cases in this robustness test. Instead, interacted dividends were now significant
positive from 10% to 20%, when they were significant positive at the 20% cutoff only.
Consequently, the overall story remains valid that agency costs indicators do have
an impact on the lower TQ cases and that the median TQ cutoff is not sufficient.
3.5.5 Discussion and Implications
The importance of the market for corporate control should not be underestimated.
In any market-based system in which allocative efficiency relies on market valuations
and shareholder primacy underpins corporate governance, the market for corporate
control is the ‘court of last resort’ (Jensen 1987, Kini et al. 2004). Perhaps this
point was best captured by Manne (1965) when he stated that ‘Only the takeover
scheme provides some assurance of competitive efficiency among corporate managers
and thereby affords strong protection to the interests of vast numbers of small, non-
controlling shareholders’ (p 113). In this study, we set out to answer two questions
regarding the market for corporate control and takeover likelihood: (1) How effective
is the market for corporate control in an economy with an open merger policy? and
(2) What agency cost indicators are associated with market discipline?
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In another key insight, (Manne 1965) continues that ‘The lower the stock price,
relative to what it could be with more efficient management, the more attractive
the takeover becomes to those who believe that they can manage the company more
efficiently’ (p 113). Consistent with this second insight, our first tests establish that
stock price and market valuation effects drive takeover likelihood. We then examine
whether takeover likelihood is related to more specific indicators of agency costs. As
such, we contribute to the literature by identifying which companies are likely to
be candidates for a disciplinary takeover and then by examining how the takeover
likelihood for these firms is related to a panel of indicators of agency costs.
A functional market for corporate control guides efficient allocation of resources
and as such is desirable for shareholders and society as a whole. For shareholders
and corporate management, a well-functioning market for corporate control is a key
mechanism for protecting investors from agency costs. Without such a mechanism,
the cost of capital increases, producing serious implications for hurdle rates, the
level of corporate investment and financial development in general. Previous studies
using US data have demonstrated that well-performing companies are more likely
to be subject to a takeover (Agrawal & Jaffe 2003, Rhodes-Kropf et al. 2005, Powell
& Yawson 2007, Loderer & Waelchli 2015). Our results tell a different story. We
observe higher takeover likelihood when a company’s stock price falls and market
valuation is low relative to its assets. In particular, we find that companies in
the lowest decile for excess return are the most likely to be subject to a takeover
bid irrespective of firm fundamentals, whereas companies in the lowest decile for
Tobin’s Q are more likely to be takeover targets conditional on certain agency cost
indicators. We interpret these results as consistent with the market for corporate
control hypothesis.
From our initial review of the literature (see Table 3.1), we expected the opposite
sign from several of our tests of agency variables, namely that indicators of agency
costs provide bidders with the opportunity to correct poor management and improve
these indicators. However, the results suggest an alternative interpretation. Tobin’s
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Q and profitability indicate the presence of agency costs while our firm fundamentals
provided evidence of underlying strength of companies most likely to be taken over.
Discipline occurs when Tobin’s Q is too low and other indicators are stronger. In
this study, asset utilisation and sales growth are the indicators of that strength. In
our results, profitability was a key indicator that agency costs were present, rather
than low TQ companies simply being undervalued. Consistent with our view, the
lower the profit, the higher the takeover likelihood of companies in the low Q set.
Companies with lower asset utilisation or sales growth had a lower probability of
takeover. Companies with higher profit and, by extension, lower agency costs were
also less likely to be taken over. The implication for practitioners is that disciplinary
takeover likelihood in our sample can be inferred from the analysis of the ratio of
Tobin’s Q to asset utilisation, sales growth and profitability.
Given that anti-takeover provisions are disallowed in the UK, our results can
be interpreted as support for the effectiveness of an open merger policy. In any
market where corporate governance by boards is in question, our results suggest
that an open merger policy is preferable. In other markets which allow takeover
defences (such as the US for example), company managers could decide to deac-
tivate anti-takeover provisions, as a form of bonding, to signal corporate control of
agency costs. Shareholders may be willing to pay a premium for such companies in
markets where takeover provisions are allowed. Removing anti-takeover defences has
been previously proposed in the literature as a means to enhance takeover likelihood
(Bebchuk, Coates IV & Subramanian 2002). Where takeover defences are in place,
shareholders forgo potential returns that accrue if potential bidders are not deterred
by defence mechanisms (See, for example, Masulis, Wang & Xie 2007 and Bebchuk,
Cohen & Ferrell 2008). Yet, other studies have found anti-takeover provisions ef-
fective in improving bargaining power during M&A negotiations (conditional on the
takeover going ahead) when target boards are outsider dominated (Brickley, Coles
& Terry 1994). While our results do not directly imply that shareholders should
seek the abolition of anti-takeover provisions, the findings do suggest that further
investigation is warranted.
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The market for corporate control does not simply act as a disciplinary mechanism
but also puts pressure on managers to act in the best interests of shareholders. Our
indicators provide direct evidence of this pressure. Specifically, Tobin’s Q is a strong
indicator of the presence of agency costs in the market for corporate control. Sales
growth, asset utilisation and return on assets were also found to be associated with
agency costs in our framework. Managers of potential targets wishing to understand
the risk of a disciplinary takeover can take heed of the indicators we provide and use
them as a guide for reducing disciplinary takeover risk (if not performance directly).
Such indicators also provide avenues for future research. One such suggestion is to
compare the results of our study to experiences of disciplinary takeover likelihood
in other markets that allow such protections from takeover. In addition, further
work should examine the valuation implications of voluntarily rejecting anti-takeover
provisions. Furthermore, examining disciplinary takeover likelihood during periods
of high takeover intensity more formally may produce interesting findings.
Finally, we argue that a functioning market for corporate control and an open
merger policy are desirable for society. Allocative efficiency and economic perform-
ance are enhanced when the pricing of stocks reflects the value placed on assets by
market participants. Resources are most effectively allocated and exit is facilitated
when valuations are accurate. An ineffective market for corporate control and anti-
takeover provisions result in inefficient allocation of society’s scarce resources. In
such a market, value-destroying firms and projects are allowed to continue unim-
peded.
3.6 Conclusion
We examined the effectiveness of the market for corporate control in the UK and
draw implications for shareholders, managers, regulators and researchers. The aim
of the study was to initially answer two broad questions: (1) How effective is the
market for corporate control in an economy with an open merger policy? and (2)
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What agency cost indicators are associated with market discipline? Findings indic-
ate that the most undervalued companies relative to their assets become takeover
targets in the UK. Note that these results are consistent with Manne’s definition of
the market for corporate control (1965). Comparing our results to US takeover like-
lihood studies leads us to conclude that an open merger policy in which the market
for corporate control is not inhibited by anti-takeover defences provides strong pro-
tection for shareholders and an effective market for corporate control. We also test
whether agency costs, working through stock prices and valuation metrics, indicate
the likelihood of a disciplinary takeover.
To confirm that the effects identified reflect market discipline, we compare results
using two definitions of disciplinary takeover. The first specification of a disciplinary
takeover is the lowest decile of excess return, which should be less related to market
discipline because stock price falls may be corrections to market value rather than
deviations from efficient value. The second specification, which was expected to
be more strongly associated with agency costs, is the lowest decile of Tobin’s Q,
i.e. the lowest decile of market value to the replacement cost of assets. We then
tested the association between market discipline and agency costs using interaction
terms between disciplinary takeover targets and a panel of variables identified in the
previous literature to indicate the presence of agency costs (Table 3.1).
When using the lowest decile for excess return to identify disciplinary targets,
takeover risk increased but we found little evidence to indicate that fundamental
agency cost indicators were related to takeover risk. The market was more selective
regarding companies in the lowest decile of Tobin’s Q. For these firms, the market
favoured the disciplinary targets with potential for improved valuations. For ex-
ample, we found significantly higher takeover risk for companies with higher sales
growth and asset utilisation ratios within the low Q sample. These companies ap-
pear undervalued and, therefore, improved managerial efficiency is likely to enhance
company value. Importantly, we also observed lower takeover risk for firms with
higher profitability. This finding was important as it confirms that lower profit com-
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bined with positive information on other firm fundamentals increases disciplinary
takeover risk.
Overall, given the impediments to efficient pricing resulting from anti-takeover
provisions, we interpret that the market for corporate control is effective in the UK
and argue that our evidence provides support for the effectiveness of an open merger
policy. When market values decrease to low levels relative to the underlying assets,
the market for corporate control protects shareholders. However, we caution that
takeover risk is lower for companies within the low Q set and which are subject to
agency costs, i.e., when both Tobin’s Q and agency cost indicators are simultaneously
concerning. Future research might seek to improve the measurement of replacement
cost of assets in the study to more precisely identify the low Q set. Additionally,
our results can be replicated in other markets, particularly in the US, a similarly
market oriented economic system with good minority shareholder protection, but
contrary to the UK, widespread application of anti-takeover provisions. A more
specific suggestion for future work is for researchers to establish - in markets that
allow anti-takeover defences - whether voluntary rejection of anti-takeover provisions
can act as an effective bonding mechanism.
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Chapter 4
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow
and the Market for Corporate
Control
4.1 Introduction
Through the threat of takeover as an extension of price pressure, a stock market list-
ing can act as a central mechanism for disciplining management to reduce agency
costs (Manne 1965). A particular subcategory of agency costs is Jensen’s agency
costs of free cash flow (1986). When combining the two theories, increased threat of
takeover for firms with elevated agency costs of free cash flow is expected. The ob-
jective of this study is to examine whether this takeover mechanism reduces Agency
Costs of Free Cash Flow (ACFCF). This study addresses two research questions:
(1) Can we identify companies with free cash flow agency problems? and (2) If yes,
are such companies disciplined in takeover markets?
Our study builds on Dickerson, Gibson & Tsakalotos (2002) to further refine the
methodology applied to identify companies with free cash flow agency problems. In
particular, Dickerson et al. (2002) used low Tobin’s Q (TQ) to address the issue of
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investing at below the cost of capital. However, that study ignored the free cash flow
component. Therefore, Dickerson et al. (2002) method can serve to identify general
agency problems but not free cash flow agency problems. We refine this methodology
by requiring both low TQ and high free cash flows for the classification of a case
that matches Jensen’s (1986) definition. In Jensen’s paper, the concept of ACFCF
is developed and changes in capital structure, financial restructuring and leveraged
buyouts are identified as means of decreasing ACFCF. What is not stated, however,
is what mechanism motivates activation of these ameliorating activities.
The market for corporate control, according to Manne (1965), can be considered
as a sequence from (a) inefficient management to (b) shareholders’ decisions to
sell stock to (c) a depressed stock price and finally (d) an increased likelihood of
takeover. The steps from (a) to (c) describe problems resulting from the separation
of ownership and control and are usually referred to as agency costs (Jensen &
Meckling 1976). Accordingly, increases in agency costs above a certain hurdle lead
to increased takeover likelihood.
By extension, we expect ACFCF to drive takeover likelihood, similar to more
general agency costs. The problem of ACFCF is best captured in Jensen:
Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over payout
policies are especially severe when the organization generates substantial
free cash flow. The problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the
cash rather than investing it at below the cost of capital or wasting it on
organization inefficiencies. (Jensen 1986, p 323)
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review of
the related literature and Section 4.3 presents the data and our econometric meth-
odology. Section 4.4 provides a discussion of the empirical results and robustness
checks and Section 4.5 offers some concluding remarks.
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4.2 Literature
Agency costs of free cash flow represent costs to owners where management is un-
willing to give up control over cash resources and instead invest below the firm’s
cost of capital (Jensen 1986). Methods for decreasing this cost are distributions to
investors by means of interest expense or dividends. Increasing levels of investment
would further bind capital in the firm and increase agency costs of free cash flow.
Accordingly, three variables are available that allow either an increase (dividends,
leverage) or decrease (capital expenditure) in cash flows to investors.
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and dividend payments were examined in Dicker-
son et al. (2002), who analyse their effect on takeover likelihood. ACFCF problems
were identified based on below industry-year median TQ. However, Dickerson et al.
(2002) used a simplistic framework which did not include interactions between lever-
age and their agency cost indicator. Results from their study reveal that regardless
of Tobin’s Q, higher CAPEX was associated with lower takeover likelihood while
leverage and dividends are not significant.
Additional benefits of debt outside of the cash distribution perspective are in-
creased monitoring by debt investors (Jensen & Meckling 1976) and tax deductibility
of interest expense (Abel 2018). Greater levels of debt have been shown to increase
asset utilisation (McKnight & Weir 2009) as well as TQ and sales growth until a cer-
tain level of debt is reached where financial risk offsets the benefits of debt (Doukas
et al. 2000). McKnight & Weir (2009) have not found evidence for a reduction of
agency costs of free cash flow through increased leverage. In M&A, target choice
has been shown to be an alternative way of adjusting one’s capital structure, so
that bidder and target level of debt can become drivers of takeover activity (Uysal
2011). There is some evidence for a positive effect of leverage on takeover likelihood
(Bruner 1988, Nuttall 1999), but most authors find no relation between the two
variables (Dickerson et al. 2002, Powell & Yawson 2007, Loderer & Waelchli 2015).
Ignoring low TQ, most studies do not find significant effects of leverage on takeover
likelihood (Dickerson et al. 2002, Powell & Yawson 2007, Loderer & Waelchli 2015).
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A significant positive effect for leverage on takeover likelihood is found in Bruner
(1988) and Nuttall (1999). An alternative to the current level of debt is debt capa-
city (Lemmon & Zender 2010), which can be approximated by tangibility (Powell
& Yawson 2007). Dickerson et al. (2002) have presented evidence for a negative
effect of tangibility on takeover likelihood, while others find a non-significant effect
(Powell & Yawson 2007, Loderer & Waelchli 2015).
Similar to the level of debt, dividends represent a commitment to distribute
cash to investors and can therefore reduce agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen
1986). Most studies of takeover likelihood do not find a significant effect of dividends
(Palepu 1986, Barnes 2000, Dickerson et al. 2002). Finally, the level of a firm’s
investment rate has been shown to have no effect on TQ (Yermack 1996), but to
deter takeover attempts (Dickerson et al. 2002).
Variables outside the immediate ACFCF framework with a potential effect on
takeover likelihood are stock price return (Dickerson et al. 2002, Agrawal & Jaffe
2003, Powell & Yawson 2007, Loderer & Waelchli 2015), stock price volatility (Lo-
derer & Waelchli 2015), asset utilisation ratio (Ang et al. 2000, Singh & Davidson III
2003, McKnight & Weir 2009) and expense ratio (Ang et al. 2000, Singh & David-
son III 2003), profitability (Dickerson et al. 2002, Loderer & Waelchli 2015), sales
growth (Powell & Yawson 2007, Loderer & Waelchli 2015) and tangibility (Dicker-
son et al. 2002, Powell & Yawson 2007, Loderer & Waelchli 2015), firm size (Palepu
1986, Comment & Schwert 1995, Cooley & Quadrini 2001, Dickerson et al. 2002, Lo-
derer & Waelchli 2015), takeover intensity (DePamphilis 2010, Loderer & Waelchli
2015), economic growth (Loderer & Waelchli 2015), industry concentration (Schoen-
berg & Reeves 1999, Powell & Yawson 2007) and the availability of merger part-
ners (Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson 2008, Hoberg & Phillips 2010, Loderer & Waelchli
2015).1
In our study, we expect that in a functioning market for corporate control, firms
with high agency costs become candidates for disciplinary takeover (Manne 1965,
1For a review of these articles, see Section 3.2.
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Jensen & Meckling 1976). Furthermore, we also expect that free cash flow agency
problems are a form of agency costs (Jensen 1986) and, therefore, lead to higher
takeover likelihood in the context of the market for corporate control. As such, we
propose the following hypotheses:
H1: Companies with low growth prospects and high free cash flows are can-
didates for disciplinary takeovers.
A firm with agency costs of free cash flow would be able to reduce the agency
problem by giving up control over the generated cash by means of distribution
to either equity investors or debt investors. Such investors would then be able to
redirect the freed up cash into more profitable directions (Jensen 1986). Since agency
costs of free cash flow can be ameliorated by increasing payouts to investors (Jensen
1986), it follows that:
H2: Low growth/high free cash flow companies experience lower likelihood of
takeover with increased payouts to investors by means of higher dividends or
higher leverage.
Inverse to H2, agency costs of free cash flow will intensify if free cash is turned
into long-term assets. Greater levels of investment bind capital in the company,
when investors in the firm would be better off were they able to control free cash
flow towards more profitable assets or faster growing assets (Jensen 1986). In the
context of the market for corporate control, a bidder could purchase such a company,
decrease capital expenditures and increase cash distribution. Therefore:
H3: Low growth/high free cash flow companies are more likely to be taken
over when levels of investment are high.
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Table 4.1: Sample construction
Panel A: Sample development
N firms N takeovers
Initial 4403 1630
Exclude negative sales or total assets 3659 1630
Exclude firm-year observations after a 100% takeover 3653 1557
Exclude firm-year observation with negative duration 3570 1530
Exclude companies younger than five years 2077 751
Exclude missing data 1572 594
Panel B: Final Sample
Count % of firm-year obs. % of distinct firms
N Firm-years 20 741
N Distinct firms 1572
N Takeovers of 100% 594 2.86 28.64
Notes: Panel A of the table details the progression of the number of firms and number of takeovers in the sample
in relation to the stepwise enforcement of the inclusion criteria set out in Section 4.3.1. Panel B lists the number
of firm-year observations, number of firms and takeovers and their ratios for the final sample. Note that all models
aim to include as many observations as possible, depending on data availability. The final set presented here is for
the model with the largest number of variables and, therefore, largest number of exclusion due to missingness of
data.
4.3 Data and Methodology
4.3.1 Data
We acquire data on bidders and target companies from various sources, including
Thomson ONE Banker and DataStream. We obtain information on all takeover
bids and a longitudinal set of cross-sectional variables for UK companies that were
primary listed in London at any point from 1986 to 2015, excluding financial busi-
nesses and utilities.2 Initially, the takeover sample consisted of 6,016 takeovers of
UK public targets, of which 874 were failed attempts. Table 4.1 details the construc-
tion of our sample. Panel A lists the number of firms and takeovers in the sample
due to progressive removal of inadequate data, while Panel B provides the resulting
ratios between the number of takeovers, firms and firm-year observations. Around
a third of all companies were taken over.
Next, we classify ACFCF cases based on a firm-year observation’s rank in TQ
and free cash flow on assets as a proxy for ACFCF-related takeover (Dickerson et al.
2The relevant date for the indication of a takeover is the date of a takeover bid that results in
a 100% ownership of equity by the bidder after completion.
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Table 4.2: Interaction variable development
Panel A: Number of firm-year observations
median quartile decile
d q 10 711 5291 2063
d fcfoa 11 550 5888 2256
Combined 4730 581 44
Total firm-year obs: 20 741
Panel B: Number of unique firms
median quartile decile
d q 1376 1015 588
d fcfoa 1470 1164 706
Combined 1151 308 30
Total unique firms: 1572
Panel C: Number of takeovers
median quartile decile
d q 373 171 58
d fcfoa 320 136 39
Combined 170 20 0
Total Takeovers: 594
Notes: This table details the development of the number of firm-year observations (Panel A), the number of unique
firms (Panel B) and the number of takeovers (Panel C) for cases where the TQ condition, the free cash flow condition
and the union of both is 1. The table compares the cut-off conditions at the median, the quartile and the decile.
The sample is the final sample from Table 4.1. Variables definitions are in Table 4.3.
2002). We require Tobin’s Q to be below a certain threshold and free cash flow to be
above a certain threshold within industry-year groups. We tested thresholds at the
industry-year median, quartiles and deciles. Table 4.2 details a count of firm-year
observations, unique firms and takeovers for the three different thresholds. From this
point, we dismiss the threshold at the decile as no takeovers remained (see Panel
C). With only 20 takeovers from 586, the quartile method is also too restrictive.
Firm-specific continuous variables were standardised by industry-year group based
on ICB industry classifications. All models used lagged values for estimation of
takeover hazard. We control for several variables which may affect takeover likeli-
hood. We included market-wide variables such as industry concentration, takeover
intensity and macroeconomic growth in our estimation along with firm-specific factors
such as one-year stock price performance, profitability, sales growth, tangibility and
size and the availability of merger partners. These variables were considered because
previous studies have demonstrated their relevance to takeover risk (see for example
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Loderer & Waelchli 2015). Variable definitions are listed in Table 4.3.
An important issue with modelling takeover likelihood is the definition of com-
pany age. We defined age as the difference in years between financial year end and
the first available year of data or the date of the most recent major restructuring
event. UK companies in DataStream are effectively winsorised as the earliest year
available is set to 1964 in DataStream. This limitation is of minor relevance as it
affects only a small proportion of companies in our sample and we control for sur-
vivorship bias by including a dummy for variable for companies present in the first
year of observation (start).
Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables in this study. The
denominator for firm-specific accounting variables was the average of beginning and
end of year book value of assets. Unbound, continuous firm-level variables were
winsorised at 0.25% unless stated otherwise. We refrain from a larger degree of
winsorisation as the 0.25% level was deemed sufficient for the elimination of outliers
in our sample.
Correlation coefficients are presented in Table 4.5. Despite being small in mag-
nitude, most values are statistically significant. The strongest correlation coefficient
was -0.79 between the log of firm size (ln mva) and the relative amount of similarly
sized merger partners (size similarity). Both variables were treated as control vari-
ables and, therefore, we dismiss potential multicollinearity issues between the two.
Most other coefficients did not exceed an absolute value of 0.30.
4.3.2 Empirical Models
In line with more recent literature on takeover likelihood, we used survival analysis
to model takeover hazard (Loderer & Waelchli 2015). Specifically, we applied a
version of the Cox Proportional Hazards (Cox PH) model, which was defined as:
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Table 4.3: Variable definitions
Panel A: ACFCF identifiers
Variable Definition
d median 1 if firm-year observation is in the bottom median for Tobin’s Q and in the top
median of free cash flow on assets of its industry-year group, 0 otherwise. Free
cash flow on assets is calculated as the difference between operating cash flows
and capital expenditure divided by the average of beginning and ending year
book value of assets. TQ is approximated as the sum of market value of equity
and book value of debt divided by the book value of assets, where all values are
taken at financial year end.
d quartile 1 if firm-year observation is in the bottom quartile for TQ and in the top quartile
of free cash flow on assets of its industry year group, 0 otherwise.
d fcfoa x 1 if firm-year observation is in the top x percentile for free cash flow on assets,
0 otherwise.
Panel B: ACFCF influencers
Variable Definition
div on assets Cash dividends paid divided by average of beginning- and end-of-year book
values of Total Assets.
investment CAPEX divided by average of beginning- and end-of-year book values of Total
Assets.
leverage Book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Winsorisation is
increased to 0.50% on the right side to remove outliers.
Panel C: Control variables
Variable Definition
excess r Difference between stock return and market return for the 12 months ending
at financial year end. Returns are calculated on basis of DataStream’s return
index.
volatility Standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the last 12 months ending at
latest full month before or on financial year end.
asset utilisation Net sales divided by average of beginning- and end-of-year book values of Total
Assets.
expense ratio Operating expense divided by Net sales. Winsorisation is increased to 2.75% on
the right side for the removal of extreme values.
roa Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) divided by average of beginning-
and end-of-year book values of assets.
sales growth Net sales divided by previous year’s net sales minus one. Winsorisation is in-
creased to 0.30% on the right side to remove extreme values.
tangible (Property, plant and equipment minus Intangible assets) divided by book value
of assets.
ln mva Natural logarithm of (Market value of equity plus book value Total Debt).
mtb similarity Number of companies with similar market to book ratio from the same industry-
year group divided by total number of companies in the group. Similarity is
assumed for all peers with market to book ratios within 0.25 standard deviations
of the company in question.
size similarity Number of similar sized companies from the same industry-year group, divided
by total number of companies in the industry-year group. Similar size is assumed
for companies with a market value of equity within 0.15 standard deviations of
the company in question.
intensity Number of other companies from the same industry-year group that get taken
over, divided by total number of other companies in the industry-year group.
herfindahl Sum of squared Net sales figures for all companies of the industry-year group.
The top 2.5% percentile is excluded from the group to prevent misclassification
(Giroud & Mueller 2010, Loderer & Waelchli 2015).
gdp growth Year on year real GDP growth.
start A binary variable that is 1 for all companies that are present in the first year of
the panel and 0 otherwise.
Notes: This table details the calculations of variables. All firm-level variables are standardised by industry-year
group. All unbound continuous variables are winsorised at the 0.25% level on each side to remove outliers, unless
indicated otherwise.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics
N mean std min median max
div on assets 20 741 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.34
investment 20 741 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.65
leverage 20 741 0.19 0.18 0.00 0.16 1.52
excess r 19 116 −0.09 0.50 −2.79 −0.03 1.75
volatility 20 247 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.61
asset utilisation 20 739 1.37 0.91 0.00 1.23 6.81
expense ratio 20 259 0.99 0.55 0.35 0.93 7.02
roa 20 666 0.07 0.19 −2.95 0.09 0.69
sales growth 20 537 0.24 1.56 −1.00 0.08 33.83
tangible 20 685 0.31 0.24 0.00 0.27 0.96
mva 20 622 1062.33 4975.55 0.58 73.82 60 233.82
mtb similarity 20 622 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.21 0.50
size similarity 20 622 0.40 0.29 0.00 0.45 0.92
intensity 20 741 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06
herfindahl 20 741 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.82
gdp growth 20 711 0.02 0.02 −0.06 0.03 0.07
d median 20 741 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00
d quartile 20 741 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the final sample from Table 4.1. Variable definitions are in
Table 4.3. Market value of assets (mva) is presented in £mn.
h(t|1A(x), y, 1A(x)y, z) = h0(t) exp(β′1A(x) + γ′y + δ′1A(x)y + ε′z) (4.1)
where h(t|1A(x), y, 1A(x)y, z) is the hazard at time t conditional on vectors of
covariates 1A(x), y, 1A(x)y and z. Also, h0(t) is the baseline hazard which, in the
case of Cox PH, is non-parametric and β, γ, δ and ε are the vectors of coefficients to
be estimated. Note that 1A(x) is an indicator function that is 1 for firm-years with
free cash flow agency problems or 0 otherwise; y is a vector of firm-level, fundamental
variables that may amplify or ameliorate agency costs of free cash flow; z is a vector
of firm-, industry- and macro-level control variables. Covariates were lagged by
one period and all models incorporate firm-specific (clustered) fixed effects. We
include the start variable in all specifications to capture possible survivorship bias
for companies established before 1964.
The proportional hazards assumption states that a covariate should introduce




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































regression of scaled Schoenfeld residuals over a function of duration (Schoenfeld
1982). Occasional violations of the proportional hazards assumption were restored
by including an interaction term between duration and the violating covariate.
Furthermore, we used Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) modelling with an as-
sumed Weibull distribution as a robustness check for the results from the Cox PH
models. When using log-linear form, an AFT model can be written as:
lnT = µ− (β′1A(x) + γ′y + δ′1A(x)y + ε′z) + σW (4.2)
where lnT is the log of failure time, µ describes mean failure time andβ′1A(x) +
γ′y + δ′1A(x)y + ε′z is the acceleration factor with variable declarations equal to
Equation 4.1. Also, σW is the error term where the error term distribution is de-
scribed in W , which in our case, is assumed to be Weibull.3 The coefficients are
logarithms of ratios of survival time and, as failure time is modelled, the interpret-
ation of coefficient signs is opposite to that of a Cox PH model, because shorter
survival time (AFT) implies higher risk (Cox PH) and vice versa.
A further, more simplistic model is logistic regression (logit) modelling, which is
applied for robustness and comparability to older takeover likelihood literature (e.g.
Palepu (1986)). Such a model can be written as
P (i) =
1
1 + exp−(βdx + γy + δdxy + εz + ui)
(4.3)
where, in addition to previously defined variables P (i) is the probability of firm-
year i receiving a successful takeover bid in the next period and ui is the error term
to the logistic regression.
3All models have a log(scale) coefficient close to -1, which is significantly different from zero.
Therefore, the value must also be significantly different from +1, justifying the Weibull assumption
over the simpler exponential distribution.
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4.4 Results and Discussion
4.4.1 Takeover Likelihood and Agency Costs of Free Cash
Flow
Table 4.6 lists the findings from six Cox PH interaction models over two panels, one
for each viable Jensen case indicator. Each panel contains an initial model without
interaction terms or controls, a model with interaction terms and a model complete
with interaction terms and control variables.
The Jensen case indicator itself is only significant when using the more relaxed
definition (median). However, this definition only holds until control variables are in-
troduced. The lack of significance when using the quartile definition can be explained
by the comparatively low number of events in the dummy. The only significant value
in interaction terms was for dividends with the median definition (positive). Again,
this significance only persists before addition of control variables. Here, it is inter-
esting to note that the coefficient for uninteracted dividends is also significant, but
has the opposite sign (negative). All control variables have the expected sign from
an agency cost perspective. Higher stock price returns decrease takeover likelihood,
higher financial risk, company size, the availability of merger partners, takeover
intensity and economic growth increase takeover likelihood.
Our findings converge only slightly with those of Dickerson et al. (2002). The in-
teraction dummies cannot be compared as Dickerson et al. (2002) applied interaction
terms using the subtraction method. While those authors found a significant effect
for CAPEX only, we find limited evidence of an effect for dividends. Our coefficients
for dividends were, however, non-significant when control variables are added, which
consistent with Dickerson et al. (2002). When ignoring interaction terms, the lack
of significance was also reported by Palepu (1986) and Barnes (2000). Note that
there is some congruence with Dickerson et al. (2002) in the missing significance
for leverage. This comparison is again somewhat limited by the fact that Dickerson
117
Table 4.6: Interaction model with median and quartile definition
Panel A: Median Panel B: Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
div on assets −0.087 −0.148** −0.095 −0.097 −0.098 −0.064
(0.061) (0.071) (0.078) (0.061) (0.061) (0.069)
investment 0.034 0.045 0.074 0.122 0.121 0.116
(0.056) (0.058) (0.064) (0.115) (0.115) (0.124)
leverage 0.172 0.177 0.055 0.162 0.168 0.028
(0.142) (0.144) (0.150) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142)
d market 0.218** 0.204* 0.175 0.203 0.051 0.251
(0.093) (0.109) (0.120) (0.229) (0.371) (0.384)




asset utilisation −0.026 0.027
(0.055) (0.055)








ln mva 0.125* 0.135*
(0.075) (0.075)
mtb similarity 0.407** 0.118
(0.131) (0.063)






gdp growth 13.873*** 13.553***
(2.718) (2.707)
div on assets:d market 0.278** 0.111 0.008 0.036
(0.132) (0.153) (0.380) (0.408)
investment:d market −0.122 −0.127 −0.018 0.408
(0.204) (0.211) (0.604) (0.628)
leverage:d market −0.054 −0.047 −0.501 −0.371
(0.184) (0.183) (0.625) (0.573)
start −2.621*** −2.630*** −1.954*** −2.628*** −2.631*** −1.847***
(0.125) (0.125) (0.156) (0.125) (0.125) (0.157)
d market d median d quartile
Observations 20 741 20 741 18 514 20 741 20 741 18 514
Number of events 594 594 548 594 594 548
Number of events in 170 170 160 20 20 19
d market
R2 0.026 0.026 0.054 0.026 0.026 0.056
Max. Possible R2 0.399 0.399 0.406 0.399 0.399 0.406
Log Likelihood -5004.369 -5002.137 -4304.549 -5006.120 -5005.791 -4289.246
Wald Test 400.210*** 404.150*** 1195.880*** 399.040*** 403.410*** 1176.430***
LR Test 550.894*** 555.358*** 1034.580*** 547.393*** 548.050*** 1065.187***
Score (Logrank) Test 642.893*** 646.178*** 1274.378*** 639.304*** 639.809*** 1261.852***
Notes: This table presents a test for a disciplining effect from takeover markets for high free cash flow and low Tobin’s
Q firms using Cox PH models. Panel A identifies candidates for disciplinary action on the basis of Tobin’s Q below
the industry-year wise median and free cash flow on assets above the industry-year wise quartile. Panel B repeats
the test on the basis of a quartile definition. For each panel, we first display a model without controls and without
interaction terms, and then a model with interaction terms and finally, a model with interaction terms and controls.
Models in Panel A contain interaction terms between duration with leverage, volatility, sales growth, tangible, mtb
similarity and intensity. Panel B models contain duration interaction terms with volatility and tangible. These
interaction terms protect the Cox PH assumption. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. See Table 4.3 for
detailed definitions of all variables. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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et al. (2002) did not interact leverage with the agency cost indicator. Similarly,
the missing significance for leverage matches that of Powell & Yawson (2007) and
Loderer & Waelchli (2015).
Differences to Dickerson et al. (2002) may be due to differences in the sample
(both are from the UK, but time periods are shifted by roughly ten years). This is
most likely the case for CAPEX since Dickerson et al. (2002) found significance both
in and out of the interaction dummy, while our results were non-significant both in
and out of the interaction term. It is more likely, however, that interaction term
differences are due to the inclusion of the free cash flow component in the dummy
specification.
Importantly, our results challenge the validity of the ACFCF identifier used in
Dickerson et al. (2002). The median definition applied in that study implies that
half of the sample always suffers from ACFCF. Our slightly more refined approach
demonstrates only limited evidence for a disciplining effect on free cash flow problems
through takeover markets. Assuming our combined definitions hold, firms’ ACFCF
were handled through other corporate governance mechanisms than the threat of
takeover.
Two additional tests provided further analysis and validation of our results. The
following section examines the effect of high free cash flows, ignoring the effect
of TQ.4 Also, an alternative method of modelling takeover likelihood serves as a
robustness test of the results provided in Table 4.6.
4.4.2 The Impact of High Free Cash Flows
The previous analysis lead to further investigation of the impact of high free cash
flows on takeover risk. Table 4.7 repeats the final specification from Table 4.6 (mod-
els 3 and 6) but replaces the interaction dummy with an identifier of high free cash
4An examination of the impact of high takeover intensity on our values in Table 4.6 did not
lead to conclusive results.
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flows. We began with a strict definition of free cash flows in the top decile (model
1), which was gradually extended across another four models and ending with a top
40% cut-off in model 5.5
The dividend interaction term was significant negative in models 2 to 4, while
the level of investment was significant negative in models 1, 4 and 5. Note that the
high free cash flow dummy and interacted leverage were not significant in any model.
These findings indicate that, when free cash flows are high, a company can decrease
its takeover risk by expending the generated money (i.e., decrease cash hoarding)
either by increasing CAPEX or a payout to investors, which is reasonable because
the dummy ignores TQ. In connection with these variables, a further potentially
informative indicator of payout to investors might be net interest expense instead of
the level of leverage. This does not mean by inversion of the argument that hoarding
the money leads to increased takeover likelihood since the dummy variables were
always non-significant. It was not possible to perform an analysis of cash holding
due to missing data.6
4.4.3 Robustness Check
Accelerated Failure Time Modelling
In Table 4.8, we repeat all models from Table 4.6 with accelerated failure time
models. The results for key variables appear to be robust. Specifically, the identifier
of ACFCF significantly decreases survival time in models 1 and 2, similar to the
increase in risk for the same variable in Table 4.6. The only significant interaction
term was on dividends in model 2. The sign for the coefficient was, again, opposite
to that in Table 4.6. Also, the only significant interaction term was on dividends for
model 2 (negative) with the standalone dividend coefficient being significant and of
5By industry-year group
6DataStream holds three alternative variables for the amount of cash on a company’s balance
sheet. All three failed to deliver an amount of observations in line with data availability for all
other variables. We were not able to detect a pattern in the missingness, e.g. not only small
companies were affected. Accordingly we classified the missingness an issue of data quality and
removed the variable from all samples.
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Table 4.7: Analysis of the impact of high free cash flow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
div on assets −0.019 0.002 0.022 0.051 −0.005
(0.075) (0.078) (0.080) (0.084) (0.102)
investment 0.159 0.167 0.170 0.181 0.191
(0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.119) (0.118)
leverage 0.056 0.074 0.091 0.077 0.063
(0.078) (0.079) (0.081) (0.085) (0.089)
d market −0.147 0.076 0.017 −0.036 0.022
(0.237) (0.171) (0.147) (0.124) (0.112)
excess r −0.224*** −0.228*** −0.227*** −0.229*** −0.233***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
volatility 0.886*** 0.874*** 0.877*** 0.880*** 0.877***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095)
asset utilisation 0.041 0.038 0.040 0.049 0.049
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
expense ratio −0.175 −0.161 −0.157 −0.144 −0.153
(0.205) (0.205) (0.205) (0.205) (0.205)
roa 0.048 0.021 0.024 0.026 0.014
(0.098) (0.096) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097)
sales growth −0.072 −0.073 −0.074 −0.081 −0.074
(0.200) (0.201) (0.203) (0.205) (0.205)
tangible 0.067 0.075 0.078 0.092 0.091
(0.108) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107)
ln mva 0.134* 0.136* 0.134* 0.132* 0.134*
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075)
mtb similarity 0.413** 0.421** 0.418** 0.406** 0.408**
(0.128) (0.128) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127)
size similarity 0.267*** 0.265*** 0.264*** 0.264*** 0.267***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
intensity 107.225*** 106.983*** 106.491*** 106.586*** 107.423***
(6.609) (6.590) (6.589) (6.607) (6.616)
herfindahl 6.670*** 6.637*** 6.679*** 6.714*** 6.741***
(1.102) (1.099) (1.098) (1.097) (1.096)
gdp growth 13.507*** 13.530*** 13.541*** 13.433*** 13.359***
(2.703) (2.701) (2.702) (2.698) (2.701)
div on assets:d market −0.237 −0.286** −0.292** −0.291** −0.117
(0.181) (0.156) (0.147) (0.136) (0.133)
investment:d market −0.671* −0.402 −0.379 −0.513** −0.449**
(0.407) (0.289) (0.248) (0.207) (0.174)
leverage:d market 0.304 0.071 −0.057 0.012 0.034
(0.237) (0.209) (0.190) (0.162) (0.148)
start −1.840*** −1.845*** −1.847*** −1.841*** −1.839***
(0.157) (0.157) (0.156) (0.156) (0.157)
d market d fcfoa 10 d fcfoa 15 d fcfoa 20 d fcfoa 30 d fcfoa 40
Observations 18 514 18 514 18 514 18 514 18 514
Number of events 548 548 548 548 548
Number of events in d market 36 70 100 166 235
R2 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057
Max. Possible R2 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406
Log Likelihood -4281.954 -4282.333 -4281.992 -4279.139 -4280.901
Wald Test 1195.730*** 1179.630*** 1188.690*** 1194.180*** 1194.880***
LR Test 1079.770*** 1079.013*** 1079.694*** 1085.401*** 1081.876***
Score (Logrank) Test 1276.077*** 1274.755*** 1274.371*** 1278.827*** 1276.327***
Notes: This table presents Cox PH models for testing the impact of high free cash flow with respect to influencers of
agency costs of free cash flows on takeover likelihood without consideration of Tobin’s Q using Cox PH models. The
free cash flow on assets dummy is first defined at the top decile (Model 1), which is then progressively relaxed until
the top 40% in Model 5. All models include interaction terms and control variables. Models contain interaction
terms of volatility, investment, sales growth, tangible, mtb similarity, intensity, and herfindahl with duration. These
interaction terms are for the protection of the proportional hazards assumption. Standard errors are provided in
parentheses. See Table 4.3 for detailed definitions of all variables. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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the opposite sign. Contrary to Cox PH models, all AFT models returned a significant
decrease of survival time on higher leverage outside the interaction dummy before
controls were added.
Control variables partially differed in significances. Market value of assets was
not significant, as illustrated in Table 4.8, when there was a significant positive effect
in the Cox equivalent. Significance on mtb similarity in model 3 and herfindahl in
model 6 from Table 4.6 was lost when using AFT. Note that the models concur on
excess return, intensity and GDP growth.
Logistic Regression Modelling
For additional robustness the main results were also modelled using logistic regres-
sion (logit) in Table 4.9. The interpretation of signs from a logit model is similar to
that of a Cox PH model in that a positive sign is indicative of a positive relation of
the coefficient with takeover risk and vice versa in case of a negative sign. The table
set up is similar to Table 4.6 and Table 4.8. d market in the median definition was
now always significant positive, while significance dissipated with Cox PH model-
ling. The only concurrence in interaction term significance was dividends with the
median dummy definition for ACFCF. Just as in Cox PH modelling, the sign of this
interaction term was wrong for agency costs of free cash flow. Leverage, outwith the
interaction terms, was now occasionally significant positive, which is also the wrong
sign for agency costs. Logit is generally inferior to Cox PH modelling and probably
overstated the significance levels of the median-defined d market. With the excep-
tion of the median dummy, logistic regression modelling did not find a disciplining
effect through the threat of takeover on agency costs of free cash flow, so that the
main result was largely supported by this robustness test.
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Table 4.8: Accelerated failure time modelling
Panel A: Median Panel B: Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
div on assets 0.026 0.050* 0.015 0.031 0.031 0.009
(0.025) (0.028) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.022)
investment −0.018 −0.022 −0.027 −0.011 −0.011 −0.017
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
leverage −0.053* −0.058* −0.029 −0.048* −0.050* −0.025
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
d market −0.087** −0.082* −0.057 −0.097 −0.049 −0.100
(0.038) (0.046) (0.044) (0.093) (0.129) (0.120)




asset utilisation −0.005 −0.006
(0.023) (0.022)








ln mva −0.027 −0.026
(0.028) (0.028)
mtb similarity −0.021 −0.027
(0.027) (0.027)
size similarity −0.076*** −0.079***
(0.021) (0.021)




gdp growth −5.628*** −5.652***
(0.926) (0.933)
div on assets:d market −0.103** −0.032 −0.016 0.001
(0.045) (0.046) (0.115) (0.124)
investment:d market 0.040 0.040 0.012 −0.147
(0.091) (0.085) (0.258) (0.236)
leverage:d market 0.029 0.027 0.152 0.085
(0.080) (0.068) (0.200) (0.177)
start 0.974*** 0.976*** 0.972*** 0.976*** 0.977*** 0.972***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038)
Constant 3.790*** 3.787*** 3.954*** 3.769*** 3.768*** 3.941***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.059) (0.042) (0.042) (0.059)
d market d median d quartile
Observations 20 741 20 741 18 514 20 741 20 741 18 514
Number of events 594 594 548 594 594 548
Number of events in d market 170 170 160 20 20 19
Scale 0.377 0.376 0.338 0.377 0.377 0.338
Log(Scale) -0.975*** -0.977*** -1.085*** -0.975*** -0.976*** -1.085***
Log Likelihood -3969.040 -3966.706 -3534.444 -3971.418 -3971.180 -3536.256
χ2 629.195*** 633.865*** 831.253*** 624.441*** 624.916*** 827.630***
This table details a robustness check for the results presented in Table 4.6 using accelerated failure time models. All
models assume a Weibull distribution of the error term. All models have a log(scale) coefficient close to -1, which
is significantly different from zero. Therefore, the value must also be significantly different from +1, justifying the
Weibull assumption over the simpler exponential distribution. See Table 4.3 for detailed definitions of all variables.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors are provided in parentheses.
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Table 4.9: Logistic regression modelling
Panel A: Median Panel B: Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
div on assets −0.026 −0.071 −0.083 −0.037 −0.037 −0.055
(0.054) (0.061) (0.074) (0.053) (0.054) (0.066)
investment −0.031 −0.044 −0.030 −0.059 −0.062 −0.065
(0.052) (0.055) (0.065) (0.051) (0.052) (0.063)
leverage 0.119** 0.108 0.023 0.101* 0.103* 0.025
(0.060) (0.065) (0.078) (0.059) (0.060) (0.072)
d market 0.319*** 0.376*** 0.348*** 0.198 0.282 0.476
(0.095) (0.106) (0.117) (0.233) (0.347) (0.354)
start −0.011 −0.012 −0.054 −0.013 −0.013 −0.056
(0.084) (0.084) (0.091) (0.084) (0.084) (0.091)




asset utilisation 0.059 0.071
(0.053) (0.052)








ln mva 0.227*** 0.234***
(0.077) (0.077)
mtb similarity 0.161*** 0.194***
(0.062) (0.062)






gdp growth 8.757*** 8.696***
(2.509) (2.510)
div on assets:d market 0.237* 0.178 −0.033 −0.010
(0.130) (0.144) (0.351) (0.387)
investment:d market 0.115 0.029 0.333 0.542
(0.172) (0.191) (0.525) (0.547)
leverage:d market 0.059 0.012 −0.135 −0.202
(0.167) (0.178) (0.497) (0.489)
Constant −3.596*** −3.596*** −4.334*** −3.522*** −3.522*** −4.270***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.125) (0.058) (0.058) (0.123)
d market d median d quartile
N 20 741 20 741 18 514 20 741 20 741 18 514
Number of events 594 594 548 594 594 548
Number of events in 170 170 160 20 20 19
d market
Log Likelihood -2687.906 -2685.995 -2383.919 -2692.974 -2692.734 -2388.088
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5387.812 5389.990 4811.838 5397.948 5403.468 4820.176
This table details a robustness check for the results presented in Table 4.6 using logistic regression (logit) models.




The results provided in Table 4.7 adds to criticism of Dickerson et al. (2002) by
underlining the importance of high free cash flows when testing for the effects of
ACFCF in takeover markets. The results for the interacted variables for investment
and dividends provide strong support for Jensen (1986). The missing significance for
the interaction term for leverage might be restored if interest expense is examined
rather than the level of debt. We use leverage for consistency with previous studies,
not only in Dickerson et al. (2002), but the takeover likelihood literature more gen-
erally (for example Powell & Yawson 2007. Additionally, Jensen (1986) identifies
signals of a permanent increase in payout to shareholders, which is more accurately
indicated by leverage than interest expense.7
The disparity to results in Dickerson et al. (2002) is not driven by their lack of
accounting for free cash flow alone. As visible in Table 3.10 from Chapter 3, the
response from agency cost indicators towards likelihood of disciplinary takeover are
getting weaker when relaxing the TQ threshold.8 However, this does not explain
why we do not find comparable results to Dickerson et al. (2002).
There are a number of possible reasons for this, of which sampling issues will be
most influential. In particular, the time periods covered in the respective studies
are covering different economic regimes (1976 to 1990 vs. 1986 to 2015). The main
reason for using a more recent sample than in the Dickerson study is that the 70s and
80s, Thatcher era is hardly representative for inference today. Most notably the 70s
and 80s are covering phases from pre-globalised world to globalisation with heavy
privatisation efforts and transformation of the UK economy from manufacturing to
services in the UK (Hall 1993, May 1996, Thompson 2014). Another influencing
factor would have been the oil crises of the 70s (Campbell 2005). The 1990s and
early 2000s, by comparison, were marked by the advent of the internet and increased
global competition (Shiller 2015), as well as the expansion of the Chinese economy
7Jensen (1986) rejects the use of share buybacks to decrease ACFCF for this reason.
8This is confirmed by running two models with close resemblance to those in Dickerson et al.
(2002). See Table C.1 in the Appendix.
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(Barro 2016) and the global financial crisis, which was the largest since the 1929 crash
(Ivashina & Scharfstein 2010). These differences are visible in ratios of takeover to
total firms of 36% in Dickerson et al. (2002) compared to 28.64% in our case.
The calculation of variables is congruent insofar that flow variables were scaled by
average assets, not end of year total assets. A difference, however, is that Dickerson
et al. (2002) use net assets and we use total assets for scaling. Because leverage is
traditionally low in UK companies (median debt on assets of 16% in our sample, see
Table 4.4) this effect will be negligible. A notable exception to this is the calculation
of TQ. While we are following the approach of approximating TQ as market value
of assets over book value of assets, Dickerson et al. (2002) use the more elaborate
TQ proxy from Lindenberg & Ross (1981). Chung & Pruitt (1994) show that there
is a 96% alignment between the two methods, so that the effect will be negligible in
our sample and not sufficient for explaining the differences in findings.
Finally, one must keep in mind that results in Dickerson et al. (2002) are not
conclusive with regards to agency costs of free cash flow. Increases in CAPEX were
decreasing takeover likelihood both within and out of the low TQ interaction, which
contradicts agency theory. Dividends were not significant at all, also not matching
the hypothesis based on Jensen (1986). In summary, whatever effect Dickerson et al.
(2002) found, does not seem to exist anymore. The bottom median is not a sufficient
cutoff (see Table C.1 in the Appendix and the TQ definition test in Table 3.10 in
Chapter 3) and ignoring FCF is misleading in terms of economic theory and empirical
results (see Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 in this chapter).
4.5 Conclusions
This study assesses the threat of takeover as a tool for disciplining companies with
agency costs of free cash flows. We aimed to answer the following two questions:
(1) Can we identify companies with free cash flow agency problems? and (2) If
yes, are such companies disciplined in takeover markets? Indeed, we could identify
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a set of company-year observations where high free cash flows were generated, but
growth opportunities for investment of that cash were lacking by requiring both
TQ to exceed and free cash flow on assets to fall below industry-year-wise cut-
offs. However, we only found limited evidence for such companies being disciplined
in takeover markets. We did not observe strong evidence for companies’ ability to
reduce takeover likelihood by distributing cash to investors. These two findings were
established by using our ACFCF identifiers as interaction terms with variables of
cash disgorgement in models of takeover likelihood. These findings strongly indicate
that agency costs of free cash flow are regulated through means other than the
market for corporate control.
Alternatively, it might be possible that high free cash flow companies are re-
peatedly taken over before TQ can sink too far. Our examination of the effect of
free cash flow interaction terms (without TQ) does not provide evidence for higher
takeover risk in high free cash flow companies. Such companies can, however, de-
crease their likelihood of becoming a target by expending or distributing cash.
We provide key contributions to the literature by further developing a method
for identifying ACFCF. We are further able to demonstrate that ACFCF have only
a limited role in takeover markets. Subsequent research might seek to establish how
alternative corporate governance mechanisms affect ACFCF in the takeover market




This chapter presents concluding remarks in the form of summary findings and their
contributions to the literature, implications and limitations and derives avenues for
future research.
5.1 Summary of the Main Findings
In this thesis, we provide evidence for agency costs in UK takeover markets through
the study of bidding firm abnormal returns and an examination of takeover likeli-
hood. This thesis adopts a framework where negative bidding firm abnormal returns
are a result of agency costs. Chapter 2 of the thesis reassesses the magnitude of such
costs by refining the underlying methodology for abnormal return calculation. Sim-
ilarly, in the framework adopted in this thesis and in the context of the market for
corporate control, a company’s likelihood of becoming a takeover target is driven by
its agency costs. In Chapter 3 of this study a large range of agency cost proxies is
applied to reclassify a set of disciplinary targets. Both, agency cost indicators and
disciplinary target definitions, are combined to predict takeover likelihood, which
allows to reassess the functioning of the market for corporate control. A final em-
pirical chapter employs a narrower set of indicators to assess the effects of agency
costs of free cash flow on takeover likelihood.
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In Chapter 2, we refine the methodology for assessing bidding firm abnormal
returns, that serve as a demonstration of the price finding mechanism as the driver
of the market for corporate control. The following questions are investigated: (1)
Are there ARCH effects when conducting M&A event studies in the UK? (2) Can
models from the GARCH family help ameliorate the estimation problems of OLS
when ARCH effects are present? (3) Are the resulting abnormal returns different
from standard event studies when using ARCH models? and (4) Do these differ-
ences translate to variations in Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) cross-sectional
models? ARCH effects are detected in about half of events. We correct the usual
OLS estimator for Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) effects,
where appropriate, by applying a range of Generalised ARCH (GARCH) type mod-
els, which is effective in all but 4% of events. We report significantly greater CAR
for both short- and long-term event windows, without repudiation of the traditional
finding of long-term value destruction for bidding firms.
The central mechanism for resolving agency costs in takeover markets is the mar-
ket for corporate control, which we examine through the lens of takeover likelihood
in Chapter 3. The issue is approached by asking (1) How effective is the market for
corporate control in an economy with an open merger policy? and (2) What agency
cost indicators are associated with market discipline? We identified sets of discip-
linary candidates that experience a significantly increased likelihood of becoming a
takeover target when using excess return to define the set. Here, firm fundamental
agency indicators had a minimal effect. In contrast, defining the set through Tobin’s
Q (TQ) leads to changes in takeover likelihood depending on firm fundamentals as-
sociated with agency costs. In particular, firms with higher sales growth and asset
utilisation within the low TQ set experienced higher takeover likelihood and firms
with higher profitability within the same set had lower takeover risk. Comparing
this evidence from our UK sample, in which anti-takeover provisions are prohibited,
to findings from US studies, raises support for the potency of an open merger policy
if policy makers intent to establish a functional market for corporate control.
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In a third empirical chapter, the driving research questions are: (1) Can we
identify companies with free cash flow agency problems? and (2) If yes, are such
companies disciplined in takeover markets? We identified a set of disciplinary can-
didates by using high free cash flow on assets in combination with low TQ for the
definition of the disciplinary set. With this method, there was no robust evidence
for the relevance of agency costs of free cash flow in the market for corporate con-
trol. However, we demonstrated that high free cash flow should not be omitted
when testing the role of agency costs of free cash flow in the market for corporate
control as we did find possibilities for lowering takeover likelihood by expending or
distributing cash for high free cash flow firms.
This research provides contributions to the literature on Mergers and Acquisi-
tions (M&A) and agency costs by (1) presenting an update on the value creation
in UK bidding firms by methodological refinement, and (2) refining previous at-
tempts to define disciplinary candidates in takeover likelihood studies and thereby
identifying a detailed view of the mechanism underlying the market for corporate
control with regards to agency costs and agency costs of free cash flow. We presented
evidence for a functional market for corporate control reflected in higher takeover
likelihood for low TQ firms with firm fundamentals indicating agency costs. Addi-
tionally, we observed higher takeover likelihood for a set of firms that experience falls
in stock price, but this set has little relation to agency costs. Finally, the market
for corporate control is not activated for reducing agency costs of free cash flow.
5.2 Implications of the Study
The findings presented in this thesis present a set of implications for (1) researchers
regarding agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and M&A, (2) practition-
ers such as analysts, shareholders and management as well as market observers, and
finally (3) regulators and policymakers.
When researchers conduct M&A event studies, ARCH effects have a significant
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impact because OLS overstates systemic risk of bidders in the presence of ARCH
problems. The result is a higher benchmark return, which leads to significantly
lower CARs. Our evidence suggests that previous studies have overstated the mag-
nitude of value destruction for M&As in the UK and should be downward corrected.
Cross-sectional studies of bidding firm CARs remain valid as there were no signi-
ficant differences in coefficients found from such regressions. Considering takeover
likelihood, the most important implication for researchers examining the market for
corporate control is that the cut-off point for excess return and TQ must be set
relatively low for the classification of the disciplinary set. Most takeovers are not
disciplinary in this study. Notably, when using TQ, the median is not sufficient as
we observe the most significance of agency indicators the lowest 10% to 20% TQ
sets with diminishing significance towards the 40% cut-off. For market for corpor-
ate control studies focussing on agency costs of free cash flow, it is not sufficient,
as in Dickerson, Gibson & Tsakalotos (2002), to define disciplinary takeovers using
Tobin’s Q alone without consideration of the magnitude of free cash flows. Finally,
researchers can expect markedly different results in economies with weaker share-
holder protection.
For practitioners, our results regarding bidding firm abnormal returns demon-
strate that the previous finding of long-term underperformance must be somewhat
upwardly revised. Importantly, shareholder value is still destroyed, meaning UK
acquisitions do not serve owners and are, therefore, on average, agency costs. Share-
holders should be cautious of their management’s acquisition plans. Management
can draw on our results and consider what abnormal return drivers can help them
perform better than their peers and possibly circumvent disciplinary takeovers.
Through the study of takeover likelihood, we observe a well-functioning market
for corporate control in the UK. The market for corporate control does not simply act
as a disciplinary mechanism but also puts pressure on managers to act in the best
interests of shareholders. Our indicators provide direct evidence of this pressure.
The significance of explanatory variables in takeover likelihoods models suggests
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that algorithmic trading could be profitable, but further testing is recommended.
For example, our Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) models can forecast the number
of years before a company becomes a takeover target. However, what is important
for practitioners is that we are able to demonstrate which companies are likely
to be disciplinary candidates. In our sample, takeover likelihood for disciplinary
candidates can be inferred from analysis of the ratio of Tobin’s Q to asset utilisation,
sales growth and profitability. Furthermore, a sharp drop in a company’s share price
during the preceding 12 months invites takeover irrespective of firm fundamental
agency cost proxies. We did not find evidence that agency costs of free cash flow are
an effective indicator of disciplinary takeover likelihood. Rather, the results reveal
that ignoring free cash flow generation in studying agency costs of free cash flow
results in spurious results. There is evidence for the hypothesis that companies with
high free cash flows might be taken even at higher levels of Tobin’s Q. An additional
implication is that companies with high free cash flows do not experience elevated
takeover hazard per se but can decrease their likelihood of becoming a target by
distributing cash.
For regulators, the main implication is that an open merger policy is desirable if
a functional market for corporate control is supposed to protect shareholders from
agency costs. The point is made especially clear when comparing our takeover
likelihood results to US-based research where anti-takeover provisions are allowed
and widely applied to the benefit of the target firm’s management. On this basis, a
follow-up study could examine whether agency costs exhibit similar predictive power
for US companies, where anti-takeover provisions are commonly allowed.
5.3 Limitations
The results and their implications in this thesis must be considered under the fol-
lowing possible limitations in assumptions, data and methodology, as well as inter-
pretation.
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In this thesis, Tobin’s Q is approximated by sum of market value of equity and
book value of debt divided by book value of total assets. This proxy has been
shown to converge with a more precise estimate that is conceptionally closer to the
original ratio of market value of assets to replacement costs of assets developed by
Lindenberg & Ross (1981). According to Chung & Pruitt (1994), the approximate
TQ values explain 96.6% of the theoretically correct values. Given the importance
of TQ for our results, the variation between the two measures offers an opportunity
for further investigation. The value of Tobin’s Q used in this study (and in most
other research; see Coles, Daniel & Naveen 2008, McKnight & Weir 2009, Danbolt,
Siganos & Tunyi 2016, Dargenidou, Gregory & Hua 2016) is conceptionally closer
to that of an unlevered market to book ratio (Penman 2013).
An ideological limitation of the thesis is that the topic of agency costs is tightly
integrated with a theory of the firm that assigns primacy to shareholder value max-
imisation (Jensen 2001, Schwartz 2017). The implications for policymakers derived
from our findings are provided in the same spirit, and practitioners pursuing a more
balanced stakeholder approach should consider this issue.
As demonstrated by the introductory example of ABN Amro and RBS (see
Chapter 1), the market for corporate control may not be effective in disciplining
exceptionally large targets. Similarly, in some situations bidders may lack financial
resources or be unwilling to rescue distressed companies. There may also be broader
situations of elevated uncertainty, such as financial crises. In this thesis, measures of
firm size, takeover intensity, economic growth, and industry-year effects are included
to account for the effects of crises and size. Despite the use of these controls further
investigation of these particular situations could be undertaken.
A point that usually receives minimal attention in M&A event studies is that
small bidders might react in a more volatile manner to takeover announcements,
which could lead to an over- or understatement of average abnormal returns (see
for example Fama & French 1993). From a market-wide perspective it might be
informative to examine value weighted average abnormal returns.
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Most takeover likelihood models presented in this thesis rely on Cox Proportional
Hazards (Cox PH) modelling which, as the name suggests, assumes the hazard intro-
duced by a variable to be constant across the duration of a subject. The assumption
is somewhat questionable from an economic perspective as older firms might behave
differently than younger firms and, indeed, the proportional hazards assumption was
violated multiple times in our models. We countered this violation by introducing
interaction terms with duration for the variables in question. Additionally, we added
parametric tests as well as logistic modelling for robustness, which confirmed our
findings.
A limitation to our findings on the role of ARCH effects is that 3.96% of events
had a significant ARCH-LM test for all attempted models. A possible allay for future
research is to apply more elaborated GARCH-type models to remove the remaining
ARCH effects. Additionally, one might argue that it is sufficient to correct ARCH
effects using Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard er-
rors and thereby not change the OLS estimators (Newey & West 1987). Importantly,
the very purpose of Chapter 2 is studying the impact of GARCH correction on event
study methodology for bidding firm abnormal returns to M&A announcements so
that HAC is of little relevance.
Additionally, most variables in takeover likelihood models are scaled by the av-
erage of the beginning and end of year assets. While this approach is not entirely
uncommon in academia, the standard seems to be to scale by end of year values.
We have given precedence to our method due to its use by practitioners and, in our
opinion, greater intuitive sense.1, 2
Finally, the sample in this thesis is collected from the pre-Brexit era. Depending
on the ultimate nature of Brexit and the subsequent reaction of market participants,
some of our results might be vastly different to a future UK sample. So far, deal
value has increased domestically for UK companies in an attempt to prepare for the
1See e.g. Penman 2013
2A year’s profit is earned by using the assets over the year. Assets at the end of the year are
a result of assets at the start of year plus earnings and changes to capitalisation.
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regulatory effects of Brexit (Cristerna et al. 2018). The more questionable aspect
from this thesis, after Brexit, is probably abnormal return creation, both short and
long term. The functioning of the market for corporate control is not likely to
be impeded by Brexit as the open merger policy is likely to continue. That said,
a change in takeover appetite might lead to different results, even though this is
unlikely as we have controlled for takeover intensity in our results.
5.4 Directions for Future Research
The methodology described in Chapter 2 can be applied to other countries for a
study of targets or combined firms, or issues different from M&A announcements.
As previously discussed, small events might be overrepresented in the simple mean
calculation. A way to prevent the near omission of small events, such as a value-
weighted average produces, might be the reporting of results for events sorted by
deciles according to bidder size, deal size or a ratio of the two. Important for the rel-
evance of an open-merger regime, the connection between agency costs and long-term
bidder abnormal returns should be analysed in economies that allow anti-takeover
provisions. The problem of remaining ARCH effects in our study (see Section 5.3)
can be resolved in future studies by applying more elaborate GARCH models, com-
pared to those used in Chapter 2. Additionally, in our sample, events with ARCH
problems seem to have more negative returns than events without ARCH effects. As
such, it would be interesting to examine if ARCH effects can serve as an indicator
of negative returns, both in the context of M&A and outwith. This study could
be complemented by an analysis of firm characteristics of ARCH-problematic firms
compared with those of other firms.
Future research on takeover likelihood and the market for corporate control could
also apply our methodology for classifying and analysing disciplinary candidates in
other markets, especially the US. Results from such a study can be expected to
be especially meaningful for policymakers. Furthermore, a separate study might
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seek to establish if a voluntary abolishment of anti-takeover provisions for a firm in
which such tactics are allowed acts as an effective bonding mechanism (the signal to
shareholders is a decrease in agency costs). The limits of the market for corporate
control can be studied by defining cases where the takeover mechanism fails to
prevent bankruptcy or state intervention, such as with very large targets, missing
financial power or willingness to takeover of other market participants as well as
situations of increased economy-wide uncertainty. Our results regarding agency costs
of free cash flow suggest an examination of alternative corporate governance systems
is warranted. Such a study would seek to identifying which regime is most effective
at managing this specialised form of agency cost. Initially, the methodologies for
the disciplinary set construction in Chapters 3 and 4 can be applied to a panel
investigation in the tradition of McKnight & Weir (2009).
Finally, Brexit is likely to have an impact on M&A markets, deal structuring,
target choice and investment levels. Statistically, Brexit should be treated as a
regime change. Accordingly, it might be worth repeating our abnormal return and
takeover likelihood studies during the coming years when sufficient post-Brexit data
are available. Regardless, it will be interesting to observe how shareholders assess
bid announcements in a post-Brexit era.
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Table A.1: Variable definitions
Panel A: Deal Characteristics
Variable Definition
ex post-takeover count The total number of acquisitions per acquirer during
our period of observation
event date The announcement date of an acquisition
deal value The value of the acquisition in million British Pound
(2015)
market Cap The market value of the acquirer’s equity on the ac-
quisition date in million British Pound (2015)
rel deal value Ratio of deal value to acquirer market cap
same industry A dummy that is 1 when the acquirer and target have
the same 4-digit SIC code
pct acquired The percentage of the target’s equity acquired
mtb similarity The amount of industry participants with a market-to-
book ratio within 0.25 standard deviations of the ac-
quirer divided by total number of industry participants
for a year
size similarity The number of industry participants with a market
value of equity within 0.15 standard deviations of the
acquirer divided by total number of industry parti-
cipants for a year
Panel B: Agency cost proxies
q The sum of market value of equity at event date and
book value of debt divided by book value of assets
roa Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) divided by
average assets
sales growth Year-on-year change in net sales
leverage End of year total debt divided by end of year book
value of assets
mva Market value of equity at event date plus book value
of debt in million British pounds (2015)
asset utilisation Net sales divided by average assets
expense ratio Operating expenses over net sales
div on assets Dividends paid divided by average assets
investment Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) over average assets
tangible Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) divided by end
of year assets
Panel C: Environmental factors
intensity Industry-year wise number of acquisitions divided by
the number of industry members
herfindahl Industry-year wise sum of squared market shares where
the top 2.5 percentile is excluded
gdp growth Year-on-year change in real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) for the UK
Notes: The table details the calculation of variables used in cross-sectional modelling and subsequent coefficient
difference testing. Average assets are calculated as the average of beginning and end of year book value of assets.
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Table A.2: Comparison of regression models
Panel A: Long term models (CAR t3 to t520)
All events Corrected events only
IM MM IM GAM MM GAM IM MM IM GAM MM GAM
rel deal value - - - - - - -* - -* - - -
pct acquired - - - - - - - -** - -** -** -**
same industry + - + - - - + + + + + +
mtb similarity - -* - - -* - -** -** -** - -** -
size similarity + - + - - - - -** - -* -** -*
q -** -*** -** -*** -*** -*** -* -*** -* -** -*** -**
roa +*** +*** +*** + +*** + +** +** +** + +** +
sales growth -* -** -* -*** -** -*** - -* - -** -* -**
leverage + + + + + + + + + + + +
ln mva -** -*** -** -*** -*** -*** - -** - -*** -** -***
asset utilisation + + + + + + +* +** +* +** +** +**
expense ratio - - - - - - - - - - - -
div on assets + + + +* + +* + + + + + +
investment -*** - -*** + - + -** -** -** -** -** -**
tangible +* +* +* + +* + +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +***
intensity -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -***
herfindahl -** -*** -** -** -*** -** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -***
gdp growth -** -* -** -* -* -* -* - -* -* - -*
Constant +** +** +** +** +** +** +** +*** +** +*** +*** +***
Panel B: Short term models (CAR t0 to t10)
All events Corrected events only
IM MM IM GAM MM GAM IM MM IM GAM MM GAM
rel deal value + + + + + + - - - - - -
pct acquired - -* - -* -* -* - - - - - -
same industry + + + + + + - - - - - -
mtb similarity + + + + + + - - - - - -
size similarity + - + + - + - -** - - -** -
q -** -*** -** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -***
roa +** +*** +** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +***
sales growth -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -***
leverage +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +** +** +** +** +** +**
ln mva -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -***
asset utilisation - - - - - - + - + + - +
expense ratio + +** + +** +** +** + + + + + +
div on assets + + + + + + - - - - - -
investment -* - -* - - - - - - - - -
tangible + + + + + + + + + + + +
intensity - - - - - - - - - - - -
herfindahl +** +* +** +* +* +* - - - - - -
gdp growth - - - - - - + + + + + +
Constant +*** +** +*** +** +** +** +** +** +** +** +** +**
Notes: This table contains a descriptive comparison of the regression model results. Panel A compares long-term
CAR models (Table 2.9) and Panel B compares short-term CAR results (Table 2.10). In each panel, the left three
columns refer to models using all events and the three rightmost columns refer to models using corrected events
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The graph shows frequencies of the percentage of the target’s equity owned after acquisition by the bidder. Possible
cut-offs for controlling acquisitions (anything over 75%) are dominated by 100% acquisitions, which is why we have
opted for this strict definition of control. The effect of acquisitions at smaller cut-offs is negligible.
Figure B.1: Histogram of percentage equity owned after successful acquisition
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The graph shows frequencies of the BYEAR variable for each unique company in the sample of Table 3.6, model 2.
The variable is used for the calculation of duration which is an important input in our models. With two spikes at
1964 and 1969, the graph emphasises the need for the inclusion of the start variable in our models, that controls for
the artificial winsorisation imposed by DataStream’s cap at 1964 in our sample.
Figure B.2: Histogram of individual companies’ BYEAR
The graph shows frequencies of the maximum duration per unique company in the sample of Table 3.6 model 2.
The spike on the maximum value gives additional support for the inclusion of the start variable in our models.
The distribution corresponds to a Weibull distribution with shape parameter < 1 (after controlling for the artificial
BYEAR winsorisation imposed by DataStream).
Figure B.3: Histogram of individual companies’ maximum age
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Table B.1: Robustness test with alternative excess r dummy
(1) (2) (3)
asset utilisation 0.002 −0.008 0.021
(0.053) (0.058) (0.059)
expense ratio 0.033 −0.060 −0.248
(0.219) (0.239) (0.219)
div on assets −0.043 −0.073 −0.020
(0.062) (0.067) (0.066)
investment 0.046 0.067 0.135
(0.133) (0.135) (0.123)
leverage 0.052 0.021 0.077
(0.071) (0.080) (0.080)
roa −0.164** −0.225** −0.079
(0.086) (0.101) (0.106)
sales growth −0.150 −0.112 −0.008
(0.209) (0.208) (0.187)
tangible 0.167 0.217 0.096
(0.108) (0.111) (0.105)
d market 0.514*** 0.573*** 0.478***
(0.138) (0.167) (0.169)














asset utilisation:d market 0.091 0.070
(0.155) (0.159)
expense ratio:d market 0.484 0.564
(0.532) (0.520)
div on assets:d market 0.480** 0.421**
(0.196) (0.198)
investment:d market −0.246 −0.228
(0.257) (0.247)
leverage:d market 0.181 0.216
(0.172) (0.175)
roa:d market 0.223 0.056
(0.200) (0.209)
sales growth:d market −0.123 −0.111
(0.290) (0.279)
tangible:d market −0.288 −0.300
(0.176) (0.178)
d market d excess r decile alt
N 20 076 20 076 19 938
Number of events 586 586 586
Number of events in d market 67 67 67
R2 0.028 0.029 0.050
Max. Possible R2 0.404 0.404 0.406
Log Likelihood -4913.040 -4905.396 -4688.011
Wald Test 449.970*** 468.580*** 1210.790***
LR Test 567.480*** 582.769*** 1016.077***
Score (Logrank) Test 664.873*** 685.743*** 1263.443***
Notes: d excess r decile alt is an alternative specification of d excess r decile of Table 3.7 and Table 3.8. In this table
the dummy is created after missing observations are dropped so that its mean across the sample is 0.10. The model
confirms the previous finding of higher takeover risk for the low excess r set with little relation to firm fundamental
variables of that set. The exception in this case is dividends, which are significant on the interaction term. Variable
definitions are in Table 3.3. The models contain interactions of investment, tangible, sales growth, mtb similarity,
intensity and herfindahl with duration in order to protect the proportional hazards assumption. *p<0.1; **p<0.05;
***p<0.01 Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C.1: Dickerson Style Modelling
(1) (2)
















div on assets:d market 7.453*** 0.193*
(2.618) (0.114)
investment:d market 1.712 0.143
(1.174) (0.111)
Standardised values No Yes
d market d q median overall d q median
N 20 494 20 494
Number of events 592 592
Number of events in d market 383 372
R2 0.039 0.028
Max. Possible R2 0.401 0.401
Log Likelihood -4846.352 -4965.398
Wald Test 790.530*** 431.080***
LR Test 821.998*** 583.908***
Score (Logrank) Test 927.226*** 674.020***
Notes: The table depicts Cox PH models with the indicated variables with full (100%) takeover as the event in the
next period. Model 1 uses unstandardised values similar to Dickerson et al. (2002) and model 2 uses industry-year
standardisation similar to Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Loderer & Waelchli (2015). Accordingly the d market dummy
in model 1 is using the bottom median for TQ for the whole sample and model 2 uses the bottom median per
industry-year group. Variable definitions are in Table 4.3. Model 1 contains interaction terms of dividends and
tangible with duration for the protection of Cox PH assumptions.
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